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ABSTRACT

Twenty-three conference papers related to the topic of women and curriculum are presented. Keynote addresses have been grouped together in the first section to provide an overview of the field of women's studies. Papers covering research about women in the sciences, social sciences, and the humanities are grouped together in Part II. The text concludes with the papers dealing with research about sex role issues in the classroom and mainstreaming techniques. Papers presented are: "Scholarship about Women: The State of the Art" (Catharine Stimpson); "Women and the Power of Education" (Florence Howe); "Scientific Objectivity and Feminist Theorizing" (Helen Longino); "Why Should More Women be Scientists?" (Alan Soble); "Sexual Dimorphisms in the Brain and Behavior: Reflections on the Concept" (Trudy Villars); "Darwin and Sexism: Victorian Causes, Contemporary Effects" (Charlotte A. Hogsett and Sue V. Rosser); "Women and the Changing Norms of Health and Disease" (Rosalind Ekman); "Women and Social Security: Social Policy Adjusts to Social Change" (Hilda Kahne); "Work Satisfaction among Women in Non-Traditional Occupations" (Judith S. McIlwee); "The Emerging Theory of Institutional Discrimination" (Marianne Triplette); "Collegiate Women and Institutional Change, 1875-1920" (Anne J. Russ); "Aztec Women in the Sixteenth Century: Kinship and Religion" (Susan Kellogg); "The Myth of Sexual Egalitarian Communities: New Harmony and Brook Farm Revisited" (Carol Kolmerton); "Elsie Dinwiddie Haunting the Minds of Millions of Women" (Mary Welek Atwell); "Male Instructors in Women's Colleges" (William Aiken); "Perceptions of Authors and Their Arguments as a Function of Sex" (Arthur R. Poskavil); "Predicting the Null in Women's Research with Black Populations" (Mary Mitchell Harris); "A Developmental Study of Sex Differences in Mathematics and Reading Avoidance" (Joan Douglas); "A Typology of Motives and Attitudes toward Women's Roles among Black and White Older Undergraduate Women at an Urban University" (Audrey Maslin); "Mainstreaming Women's Studies into Teacher Education" (Dorothy S. Russell); "Methodologies of Integration of Scholarship about Women into Sociology Courses" (Caroline M. Dillman); "Woman's Point of View in a Freshman Literature Course" (John Allen); and "Integrating Women's Studies Perspectives into the Philosophy Curriculum" (Laura M. Purdy). (LH)

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WOMEN'S STUDIES AND THE CURRICULUM

PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE ON
"SCHOLARS AND WOMEN" MARCH 13-15, 1981

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WOMEN'S STUDIES AND THE CURRICULUM

**EDITED BY
MARIANNE TRIPLETTE**

**SALEM COLLEGE
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY
WINSTON-SALEM, NORTH CAROLINA**

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Preface

Salem College, founded in 1772, is the oldest educational institution for women to continuously operate in one location in the United States. It is fitting that the institution where education for women began should make a strong commitment to the new scholarship on women. Fitting too that this commitment was reflected in institutional support of the "Scholars and Women" conference and the undertaking of this publication.

Working in this environment has been stimulating, and it was my good fortune to be a member of the Salem College faculty when an editor for this project was needed. I attended the conference on "Scholars and Women" in 1981. It was an exciting gathering of scholars representing diverse fields and perspectives. The papers have been organized to capture the mood of the conference but do not follow the order of the conference program. (The conference program can be found in the Appendix). The keynote addresses have been grouped together to provide an overview of the field of women's studies. Papers covering research about women in the sciences, social sciences, and the humanities are grouped together in Part II. The text concludes with the papers dealing with research about sex role issues in the classroom, and mainstreaming techniques.

The conference on "Scholars and Women" served as a catalyst for new research and curricular change in 1981. It is hoped that the publication of the conference proceedings in 1983 will serve the same purpose.

Marianne Triplette
Winston-Salem, North Carolina

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank the following for permission to reproduce copyright material:

Florence Howe, "Women and the Power of Education"; Alan Soble, "Why Should More Women Be Scientists?", *Metaphilosophy*, vol. 14, 1983; Helen Longino, "Scientific Objectivity and Feminist Theorizing" © 1982 Association of American Colleges, *Liberal Education*, vol. 67, no. 3 (Fall 1981): 187-195.

Thanks also go to each of the authors of the works included. Readers seeking additional information not covered in the papers, references or citations should contact the authors directly.

Appreciation is due to the presidents of the sixteen colleges comprising the "Informal Group." They first conceived the idea of a joint educational venture, and throughout they gave their support and cooperation. Particularly crucial for the realization of the conference goal was the leadership given by two of the presidents. President Alice Emerson of Wheaton College chaired the original planning conference and gave her continuing encouragement. President Alberta Arthurs of Chatham College drew up the final grant proposal for submission to the Ford Foundation and Carnegie Corporation on behalf of the "Informal Group," and also gave her support throughout.

Great appreciation is due, above all, to the Carnegie Corporation and the Ford Foundation. Their generous financial support made the conference possible. Both Mariam Chamberlain then of the Ford Foundation and Sarah Englehart of the Carnegie Corporation were strongly encouraging, and we all benefited from their presence at the conference itself.

The Planning Committee, which evolved from the first meeting, was the crucial agent for bringing the conference into being. These members included: Dr. Inzer Byers (Salem), Chairperson; Dr. Ruth Schmidt (then Provost of Wheaton College, now President of Agnes Scott College); Dean Thomas Hershberger (Chatham); Dean Frances Hoffman (Skidmore); Dean David W. Marcell (Skidmore); Dr. Patricia Bartlett (Hood); Dr. Susan Kellogg (Sweet Briar); Dean Kathryn Brisbane and Dean Addie Shopshire (Spelman); Ms. Susan Bales, Research Associate, Women's College Coalition. This committee did the crucial foundation

work in planning and took responsibility for execution of the joint project. We appreciate also the Women's College Coalition who allowed us to hold three planning meetings at their headquarters, and the staff members who proved consistently helpful.

Dr. Patricia Bartlett (Hood) offered indispensable help in making the local arrangements for the conference at the Center of Continuing Education, The University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland. We also appreciate the assistance of the staff of the Center for their part in carrying out the logistics of the conference.

As Chair of the Planning Committee, Dr. Inzer Byers would also like to express personal thanks to a number of persons at Salem who significantly aided her in carrying out her responsibilities. She wishes to acknowledge a major debt of gratitude to Richard Morrill, (then President of Salem College, now President of Centre College) for his enthusiastic and unfailing support and his wise advice as to the planning and execution of the conference and in encouraging the publication of the proceedings. Another significant debt of gratitude is owed to Dr. Clark Thompson (then Acting Dean) for his active support and enthusiasm.

Particular thanks are owed to Ms. Dorothy Canady, Ms. Leigh Jarvis and Ms. Delores Clarke of Salem College for their untiring efforts and their unfailing good humor in handling all the multiple secretarial tasks of the conference plans. Also, thanks are due to Mr. Thomas Macon, Comptroller, and to Ms. Paige French for their assistance.

Since the time of the conference, Dr. Byers has incurred further debts of gratitude to President Thomas Litzenburg and to Dean Patricia Sullivan of Salem. Their strong interest in the conference results and their advice and support have played a crucial part in making possible the publication of the proceedings.

In conclusion, we would like to thank the staff of Brookstown Universal Printing and Publishing Company, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, and all of those individuals not already named who worked to make this conference and the conference proceedings a success. Finally, and again, for their gracious responses to requests for extensions of the original grant time, to allow for publication of the proceedings, we wish to thank the Carnegie Corporation and the Ford Foundation.

Marianne Triplett
Editor "Scholars and Women"
Conference Proceedings

Inzer Byers
Chair, "Scholars and Women"
Conference Planning Committee

PROLOGUE

INZER BYERS

Salem College

*Chair, "Scholars and Women"
Conference Planning Committee*

In the past fifteen years, research about women has burgeoned in the scholarly literature of many fields. Scholars have undertaken impressive work of major significance in many disciplines including history, sociology, literature, biology, psychology and religion. Some 20,000 women's studies courses have been added to the curricula of the nation's colleges and universities. It has become clear that scholarly concern about women is a permanent aspect of the academic landscape.

The new scholarship has had its major impact on the curriculum in the area of women's studies itself, either in new departments or in grouped course offerings. However, the problem of integrating, or "mainstreaming," the new scholarship about women into courses not specifically designated as women's studies courses has remained largely unresolved. Only in the last three to five years has the integration problem begun to receive serious critical attention.

The challenge which the new scholarship about women poses for the curriculum is essentially two-fold. First, there is the range of that work and the need to make faculty aware both of the scope and high quality of the new research. Indeed, the expansion of scholarship in some disciplines has become so significant that faculty can no longer claim to be serious scholars in these fields without taking into account the new research.

The second problem is a methodological one. There is growing awareness that much of the new scholarship cannot be handled adequately within the traditional frameworks of interpretation. The new scholarship involves new perspectives, sometimes radically different ones, on traditional disciplines. The accommodation of this new research will call for major revisions in how the material of the discipline is structured and taught.

To explore the challenges which the new scholarship about women pose for the curriculum, representatives from sixteen independent colleges with a shared history of commitment to women's education gathered at College Park, Maryland in

March, 1981 for the conference on "Scholars and Women." A generous grant, jointly funded by the Carnegie Corporation and the Ford Foundation, made the three-day conference possible and has permitted the publication of the conference proceedings by Salem College.

The conference focused on two major curricular concerns. One purpose was to examine the major trends in scholarship about women during the last decade in the broad areas of the humanities, the social sciences and the natural sciences. The second aim was to investigate the need and possible methodologies for the integration of this scholarship into the liberal arts curriculum.

To explore these concerns, the conference used two strategies. To provide the broad perspective on research and methodological issues, the conference drew on the expertise of several national scholars. The views of two of these keynote speakers Catharine Stimpson and Florence Howe, are included in these proceedings. The second concern was to involve the faculty of the sixteen institutions in sharing their research about women, current explorations of sex role issues in the classroom, and strategies for integrating the new scholarship. Twenty-one of the twenty-four faculty papers presented are included here.

The conference thus centered on faculty development. The aim was to share knowledge about the new scholarship on women and to discuss strategies for bringing about the significant curricular revisions which must follow from this scholarship. A key motivating premise of the conference was the belief that women's colleges have a special obligation to be involved in women's studies scholarship and have a potentially innovative role to play in the "mainstreaming" efforts.

The sixteen colleges involved in the conference included: Agnes Scott (Ga.), Cedar Crest (Pa.), Chatham (Pa.), Goucher (Md.), Hollins (Va.), Hood (Md.), Mary Baldwin (Va.), Mills (Calif.), Randolph-Macon Woman's College (Va.), Salem (N.C.), Scripps (Calif.), Skidmore (N.Y.), Spelman (Ga.), Sweet Briar (Va.), Wells (N.Y.), and Wheaton (Mass.). One member, Skidmore, has become in recent years a coeducational institution. Though the presidents of the institutions have, for some years, been informally exploring shared concerns, and the colleges had joined in an administrative internship program for women funded by the Carnegie Corporation, the 1981 conference was the first cooperative educational venture for faculty.

From informal evaluations at the time of the conference and from subsequent reports, the conference did, in the view of the participants, meet its major objectives. Conferees came away with a sense not only of the high quality and broad scope of women's studies scholarship but also of the vital importance of bringing that scholarship into the classroom in an integral way. The conference also made clear that incorporating recent scholarship about women into the curriculum calls for substantial rethinking of conventional approaches within disciplines and in teaching.

Because of the importance of the challenge and the imperative for well-conceived and innovative responses, Salem College assumed the responsibility for the

publication of the proceedings of the conference. We appreciate the special consideration given to us in this venture by the supporting foundations.

It is our hope that the materials here, both the broad perspectives of the keynote speakers, and also the wide-ranging papers of the faculty of the participating institutions, will help stimulate the interest and involvement of others in the integration of scholarship about women into the liberal arts curriculum.

PART I

**AN OVERVIEW
OF WOMEN'S STUDIES**

Scholarship About Women: The State of the Art*

Catharine Stimpson

Rutgers University
Founding Editor of *Signs*

I always wanted to go to a women's college. I remember growing up in a small town in northwestern Washington, standing with my mother. She, of course, was ironing. None of us knew about Tillie Olsen then, but my mother was ironing. I could barely see over the ironing board, but I remember saying to her, "Mommy, when I grow up (and this is a verbatim quote), I want to go to one of those eastern women's colleges." I think I must have read about them in *Time Magazine* or *Life Magazine*. She looked at me and said, "You will, darling, you will." This I suppose, is my deep relationship to women's colleges, one of ambition and maternal nurturance. I have retained an ideal expectation of their possibilities. In the 1970's, I was one of those graduates of a women's college who would go back to say, "You must do more for the cause of women. It isn't enough to admit them and to teach them. You must take more explicit stands about the new scholarship about women and about the women's movement."

I wish to speak today about the new scholarship about women. My perspective will be that of an enthusiast. It is important for us to remember how much this enterprise has grown since 1969. Margaret Mead did go to Samoa before 1969. David Potter did write his article about the deformation of American historiography because of its indifference to women before 1969. Nevertheless, in 1969 the new scholarship about women assumes a systematic quality, intensity and scope. There is the famous statistic that in 1969 there were perhaps sixteen courses devoted to the subject of women. Today there may be at least one in every college and university, and perhaps three hundred and thirty degree granting programs. We know that in 1980 the Feminist Press, which Florence Howe helped found, celebrated its tenth anniversary with an evening of song, poetry, dance and film in Town Hall. We know, too, that in 1981 the Woodrow Wilson National Fellowship Foundation published a curriculum guide to *Women in American History* to tell

*This address was transcribed from a tape that contained several inaudible sections. The author reviewed the resulting manuscript. Transitions were clarified; conversational asides and repetitions were removed. Otherwise, roughnesses, with their flavor, were retained.

teachers of American history how to integrate women into survey courses. Since we belong to colleges and universities, we know that the final truth of growth lies in bibliographies. Let me tell you about a recent one. Natalie J. Sokoloff decided that she would do a bibliography dealing with the sociology of women and work. She was going to list only articles and books published in that field since 1970. She was going to be not compulsively inclusive, but representative. Even given these limitations, she had 74 double columned pages of tiny type.

Our enterprise does not exist in a vacuum. Women's education itself since the seventeenth century in the West has been the product of socio-economic and cultural change. First is the entrance of women of all races and all classes into the public labor force. Estimates say that by 1990 perhaps one out of every four women, but only one out of every four, will be a full-time mother. Next, despite the fact that out of 100 United States Senators only two are women, there is a greater participation of women in public politics. Third is a secularization of our culture that entails a lessening, to a degree, of the power of traditional religious definitions of masculinity and femininity. This, of course, is accompanied by fourth, a rise in a supplementary ideology praising equality and individual autonomy. Finally, in demographic terms, there is a growing acceptance of divorce and the impermanence of marital bonds; a decrease in infant mortality rate; and an increase in women's life span which means the average woman spends a far less proportion of her life bearing and raising children. We have more systematic birth control technology that means the possibility of separating sexuality from reproduction.

The consequences for us in the academic world of all these changes are a vast amount of material that we must study, grasp and codify. The new scholarship about women has been among the leaders in helping us to understand these historical shifts. It has also meant that a growing number of women have legitimately demanded their place in the formal institutions of consciousness; a number of women have not been content to let the women's colleges be the only institutions that give equality to women on the faculties; a growing number of women demand to be the academic witnesses of their own and others' experiences. If, in 1965, only 10.5 percent of all doctorates belonged to women in America, by 1979, 28.6 of all the doctorates in America did.

We also exist within a political context, which gives so many people much pause and difficulty. For the new scholarship about women has responded to the same historical forces as the women's movement itself. Women's studies and the women's movement have a complex, but often oversimplified set of relations. To oversimplify, it is no accident that in 1966 Betty Friedan sat down in a hotel room in Washington with a few friends and started the National Organization for Women and Juliet Mitchell published the profoundly influential article "Women, the Longest Revolution". There are at least three relationships now. For some, scholarship is inseparable from political action. The task of scholarship is to clarify a political task. Many people say "Just because I study women doesn't

mean I'm a women's libber," but others say "Because I study women I *am* a feminist and because I am a feminist I *do* study women." Joan Kelly, the distinguished historian, has written: "Ours may be a historical moment, not only to see how the patriarchal system works, but also to act with that vision so as to put an end to it." A second set of relationships sees the women's movement as a source of the questions people ask, a generator of problems to be solved. Nancy Chodoren, the California sociologist, the author of *The Reproduction of Mothering* said she got the idea to study mother-daughter bonds from her feminist study group, talking about what it meant to be daughters who had had mothers. We see economists studying the mechanisms of occupational segregations, so that they might help to put an end to it. We see biochemists studying reproduction, trying to find birth control technology that might not be quite so difficult for women. Those scholars who take problems that have been articulated by a social movement belong to that grand and pragmatic strain of American scholarship that has been with us since the nineteenth century. They are no different than agronomists in Iowa who struggled to develop more fertile strains of rice in order to nurture the "green revolution" in a starving world. There is a third relationship as well. A set of people deny any direct connection between the women's movement and the study of women. They say the study of women is an academic enterprise, and people can do it whether they think Nancy Reagan, Phyllis Schlafly, or Gloria Steinem is a heroine.

Despite accusations to the contrary, more people doing the new scholarship about women *do* pay attention to the unexpected finding. We *do* pay attention to the rules of logic and evidence. We *do* pay attention to primary and secondary sources. There is a fear that the new scholarship about women is a Trojan mare, shod in footnotes, that will sneak by us into the academy. If we let it in, all those dreadful women's libbers will jump out and turn us into castrated men and hard-nosed women. The first year that we were editing *Signs* we were conscious of the accusation that the new scholarship about women was necessarily tainted by partiality, subjectivity, and political bias. We were determined to put that accusation to rest, to prove our innocence. At the end of the first year of publication, I got a phone call from the University of Chicago Press. I picked up the phone. They said "Guess what happened?" I, narcissistic fantasies aflame, said "What?", wondering if we had just gotten an award or if our subscriptions had just set a record. They said, "Congratulations! You have published more square inches of footnotes than any other University of Chicago Press journal ever has."

The third context in which the new scholarship about women exists is intellectual. For it shares certain features of contemporary consciousness itself. That is, it is restless rather than contemplative, relativistic rather than absolute, skeptical of tradition rather than submissive to it. Paradoxically, the poet of the new scholarship about women might be Wallace Stevens in "The Poems of Our Climate" who talked of the never-resting mind. The theoreticians of the new scholarship about women would include Thomas Kuhn in *The Structure of*

Scientific Revolutions and Peter Berger and Thomas Luckman in *The Social Construction of Reality*, who remind us that we shape our world even as we attempt to know it.

I have been speaking about the new scholarship about women as if it were unified and monolithic. To a degree, it is. It has shared three consistent ambitions. The first is the deconstruction of errors about women. The re-doing of our curriculum of mistakes about women—including that notion that women's personality is the indelibly unhappy consequence of their lack of a central organ. The second ambition is the addition of knowledge; of facts; of suffrage movements to civil rights and history courses; of women authors other than George Eliot to courses in the novel. Gerda Lerner calls this compensatory knowledge. The third task, perhaps the most ambitious, is the large-scale construction of theory. For example, historians asked what happens if we deconstruct errors about women and add knowledge about women to our notion of progress and our names for historical periods? If we add women to the historical record, we will see that periods that have been called pinnacles of progress such as Classical Greece or early Renaissance Italy, were not periods of progress for women, but really valleys with increasingly steep slopes.

Deconstruction, addition, and reconstruction carry with them one assumption: we have to realize that our ways of knowing ourselves are genderized and many men, despite their PhD's are unable to be objective about women. deBeauvoir's *The Second Sex*, published in 1949 in France and in 1953 in America, first in a large scale way suggested that for one reason or another, when men looked at women they saw a picture that was the combination of projection, distortion, and the discharge of desire. I take a metaphor for this from nineteenth century English history, and a middle-class gentleman named A.J. Munby. Like many nineteenth century middle-class gentlemen, he was infatuated with a new toy, the camera. Munby not only had a camera; he had a mistress, a woman who later became his wife. Her name is Hannah Cullwide, and she was not middle but working-class. She did not sew a dainty seam. She scrubbed floors. Munby looked at Hannah and took pictures of her. He took some pictures of Hannah with the scrub brush and pail, for he had enormous hands and a sturdy body. But he also dressed her up. He put her in a grotesque black face and took pictures of her as a slave. He put her in polite crinolines and took pictures of her as a lady. He put a bizarre Sunday School halo and wings on her and took pictures of her as an angel. When he took that off, he put her in a frock coat and ascot and took pictures of her as an English gentleman. I would suggest that many men in academic life and elsewhere have done to women what Munby did to Hannah: sometimes to see her clearly, but, more often, to costume her according to his fantasy.

Of all the academic disciplines, probably anthropology first told us that many men, for structural reasons, could not be objective about women. This had, in part, to do with the presence of women in anthropology, who exemplified what we call the empty field theory. That is, we go into fields when nobody else is there.

Male anthropologists also went into the field. They often were not admitted to the women's quarters, or found that women would not talk to them because they were men. So male anthropologists would come back and say there is something about my sex and the construction of my sex *alone* that has made it impossible for me to have accurate reports. If we study women, we do not confine ourselves to the one sex. If you study women, you do study fifty percent of the population. That means if you make a mistake about women it is huge. To make a mistake about women is not like making a mistake about toothpicks. A whole sense of reality does not get skewed if one makes a mistake about toothpicks, unless one happens to have a toothpick fetish. The study of women systematically leads to other large areas of human life. We will understand the family, and what the anthropologist Gail Rubin has called our sex-gender systems. We will understand the way in which we, as a race, have structured our dimorphism.

However, the new scholarship about women is not simple, not monolithic. It also has had in the last twelve years an intellectual development, an intellectual process. I would like to trace that intellectual process and the four overriding ideas that I think have helped control and shape our inquiry. It is not as if there were idea one, and it had two years, and it dropped dead, and then came idea two, and it had a life of two years and it dropped dead, and then came idea three. Ideas do not work that way. Rather, I think of it as a geographic sprawl with idea one overlaid by idea two and then a third development and then a fourth.

First, largely in response to deBeauvoir and to the women's movement, there was an enormous amount of attention that was paid to women's suffrage, to sexual discrimination, to female equality, invisibility, to the woman as other. It was this controlling idea that helped implicitly to produce such studies as the math anxiety studies, the underlying notion of which was that because we have treated women as second class intellectual citizens, we have made them anxious about the study of mathematics. There is a quarrel about the universal subordination of women. One idea said that women at all times and in all places have been subordinate, echoed by such influential anthropologists as Sherry B. Ortner. Another group, led by such anthropologists as Constance Sutton said women have not been universally subordinate. We can find cultures in which there has been egalitarianism. The quarrel was not about the fact of subordination, but rather about the universality of subordination. If you were teaching about the new scholarship about women in 1969 or 1970, you would end up with a very funny classroom. Female students would burst into depressed tears and say "If we've always been subordinated, what the heck am I supposed to do? I'm only an undergraduate," while male students would shuffle their feet guiltily.

This idea was then overlaid with another, a way of picturing the world. It said, look at the world as two inter-related, interdependent, intersected, but still separate spheres. The members of one world can cross into the other under certain circumstances, but still, despite such recognition of interdependence and overlapping, construe the world as two spheres. The first is the sphere of the male, the

world of production, public activity, culture and formal speech. It is the domain of power. And because it was this sphere that decided what history books are composed of, it has forged our collective memory with all its repressions and omissions. In familial terms, in fact and as metaphor, it is the realm of the father and son. Perhaps inevitably ambitious Americans produced many studies of the performance, the competence and the success of women who crossed into the world of men in terms of work.

The second world was not the male, but female; the world, not of production, but of reproduction; the world, not of culture but of private and domestic activity, of nature and the natural; the domain not of power but of love. The codification of history has no collective memory of it except in family histories and old wives' tales. It was the realm, not of the father, but of the mother; not of income, but of outgo, the realm of spending and consumption. However, in this realm of the mother, not all mothers were good (i.e. Marys). There were bad mothers as well (i.e. Eves). The realm of the mother bifurcated along moral lines somewhat taken from the Judeo-Christian tradition.

A good deal of work has gone into brilliant mappings of the female world. At first the mapping of the female world provoked anxiety about lesbianism, the same anxiety about lesbianism that has haunted the history of all the women's colleges. That anxiety, though present, has diminished. Indeed there are theoreticians, such as the historian Blanche W. Cook, who are mapping causal relations between women who lived intimately with other women and modern creativity, production and self-esteem. She is focusing on people like Jane Addams and the women in the Settlement House movement. This study of the female world has energetically exploded in discipline after discipline. From these studies has, for example, arisen an examination of the women's movement or the great debate about housework, its function, its value, and its alteration. In 1980, it is fashionable to study the attitude of men toward housework. The studies I have seen about how men feel about housework are coming out of the advertising agencies, not out of the academy, but they contain wonderful facts. Seventy-five percent of men assume that their wives who work outside the home will do the cooking. Seventy-eight percent of the men assume such wives will clean the bathroom. But eighty-five percent of the men with working wives feel guilty about those findings. Whether guilt leads to action is a question that haunts not only Christianity, but the new scholarship on women.

The study of the female world means the study of women's activity everyday, of the ordinary not the extraordinary. This has helped, again implicitly rather than explicitly, to shift the notion of heroism. The hero is no longer the doer of great deeds, but the women who have endured. It has meant studying the common gesture. This study is parallel to the new social history. The new social history and women's history exist in a wonderful dynamic relationship. What helps to distinguish this women's history from the new social history is the attitude of women and about themselves. People assume that women have been vulnerable

and have been used. In rape studies, for example, the victim is no longer seen as a deviant villain who has set the man up, or some poor repressed creature who was longing for sexual gratification in a somewhat unpleasant way, or a fantasist. The rape victim is seen as a genuine victim of brutality, of a power drive disguised as sexuality.

The study of the female world and its interdependence with the male world has had several effects. First, politics has become not simply the matter of public affairs but of domestic relations. Next, we are asking about origins. If the sexes are not equal, when did this begin—in the formation of private property, in the formation of modern industrial society, in the formation of the state? Some questions deal not with origins but with continuities. What are our mechanisms of systemic reproduction: biological, psycho-sexual and socio-economic.

As we study women, our picture of them significantly changes. As we mature, we still see things austerely. We know that Mary Baldwin does not have the endowment of Harvard. We know that even Wellesley does not have the endowment of Harvard. We know that women are still subject to rape, wife abuse, sexual harassment and economic hardship. We are living in a western industrial democratic society in which women consistently get 59 cents for every dollar in comparative salary with men in the workforce. Still, our picture of women has shifted. They seem to be strong and active as well as mute and passive, creatures capable of resistance, protest, and shrewd adaptation. The women we are studying are less the existential weaklings, or the servants of socialization, than they were in 1969. Black women are particular models of strength, under the most terrible conditions.

The more women of all kinds have their own institutions that they control, at least a little bit, the better off they seem to be. The more they have their own colleges, convents, training associations, and thoughts, the more apt they are to have competence and power and self-respect. I think we all guessed that in that terrible period from 1960 to 1970 when we all went to the wall to keep the women's colleges going. We knew in our bones that if we let all the women's colleges go under, we would lose formal institutions and violate an emerging historical fact, the active causal relationship between women's institutions, responsibility and intellectual development.

This paradigm of the intersecting female and male worlds is still powerful. But as more and more people have practiced the new scholarship about women, we have a third idea, a suspicion of the paradigm. This suspicion comes from two sources: 1) a group that believes that seeing the world in terms of two spheres is an unconscious perpetuation of binary systems of thought; 2) groups of women who say that this paradigm does not account for the reality of their lives. We see strong international scholars who say that this paradigm, a male and a female world, cannot possibly explain the world, for it does not take into account the influence of the American world of which both men and women are citizens. In America are those women who say this paradigm does not work for us, Black women have said

this, for example. The California anthropologist Diane K. Lewis said that you cannot explain the lives of Black women by a paradigm of a powerful, public male world and a domestic, powerless female world. For the Black woman in America has had to exist in a situation where Black men themselves have had no public life. This suspicion has created a good number of wholesome and intellectually helpful empirical studies about what it is like to be a woman in a particular kind of place.

The final development has to do, not with the investigation of differences among women, but about sexual differences itself. Perhaps there will always be a cultural pattern of sexual differences. But the new scholarship about women in America and elsewhere has had what I call a "minimalist" theory of sexual differentiation, present in all academic disciplines. The minimalist theory has said of course there are biological differences between men and women. I am not like my father. I am not like my brother. I do not have whiskers, and my reproductive capacity is different. However, the minimalist theory says that differences in behavior, power and family activities are made by culture, history, and economics. The phrases minimalists use are: "The relation between the sexes is a social one," "Nurture means more than nature," "Gender controls sex not sex gender." The important factor brought out here is that history is the creator of action. We have written the text of our own lives, and if we choose to do so, we can erase some pictures and rewrite others.

In the last years, from three different sources, there has been a revival in what I choose to call "maximal" theory. Let me make one thing very clear. The three sources I am about to name are feminists, that is, they believe in sexual equality. They believe that sexual differences should not be the basis for social policy; they believe one can have sexual difference and equity. Nevertheless, they are interested in re-establishing some transhistorical differences between men and women that lie in our bodies, in psyches, our use of language.

One source is American social science, led by that formidable sociologist Alice Rossi. In the Spring, 1977 *Daedalus*, she published an article that said there are physiological and evolutionary patterns that mean that women rear children as well as bear them. Rossi said she was a bio-sociologist, attempting to restore the body as one law-giver in our social system. If we are going to have equal parenting, then men are going to have "compensatory education." In household after household, where there was a valiant effort to have fifty percent sharing of the diapers and the bottle, men would sigh with very guilty relief and say "Sorry, Darling, I'm not as good as you, and it's not my fault."

A second source outside the academy of American social science is cultural feminism. It has a vision of a happy separate female world in which women hold in common their biology and sense of nurturance. A third source is contemporary French feminist theory. It attempts to reconstitute female. In the last two years it has become more and more influential in the American academy. If much less empirical than American social science, it is interesting that the revival of interest among the new scholarship about women should be working in this direction,

when, simultaneously, outside the academy there are such bitter arguments about women's rights: about ERA, abortion and homosexual rights.

There is resistance to the scholarship about women. However, I would hope that there would be no external quarrel with its validity and vitality. I can do nothing but encourage the women's colleges, with their traditional interests in women, to incorporate the new scholarship which is telling us about women themselves.

Women and the Power of Education*

FLORENCE HOWE

The Feminist Press

When I say that education has "power," I am not thinking only of the jobs it is a route to, or the status it may (or may not) confer. Rather, I am interested in education's power to enable, to empower people with the political vision to see through and around status and money. Most important today, because we live in a world in which the slogan "knowledge is power" is becoming a reality, the education that empowers allows us to challenge the sources and priorities of knowledge, the choice of research subjects, methodologies, even, of course, perspectives.

I am going to begin with a passage from Frederick Douglass' *Narrative*, a passage haunting for teachers. The passage opens with Douglass' master telling his wife that "it was unlawful, as well as unsafe, to teach a slave to read." Douglass had overheard this conversation and repeats some of it for the reader:

"Now," said he, "if you teach that nigger . . . how to read, there would be no keeping him. It would forever unfit him to be a slave. He would at once become unmanageable, and of no value to his master. As to himself, it could do him no good, but a great deal of harm. It would make him discontented and unhappy."

Douglass was but eight years old, and, as he recalls the event more than forty years later, he writes,

These words sank deep into my heart, stirred up sentiments within that lay slumbering, and called into existence an entirely new train of thought. It was a new and special revelation, explaining dark and mysterious things, with which my youthful understanding had struggled, but struggled in vain. I now understood what had been to me a most

*The copyright of this material is held by Florence Howe and is printed here with her permission. The essay was completed, except for a final paragraph, the day before the national elections in 1980. It was read in French Lick, Indiana, the day after the elections. In the spring of 1981 it appeared in the *Bulletin* of the American Association for Higher Education. It was read as a lecture in January, 1981, at the University of South Florida and at the Claremont Colleges in California. In March, 1981, it was presented at the Conference on "Scholars and Women" in College Park, Maryland.

perplexing difficulty—to wit, the white man's power to enslave the black man. It was a grand achievement, and I prized it highly. From that moment, I understood the pathway from slavery to freedom.

The pathway was, of course, education, the first step literacy. But Douglass doesn't leave us there; he has more to say to us as people thoughtful about the power of education. He continues to analyze how he learned this special lesson—he is describing the master's views, and his own:

What he most dreaded, that I most desired. What he most loved, that I most hated. That which to him was a great evil, to be carefully shunned, was to me a great good, to be diligently sought; and the argument which he so warmly urged, against my learning to read, only served to inspire me with a desire and determination to learn. In learning to read, I owe almost as much to the bitter opposition of my master as to the kindly aid of my mistress. I acknowledge the benefit of both.

Douglass' ideas about learning as "revelation," his acknowledgement that "learning to read" was fostered both by political opposition and by what we would call "teaching"—these are emblems of my talk. Once Douglass could comprehend his social position, education became a power with which to change it.

Educators often say that the public expects too much from education. I too have said that "schools reflect the society they serve," meaning that one should not expect too much from them. We have all heard people say that the family has to change first, or the society as a whole, before schools and colleges can change. At best, such statements are half-truths. Those of us who have taught Women's Studies through the seventies have grown accustomed to hearing from students that such courses have "changed their lives." A law like Title IX, moreover, assumes that schools and colleges should make independent, even vanguard contributions to the well-being of future or actual citizens by treating girls and women as equals to boys and men. It is irrelevant to Title IX that the family and the society in general have not yet gotten round to such treatment, let alone accepted beliefs about the equality of women and men. In the instance of Title IX, education has been directed to act as an agent of reform for a society that has only recently, and partly, begun to consider such reform essential. It may be that one reason we have Title IX and that we don't have the Equal Rights Amendment is that many people do not understand educational change as a powerful instrument of social change.

I do, and perhaps you do. Or, if you don't, then perhaps we can begin a dialogue about the question. And now for some autobiography before I return directly to the question of the power I believe educational institutions possess.

* * * *

From as far back as I can remember, I modeled my life on the teacher in the classroom: first, the elementary school teacher, then the high school biology teacher, and then the college professor of English. I was unswervingly school-centered, classroom-centered. It's no mystery to explain why: that's where women

were, and to my immigrant family, school-teaching was a woman's route out of poverty, and into middle-class American society. I had learned one significant lesson of my childhood exceedingly well. Girls and boys were different, my mother had explained on countless occasions: boys could throw their clothes on the floor and leave their beds unmade; girls were supposed to pick up their own clothes and those of their brothers, and they were supposed to make all the beds. That's the way it was, she'd continue. Hadn't I seen what she did—didn't she pick up Daddy's clothes?

And as if that instruction were not enough, there was the orthodox synagogue, where, though I was more learned at nine than boys my age, I had to sit upstairs with old women behind a curtain. My mother, who had not been instructed in Hebrew or Yiddish, had too much work at home to go to synagogue, and so I went with my grandmother, who could not read or write in any language. She sat there because she was the wife of a rabbi and had always sat upstairs with the other women. Sitting with my grandmother was not a religious experience. I remember slipping out, running down the narrow dark stairs into the bright sunlight to toss hazel nuts with other children in a formal holiday game along the synagogue wall.

My first religious experience was reading Wordsworth's "Tintern Abbey" and "Intimations of Immortality" in a Freshman English class, and the religious instructor, a woman, was my English professor. I have only begun to understand what it was that Wordsworth touched in the sixteen year-old girl, totally without consciousness of class, race, gender, or even national origin or religion. Pride of national origin was not part of my family's gift to me, nor was Jewishness a gift as such, since it was mixed with the hatred of non-Jews, and since it was confused with the question of gender. That is, boys who were Jewish had to study to be Jews, and they could participate; Jewish girls whose grandfathers died when they were ten, as mine did, were then free to forget being Jewish. And even before age ten, I was a Jew only when my Zaida was teaching me—10 hours a week.

But Wordsworth, here was someone who understood what it was to feel free or confined; what it was to have to do what you didn't want to. Also, here was someone who loved what this city kid did—the beach and the ocean, flowers and the countryside. Here was someone for whom a tree was important, and yet who cared deeply about people who were burdened, confined, closed in.

Somewhere in my college years at Hunter, I studied sociology with a Black woman named Mary Diggs, the first Black teacher I had known. From her I learned about racism, though I don't think that precise word was ever used in her classroom. But she gave us a little pamphlet called "The Races of Mankind," from which I can date my second religious experience, the experience of knowledge, of knowing that I had science on my side in debates with my parents about new friends I had made at college who were neither Jewish nor white.

I do not want to make too much of these youthful experiences, my feeling that the division of labor between my brother and me was "unfair," that the religious and race-bound views of my family were "unfair," that, as a female, I was not really per-

of the Jewishness of the household. I do not even want to make too much of the power of my college education to change some of those feelings, and to give me quite a different perspective on race than my family had provided. But I will note that I entered college aiming to become a high school biology teacher; I left bound for graduate school and a profession in academe. My parents' feelings were at best mixed. Of course they were proud of me, but as my uneducated father said prophetically, I was giving up the opportunity for what he called a "normal life."

In the years between 1950 and 1964, I worked hard to become that member of academe and I tried twice to find that "normal life." I had no analysis of my professional success and my personal failure except to blame myself.

In 1964, I wrote my first essay on educational change, "Mississippi's Freedom Schools: The Politics of Education." It opened with the sentence, "All education is political." I didn't know it then, for I hadn't read Douglass, but it was another way of saying what he had. I wrote that sentence and that essay to explain to friends and colleagues in Maryland—and to myself—why I felt suddenly "changed," why I longed to be back in Mississippi where I had spent part of that long, hot summer of 1964. Part of a summer in Mississippi, teaching black students in the basement of a church: and it had "changed my life." What were the ingredients of change?

First, the palpable experience of skin color. My skin color had not changed, but I had volunteered myself, and had been accepted into, the black community in Jackson. Such an act made me vulnerable to a share of the savagery of official and unofficial racism. I not only felt the hatred of the white community; I was a target of its attempts to do bodily harm to civil rights workers, white or black. More important, I had the opportunity, living inside the black community, to feel the self-esteem and the spirit with which that community had survived. In the freedom school classroom, I had further opportunities to see the effect of such spirit and energy on young people ready for education. In short, there was no room for cynicism, defeatism, or whatever sense of doom often afflicts intellectuals. In this brief glowing hour, I became part of a church of freedom. I felt the power of people who, while they would give their lives to the struggle, understood that a different process was needed. It was no accident that at the center of that summer was the freedom school that included not only a new curriculum but a new pedagogy.

The second ingredient of change for me was that new curriculum and pedagogy, a coherent educational program for those coming south to work in the freedom schools. Seven hundred came south, mainly college students. I was one of the "older" ones. At 35, I had been a teacher for thirteen years. Wherever I taught, I had been praised for classroom performance. I was colorful in the classroom: I walked around the room while I lectured in an entertaining fashion. I was good about answering questions, but I had no idea how to ask them, or that they were of any importance. After all, I had not been a question-asker in my days as a student; I had been a listener and a careful note-taker. That was what I expected of my students. As for curriculum, I taught what I had been taught, in the manner of all college teachers. No rebel I: when I had a choice, I chose those I had learned were the best,

Shakespeare, Milton, Swift, Wordsworth, Shaw, Yeats, Eliot—these were my favorites. Virginia Woolf, whom I had not studied, became material for my dissertation in the early sixties, but not for my classroom.

As a teacher in Mississippi, I went to school. The first lesson I learned was that, seated in the circle prescribed by the freedom school pedagogy, I was effectively silenced. Apparently, I could lecture only when standing or walking. I learned something else as well: that students might know something valuable that teachers did not; and that such knowledge shared in a classroom might spark a discussion, might provide one of those magical moments in which learning is "revelation," the kind of learning Douglass experienced, the kind that sticks to the marrow of minds.

The freedom school curriculum was, of course, as nontraditional as the pedagogy. It began with plumbing—descriptions of bathrooms in the black community and in the white community. Obviously, as teacher, I was the least informed person in the circle. But I had been provided with a mimeographed sheet of statistics about indoor and outdoor plumbing in the state of Mississippi, and in other states in the nation, and with regard to race, so that once experiences had been shared and compared for patterns, I could take that pattern and try it against what we call the information of social science. You may be familiar with this procedure if you teach Women's Studies or other courses experientially: you begin with the experiences of your students (or, if the class is too large, or the subject too intimate, with the experience of a character in a fiction or an autobiography); you share experiences; then you leaven them with information, facts, data, what social science knows and does not know; and you proceed to analysis, the hard questions. Why were most black Mississippians without indoor plumbing? How could that be changed? What did voting have to do with change? What were the advantages and disadvantages of seeking indoor plumbing in New York City, rather than in Jackson, Mississippi—if you were a Black youngster thinking about the future?

I spent the rest of the sixties trying to apply my Mississippi experience to my teaching at a woman's college. I followed my hunch and began to experiment with the writing classroom, and because my students were white and female, I followed another hunch, and began to insist that they consider the question I had avoided for more than thirty years—gender. They and I learned a great deal during the next five years, so that when the women's movement touched the campus in 1969, I was ready.

My conversion to feminism, despite all I have said of my early sense that life was "unfair" to girls, was slow and late in coming. I fought against it for reasons similar to those of nineteenth century women and men who saw women's rights as a divisive issue in a time critical for the freeing of slaves. I saw the women's movement in the sixties as dividing attention from the civil rights and antiwar movements. Wait, I urged: one thing at a time. First racism and war—then women. Without a knowledge of history, one could only repeat it.

What changed all that? A process, the elements of which by now should be clear: the personal experience, important but by itself insufficient; the sharing of that

experience, and the intellectual analysis, the knowledge that helps make sense of the experience—deep and lasting sense, revelation. The experiences were different from the shock of Mississippi; they were brief pepperings over many years, not one great explosion in a summer. These are samples of shot, some personal, some public.

First, an election to a high office in an organization I once cared about, and, as token woman, had helped to build. The other women running for the seven slots allotted to women were all ten years younger and innocent of the organization. When the votes were counted, I was the only experienced "founder" of the group not elected. The seven men elected were all my age; the seven women all younger; and I was out. This particularly virulent brand of sexism had been perpetrated by women and men together.

Second and third, more personal experiences. I decided that I would not be responsible for my husband's laundry, not even for the sheets and towels that had gone with his laundry. For more than a year I fought my own backward consciousness in this effort not to think about laundry. (I also bought more sheets and towels that year than I had ever owned.) In 1970, Paul Lauter and I published a book called *The Conspiracy of the Young* that we had been researching and writing since 1967. For reasons I still don't understand, the publishers did not put our names in alphabetical order on the jacket: his name went first—Lauter and Howe, not Howe and Lauter. And in those days I was innocent about publishing. Even our friends, however, assumed that it was really Paul's book, that I had smoothed the language, that I was the stylish writer, and of course that I had typed the manuscript. And so it was Paul who got invited to talk at M.I.T., for example, about the book's themes.

Such experiences would not have been the "awakenings" they were, except that they were preceded and accompanied by years of reading and conversation in classrooms and in other groups. Since 1964, I had been trying to teach my writing class about the connection between "identity and expression." With those students, some 15 a quarter three times a year ultimately for six years, I read or reread *A Room of One's Own* and *The Second Sex*, Mill, Wollstonecraft, Ibsen, Doris Lessing, Mary McCarthy, Anne Moody, Kate Chopin, Lillian Hellman, Maya Angelou, and others.

My political commitment to feminism finally emerged from an academic assignment. In 1969, I was asked to become the first Chairperson of the Modern Language Association's Commission on the Status of Women, and to attend a meeting of the MLA's Executive Council. The room was filled with men, and at first I did not see the middle-aged woman in the middle of one long row of tall male-filled chairs. In a corner against the wall, then, I noticed two secretaries taking notes, though there were spaces around the long table they might have filled.

During my report, one man interrupted me several times, wanting to add his own statistics. He was eager, he said, to make sure I didn't overlook the "good news," in what he assumed was my effort to demonstrate the pattern of discrimination against women in the profession. I tried to assure him that I was not interested in

hiding any information, that I was delighted to report, for example, that women Ph.D.'s in English and the modern languages had been about a third of the total since early in the century. On the other hand, I added, though graduate schools had not discriminated against these women as students, what had become of them afterwards? "Aha," he said, "That's what I was getting at. You haven't said anything about the two-year colleges." And indeed I had not, in part out of inexperience, in part out of some latent element of politeness, for there was not a person in the room out of any but the most elite institutions in the country. But the young man was persistent, and finally, I said, "All right, present your 'good news,'" knowing what he would say. His good news was that though women were statistically insignificant at elite institutions in departments of English and modern languages, and though they were approximately 22 percent of the faculty in such departments of ordinary four-year institutions, they were 44 percent of the faculty in such departments at two-year colleges. That was true, I said; and many of these women teaching in community colleges held Ph.D.'s similar to those of the men in this room—from Yale, Indiana, Northwestern, Harvard, and the Hopkins. Why were these women teaching at community colleges and their male peers at Yale, Indiana, Northwestern, Harvard, and the Hopkins: How had that "happened"?

That was the first of a series of critical experiences in which the personal was combined with what Carolyn Elliott has called the "galvanizing statistic." In the late sixties and early seventies, academic women in all the disciplines embraced numbers. We talked privately about the need—this was our expression "to do our homework"—before going into a meeting of male administrators either in professional associations or on campuses. I spent 1969 and the first two years of this last decade immersed in sociology and other social sciences, so that I could become expert at numbers and so that I could deepen my social and political analysis of what we had come to call patriarchy. Counting was our most important activity in those years. We counted the women at each rank in each institution and profession; we counted undergraduate majors and graduate and professional school admissions and attrition rates; we counted the pictures of women in first grade readers; we counted the numbers of women authors in college literary anthologies. We also noted absences: no women artists in art history texts (though endless nude female bodies were present of course); no women in history except an occasional wife or object of laughter; no black women or other female members of minority groups at all in history books or art history books, or almost any books given to school and college students. And we invented Women's Studies to begin to turn around the portrait of women in academe and in all schools and other educational institutions.

We were accused, of course, of being a fad and a fashion, of being "thin" or "narrow," of being "too broad and general," of being too "specialized," of being a distraction from the human and the humanist. And we were accused of being "political," the worst charge of all in academe.

Of course we were and are political, as were the schools and colleges we wanted to change. Patriarchy is political, we said, and a patriarchal institution does not serve

women as it serves men.

This has been more than an ordinary decade of change, following the truly extraordinary sixties. I believe that the seventies will be seen as the decade that shifted not simply the status of women, but the lens through which we perceive that status. This has been an experience for women of all races and classes and sexual preference comparable to Douglass's experience of blackness in his youth. For the first time we could see not only what there was to learn, but *the opposition to that learning*. That opposition has not disappeared or diminished. In certain areas of the society, in general and in academe, it has stiffened. Even before the national elections, we had already felt the backlash against women of all races and against men who are members of minority groups. We are aware that those efforts of the sixties and the seventies to broaden the formerly narrow western, white, male, elite curriculum—the history of laws and wars and the men who made and fought them, the Horatio Algiers and the Napoleons—have more than cracked the mirror. The traditional curriculum has been splintered so mightily that some of its advocates have already reinvented “general education” to shore up the fragments. And in many instances, the white male elite curriculum has been restored only with the addition of patriarchal Asian religions to its generally Western patriarchal orientation.

What are the major tasks that lie ahead, and how can we use what we know of the power of educational change to get on with them? Knowing all the time that that power is dual: it is the power to teach effectively in the classroom; it is also the power to reveal and be jogged by the political reality of the opposition. The opposition, indeed, may help us more than they would wish.

I am going to single out one of these tasks, the most important one and the most difficult, and the one most central to a society and world depending more and more on knowledge. That is, the task of instruction: of the curriculum and the pedagogy. In 1980, we have approximately 350 Women's Studies Programs and on such elite campuses as Yale, Harvard, M.I.T., and Princeton, new ones in formation. Large programs offer on their own and many shared departmental budgets as many as 100 courses a year. Smaller programs, at least twenty-five courses, sometimes from as many disciplines or departments. Perhaps another 600 or 700 institutions offer as many women's studies courses, but without the possibilities for undergraduates of integrating these into what we call a “minor” or a “major” or a “certificate program.” While no one has counted courses since 1973, when that statistic was in the area of 5,000, today an estimate has to exceed 20,000. Indeed, 20,000 becomes the most conservative estimate one can come up with in 1980. While I do not want to burden or bore you with numbers, it is important to gauge the size of this movement if we are to consider its potential use in the eighties.

I see the tasks as broadening that curriculum to match the broadening population of students entering higher education: I am thinking of the multi-racial, multi-ethnic, multi-religious, and multi-class society we live in; I am thinking of older students as well as those entering directly from high school; and I am thinking of

women as well as men. All of those people at the end of the twentieth century need to understand not the melting pot but the specific cultural traditions out of which this multicultural society has been woven. It is not that other groups in academe could not become the chief reformers of the curriculum; it is that they have not. It has taken the combined efforts of Black Studies and other ethnic studies programs and Women's Studies to attempt a curriculum that contains the complexities and realities of history and the present, from perspectives that are outside the "mainstream's" and with the additional assumption that change is possible.

From the first, there were two conscious goals in Women's Studies: to develop a body of scholarship and a new curriculum about women and the issue of gender; second, to use this knowledge to transform the "mainstream" curriculum, turning it into what it has never been, a "coeducational" one. Mainly, until now, we have worked at the first goal. We have tended our own gardens, we have fought for our own tiny budgets, have written grant proposals for two dozen research institutes in women's studies that have the new decade before them. Both in curricular design and in research development, women's studies is on the edge of significant new breakthroughs: in women's history and in the ways in which we will begin to teach women's history with and without men's history; in economic theory and in the understanding of women's role in the economies of capitalist, socialist, industrial, and developing countries; in theories of women's moral and intellectual development; in sex differences and in the socialization of boys and girls—I am thinking here of the longitudinal study at Stanford now in its seventh year; in the restoration of women writers and artists and other intellectuals that will see their works back into print or on the walls of museums and accompanying re-evaluations of their achievement. And this is a very small sampling of important work that needs support. Women's Studies is the other half of that intellectual ferment that began in academe about a century ago when the professional associations and the graduate schools first thought to amass what we now call "scholarship." The scholarship of patriarchy will remain in question until it is corrected by this new surge of research. And we must not rush the reports we need; we must not slight the importance of findings about humans, who are of two genders, several sexual preferences, and many races and ethnicities and social classes.

Whether or not you are in women's studies, its scholarship will affect your discipline. That is one vision of the eighties.

The second vision of the eighties is of transforming that so-called "mainstream," the male-centered curriculum. The process has already begun, and in a form not unlike the development of Women's Studies itself. I am thinking, for example, of a six-week NEH Summer Institute held in 1979 on the campus of the University of Alabama, in which twenty-five faculty members studied nontraditional women's literature, not with the aim of producing a women's studies course *per se*, but a course to be added to the curriculum of traditional English departments. The course in Women's Autobiography and Journal-Writing might also be cross-listed in women's studies, if there were such a program on that particular campus, but the

MLA-effort followed years of a FIPSE-funded project aimed at integrating courses on women writers into an English curriculum that is still, of course, male-centered.

On a variety of campuses, like Montana State University's most recently, rather ambitious efforts are underway to add single new courses on women or the issue of gender to the curriculum of as many as forty different departments, some in graduate and professional schools. Again, I think these efforts are important, and I am hopeful that the process of education arranged for each faculty member will be the enabling kind: that it will include enough of the politics of educational change to change that faculty member.

Beyond the efforts to "mainstream" by adding on new courses to departmental offerings, there is *transformation*, that ultimate vision of reforming the curriculum with which women's studies began more than a decade ago. Courses on "Women in Colonial America" and "Colonial American History" would both disappear into a "transformed" "Women and Men in Colonial America." In small, individual ways, that process has already begun by faculty who, for example, teach in addition to a course called "Women Writers," one called "American Fiction of the Twenties and Thirties" that includes not only the traditional Hemingway and Fitzgerald's, but Richard Wright, Zora Neale Hurston, Agnes Smedley, Tillie Olsen, and Meridel Le Seuer, among others.

There is also the effort of the Organization of American Historians to produce a curriculum that would include women and minorities of both sexes in the teaching of a new course in American history. That is in process. But I know of no university that has yet begun to deal with transformation at its heart: the introductory courses that still ignore or demean half the human race. (The University of Arizona's Women's Studies Program has such a plan in sight with federal funding from the National Endowment for the Humanities; and Wheaton College, with funding from the Fund for the Improvement of Post-Secondary Education.) To leap into the transformation of introductory courses in all the disciplines, one needs two ingredients at least: a willing faculty and an informed strategy for unifying knowledge about women and men into a single course. Let me take the easier question first: the informed curricular strategy. We don't have that, I am the first to admit, in literature, and according to several feminist historians, Kathryn Kish Sklar, Carolyn Lougee, Amy Swerdlow, Gerda Kerner, we are groping towards such a strategy in history. And as for other disciplines, I cannot at this moment say. But from thirty years of teaching, I can say that an interesting curricular problem in itself is a useful strategy for teaching. It is energy-producing for the faculty member and for students: here is a real problem to wrestle with—how do you read the Renaissance for women and for men? What are the factors that controlled women's lives and men's lives and made for those differences? Though one does not have the detailed teacher's guide, one has as much as the Mississippi freedom school teacher had: the key questions; the key strategy of comparison and contrast; and an approach that combines experience and information.

But there is still the difficult question: what I have called "the willing faculty."

Where are they to come from? We know that most departments are chaired by men; that most faculties are entirely male-controlled. The statistics we so painfully gathered at the beginning of this decade have not been changed by any of the processes I have described in this lecture. There are two questions here, and I am going to leave them as questions. Will these men be "willing?"—that's question number one. And if they are, can they teach students in what we have come to call "a feminist manner?" Can they, to put it in other words, teach about women and men so that both groups of students will be offered their history, their dignity and identity?

I don't know the answers to those questions, but I do know something else: I do believe that many of us in academe—feminist women mainly, but a few feminist men as well—who have been teaching women's studies and producing scholarship on women through this decade are ready for the new challenge. We are ready because we understand our own history, because we have moved past anger to a new perspective not only on women, but on the "other half of the human race." Those last words are Virginia Woolf's, as she tries to consider the question of the woman writer's attitude towards the men who controlled (or had controlled) her life. She describes her "new attitude" now that she has five hundred pounds a year (and I would say now that we have women's studies):

I need not hate any man; he cannot hurt me. I need not flatter any man; he has nothing to give me. So imperceptibly [Woolf continues] I found myself adopting a new attitude toward the other half of the human race. It was absurd to blame any class or any sex, as a whole. Great bodies of people are never responsible for what they do. They are driven by instincts which are not within their control. They too, the patriarchs, the professors, had endless difficulties, terrible drawbacks to contend with. Their education had been in some ways as faulty as my own.

Of course we have begun to hear the sarcasm in the exaggerated "endless difficulties, terrible drawbacks," and to feel the steel rapier in the final thrust, "Their education had been in some ways as faulty as my own." She broadens the irony into a portrait of educated men:

Their education had been in some ways as faulty as my own. It had bred in them defects as great. True, they had money and power, but only at the cost of harbouring in their breasts an eagle, a vulture, for ever tearing the liver out and plucking at the lungs—the instinct for possession, the rage for acquisition which drives them to desire other people's fields and goods perpetually; to make frontiers and flags; battleships and poison gas; to offer up their own lives and their children's lives. (57-8)

The portrait is one that men who want to work with feminists to transform the curriculum will have to begin to see, if not to accept, dislike, and reject. I don't know whether Virginia Woolf would have offered such men the experience of feminist "freedom schools," but in fact her 1928 essay from which I have been quoting, *A*

Room of One's Own, is one such offering of strength, wisdom, humor, warmth, and intellect. We will need all those attributes, and more, as we continue to plan, raise funds for, and work in those faculty development programs, summer institutes, and other inventions for the re-education of generations of male-centered faculties.

And while the political elections may seem (or actually be) discouraging, if one knows history, they are not exactly surprising. Feminists in the nineteenth century worked for 72 years before suffrage was passed by the Congress of these United States. You and I have been at work in a mass movement for less than 15 years. In the 72 years between 1848 and 1920, another massive effort moved forward: it took that long for colleges to open doors wide to women, and to allow them to study what was called "the men's curriculum" by our nineteenth century foremothers. We have been at work only a little more than 10 years reviewing that "men's curriculum," correcting its errors, and providing another perspective and body of knowledge about women. When I say it is not surprising to feel the opposition to our efforts, I am also returning to my opening theme: it is essential to revelatory learning to see the opposition clearly. That is, if we are still learning *about being human*, if we are still needing to teach each other that humans are precious whatever their skin color or gender, then our educational politics and vision must correct the bias of narrow and prejudiced views that infect other parts of our society. As educators, we work in a society in which education is mandatory and the schools and colleges are institutions that most people attend on route to their adult lives, or on route to changing those adult lives. As educators, therefore, we have enormous responsibility and power, and these will not diminish in the eighties. In a period when the opposition will be most visible, we may be able to do our best work.

TOP SECRET
NOV 1964

PART II

RESEARCH ABOUT WOMEN

SECTION A

**RESEARCH ABOUT WOMEN
IN THE SCIENCES**

Scientific Objectivity and Feminist Theorizing*

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Feminist scientists who interpret the basic information in their fields in ways not detrimental to women or in ways that reflect positively on women are often liable to the charge of lack of scientific objectivity. This is particularly true when their interpretations differ from accepted theories and explanations in their fields. In this paper, I wish to examine the concept of scientific objectivity in relation to notions of confirmation and evidence in science. Ultimately, I will argue that adopting a feminist perspective in one's research (whatever the field), far from destroying, contributes to objectivity in one's field.

First, some remarks regarding objectivity. Israel Schreffer described the ideal of objectivity as one which "subjects all scientific statements to the test of independent and impartial criteria, recognizing no authority of persons in the realm of cognition."¹ Thus understood, objectivity involves the susceptibility of assertions in science to criticism and rejection, and the relevance of tests rather than subjective preferences to their acceptance. To adhere to an assertion without regard to tests and arguments relevant to its acceptance or rejection is to cast off the ideal of objectivity. This much seems relatively uncontroversial. As soon as one begins to specify objectivity any more precisely, however, the waters become troubled.

Science is regarded as a monument of human rationality both because of its technological issue and because scientific method is taken as an embodiment of the ideal of objectivity. Accounts of scientific method are taken as precise and detailed explications of the objectivity that has facilitated the contemporary understanding and control of the natural world. Viewing nature at a certain remove, evolving beyond a stage that saw human values bound up with a particular cosmology, "putting nature to the question" in Francis Bacon's words, without preceptions

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or prior investment in a particular answer, are seen as accomplishments of the maturing human intellect. The picture of scientific method developed by the logical empiricists of the twentieth century purported to be a formally correct analysis of this accomplishment. To the extent that the projected unity of science was not yet achieved and to the extent that some sciences (the human sciences being a flagrant example) departed from this picture, it represented an ideal rather than a reality. But since it seemed that at least one science—physics—conformed to the picture, the ideal seemed realizable. Much has been written in defense and in criticism of various aspects of the logical empiricist model. I would like to focus on just one aspect here: the analysis of confirmation.

The empiricist model of a finished science or of a finished theory in science is structurally analogous to Descartes' vision of an axiomatic theory proceeding deductively from very general principles through more specific principles to empirical laws to statements describing observations.² The primary difference between Descartes and the empiricists lies in the source of justification. For Descartes the indubitability of its general principles provided the grounds for accepting a theory, while for empiricists the direction of justification is reversed. Justification proceeds from observation statements through generalizations and on through the most general principles of the theory. Because the logical relation in this direction is inductive, justification is not certain. However, the relation between a sentence articulating a hypothesis and a sentence describing evidence that confirms the hypothesis is a purely formal relation. One of the principal studies of this relation is Hempel's "Studies in the Logic of Confirmation."³ In this paper, Hempel proposes that an observation report (*B*) be said to confirm a hypothesis (*H*) if *B* is entailed by what is called "the development of *H* for the class of objects mentioned in *B*." Thus, "All bodies, falling from rest, fall with uniform acceleration," is confirmed by the observation report "This hammer, when released at *t*, fell with uniform acceleration," because the development of "All bodies falling from rest fall with uniform acceleration" for the class consisting of the hammer released at *t* entails the observation report by being identical with it.⁴

Two points are important here: (1) that what counts as a confirming instance is related to a hypothesis by formal ties only, so that given a hypothesis we can know what will count as evidence for it by means of logical techniques alone; and (2) that the sentences describing confirming instances are observation sentences. These two claims jointly limit the kinds of hypotheses that can be directly (and indirectly) confirmed to hypotheses that have observation sentences as their logical consequences.

The empiricist analysis of confirmation thus guarantees the objectivity of science by tying the acceptance of hypotheses and theories to a public world over whose description there can be no disagreement. In the empiricist model, the set of true observation statements changes only by becoming larger as more sophisticated instruments of observation are developed. The account of what the bare facts are is fixed and established independently of theories, perspectives, or points of view.⁵

One is objective when one allows these facts, rather than one's wishes or prejudices to determine what one will believe. While there is potentially more disagreement with respect to hypotheses because they are not directly descriptive of observed states of affairs, the purely formal relationship between hypotheses and statements describing their confirming instances means that there can be no lasting disagreements as to which of these is confirmed and which not, or which is better confirmed. When one is urged to be objective or "scientific," it is this reliance on an established and commonly accepted reality that is being recommended. The logical empiricist model of confirmation simply makes the standard view of scientific practice more systematic and logically rigorous. This articulation of the standard view is one of this model's persuasive features.

Recent history and philosophy of science has cast a shadow on the empiricist edifice. Such scholars as Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend believe their research shows that the actual, historical practice of science does not conform to the model sketched above.⁶ The adoption of theories cannot be a function of seeing which theories are best confirmed by the (independently established) evidence because at times of major theory change, incompatible theories vie as explanations for the same states of affairs and are seemingly supported by the same evidence. This difficulty is explained by appeal to the fundamental incommensurability of theories and the theory dependence of observation. Incompatible theories are incommensurable because terms which they seem to share do not have the same meaning in the two theories. Because observation is theory dependent, there is no independent fund of facts to which one can have recourse in the process of theory choice. Scientists work within logically independent and incomparable world views determined by their paradigms. How can scientific practice possibly be objective on this account? As long as one takes the empiricist analysis as providing a model to which any inquiry must conform in order to be objective and rational, then to the degree that actual science departs from the model it fails to be objective and rational. Both the historians who have attacked the old model and the philosophers who have defended it have at times taken this position. While Kuhn has denied that his is a totally subjectivist view, he does point to subjective factors such as faith in describing theory acceptance. Feyerabend, on the other hand, has forthrightly embraced and defended irrationality in science.⁷

This historical perspective has been regarded as the primary alternative to the empiricist view sketched above. Tending to dethrone established science, the historical perspective has been attractive to radicals and innovators in science. The logic of scientific assertions that emerges from this perspective is, however, highly unsatisfactory.⁸ What is less frequently noticed is the logical inadequacy of the empiricists' model of confirmation. Both the raven paradox and Goodman's Grue/Bleen riddle challenge the account's formal adequacy.⁹ Even more serious, from the point of view of analyzing science, Hempel's analysis is only applicable to situations in which a hypothesis and statement of evidence share the same descriptive terms. For the most part, however, scientific theories and hypotheses

are expressed in language that cannot be used to describe the evidence adduced for them (without begging the question). Our theories and hypotheses make reference to items too small, too large, or too remote to be observed in any ordinary sense of that term, and hence to be brought into descriptions of the evidence for those theories.

In another paper, I suggested that we view the relation between hypotheses and evidence as mediated by background beliefs.¹⁰ Thus, a state of affairs would be evidence for some hypothesis *H* only in light of some background belief that asserts a connection between the kind of state *S* is and the kind of situation described by *H*. This suggestion involves abandoning the attempt to specify the relation between evidence and hypotheses by means of formal criteria and sees this relation as involving substantive claims instead. This account, I have argued, solves a number of problems, but by relativizing what counts as evidence (and thus, hypothesis acceptance on the basis of evidence) to background beliefs or assumptions, this account raises the question: How can science so described come close to meeting the ideal of objectivity? This question arises from the following train of thought: If background beliefs mediate the relation between hypotheses and their evidence, then if any states of affairs are evidentially relevant to them (i.e., to the background beliefs), this relevance can itself only be ascertained in light of further background beliefs. What constraints, then, can be placed at the level of background beliefs to block the influence of subjective preference?

Thus, a shift in perspective is necessary if we are to attribute to scientific method some guarantee of objectivity in the very general sense discussed in the first pages of this paper. The shift I suggest involves regarding scientific method as something practiced not primarily by individuals, but by groups. Scientific knowledge is, after all, the product of many individuals working in (acknowledged or unacknowledged) concert. Scientific knowledge is produced not by collecting the products of individuals into one whole, but through a process of critical emendation and modification of those products by the rest of the scientific community. Experiments get repeated with variations by individuals other than their originators; hypotheses and theories are critically examined, restated, and reformulated before becoming an accepted part of the scientific canon. What is called scientific knowledge, then, is produced by a community (ultimately, the community of all scientific practitioners) and thus transcends the contributions of any individual or even of any sub-community within the larger community. This knowledge is produced collectively through the clashing and meshing of a variety of points of view.¹¹ The relevance of this to objectivity will be apparent shortly.

Moving in a logical, rather than a sociological, direction, we can note that an important and distinctive feature of science is its publicness. This means several things: (1) Theoretical assertions, hypotheses, and assumptions are all in principle public in the sense of being generally available to and comprehensible to anyone with the appropriate background, education, and interest. (2) The states of affairs to which theoretical explanations are pegged (in evidential and explanatory

relationships) are public in the sense that they are intersubjectively ascertainable. (This does not require a commitment to a set of theory-free, eternally acceptable, observation statements, but merely a commitment to the possibility of public ascertainability of states of affairs.) These two aspects of the publicness of science make criticism of scientific hypotheses and theories possible (in a way that is not possible for descriptions of mystical experience, or expressions of feeling and emotion). Additionally, these aspects make possible the criticism of a given hypothesis in light of a variety of concerns: one may question the conceptual soundness of a hypothesis, its consistency with already accepted theory, the degree to which it is supported by what is presented as evidence for it, or the relevance of what is presented as evidence for it. This latter type of criticism, which amounts to questioning the background beliefs in light of which states of affairs are taken as evidence for the hypothesis, is crucial to the problem of objectivity. As long as background beliefs can be articulated and subjected to criticism from the scientific community, they can be defended, modified, or abandoned, in response to such criticism. As long as this kind of response is possible, the incorporation of hypotheses into the canon of scientific knowledge can be independent of individuals' subjective preference. The objectivity of a method of inquiry consists, then, in the degree to which it makes both its procedures and its results available to these kinds of criticism. Scientific communities will be objective to the degree that their methods of accepting and rejecting hypotheses and theories include this form of critical scrutiny of background assumptions.

The respect in which science is objective, then, is one which it shares with other modes of inquiry, disciplines such as literary or art criticism and philosophy. The feature that has often been appealed to as the source of the objectivity of science, that its hypotheses and theories are accepted or rejected on the basis of observational, experimental data, is a feature which makes science empirical. That a method is empirical does not mean, however, that it is also objective. The relation between hypotheses and evidence is not direct but is mediated by background beliefs, which themselves may not be subject to empirical confirmation or disconfirmation, and which may be affected by metaphysical or evaluative bias. Thus, science's empirical nature seems the wrong place to look for objectivity. The process that can expose such assumptions is what enables, even if it cannot guarantee, independence from subjective bias, and hence objectivity. This, of course, includes showing that background assumptions are incompatible with observational data.

What does any of this have to do with feminist theorizing? The kind of criticism that exposes background beliefs often requires a point of view independent of those beliefs, especially so when the background beliefs have to do (directly or indirectly) with one's own relative worth. Because long and widely-held beliefs tend to disappear into the conceptual structure of those holding them, emerging, if at all, as necessary truths, only the articulation of an opposing point of view and its application to whatever area is in question will bring out the non-necessary and

assumptive character of background beliefs. Research from a self-consciously feminist point of view stands in this relation to establishment science.

Establishment science, it is by now banal to observe, is male-dominated. Not only has the number of female natural scientists been negligible, but because there have been so few women practicing science, there has until recently been no forum within which to develop a challenge to the dominant sexual ideology. The development of a feminist critique of social relations and the growing number of women in the non-physical (biological and social) sciences have enabled such a forum to develop, at least in the human sciences. Psychology, sociology, anthropology, and even biology have seen critiques of the dominant masculinist perspectives in those fields, and the occasional articulation of explanations taking a feminist or gynecentric point of view. The contemporary interest in women has also opened up new areas for research within those fields as questions are asked about women and women's roles that were not asked before. I wish to focus here only on the development of critiques and alternate explanations, since these have seemed the most problematic with respect to objectivity.

Feminist critiques of establishment science are able to expose sexually prejudicial theories and the sexually prejudicial background assumptions in light of which these theories are supported by seemingly neutral data. This exposure may simply identify sexually-biased assumptions as biased and unsupported. Alternate explanations and theories show even more clearly the non-necessary, contingent, character of these assumptions.

For a fairly elementary example, I would like to discuss very briefly the critique of the notion of universal male dominance among primates. Much of the research on primate behavior has been criticized by female scientists as contaminated by wholesale androcentric bias. In her classic paper "Psychology Constructs the Female," Naomi Weisstein describes the selective use of primate research to confirm hypotheses regarding the natural and inevitable character of male dominance and female subordination.¹² Baboon and rhesus monkeys, who do display irritable and aggressive behavior on the part of the males and submissiveness on the part of the females, are cited, while the behavior of the numerous primate species which do not conform to this pattern is ignored. According to neurophysiologist Ruth Bleier, students of evolution have simply assumed the universality of dominance hierarchies among primates and assumed "that these serve species survival by providing the most aggressive male with the most frequent access to the estrous females."¹³ This assumption is reflected in the use of the term "harem" to describe polygynous troop structure, in the identification of aggression with hormonally-induced fighting behaviors on the one hand and qualities associated with Western human masculinity and success on the other,¹⁴ and in the hypothesis that male hunting behavior determined the evolution of the species. Ruth Hubbard has shown how Charles Darwin's assumption of male dominance and superiority affected his articulation of the theory of evolution and the associated theory of sexual selection.¹⁵

Merely showing how dominance has functioned as an unsupported assumption determining the evidential relevance of primate behavior for male scientists has marked a major advance both for evolutionary studies and for the scientific study of contemporary humans. It has also opened the way for alternate explanations of the current givens of hominid/ human evolution: the reduction in the size of the canine teeth, the development of bipedalism, and a larger brain. In the new physical anthropology of Sherwood Washburn, these were seen as consequences of the adaptation to hunting behavior on the part of early hominids.¹⁶ The feminist anthropologists Nancy Tanner and Adrienne Zihlman, in a series of articles, explain these givens, as well as tool use and other behaviors, as a function of the behavioral adaptations to the environmental conditions of the African savanna of matrifocal communities of hominids.¹⁷ As an example, the reduction in the size of the canines, a diminution of the "anatomy of aggression," is argued to be a function of the obsolescence of the large teeth as new antipredator behavior developed, of a change in diet, and of the sexual selection by females of males who were less aggressive and more sociable. Females caring for infants requiring a longer period for maturation are the innovators, developing the gathering of food (as opposed to eating on the spot), inventing tools for digging and containers for carrying. The point is not whether the Tanner and Zihlman account is true. The point is that they present a rich and comprehensive story using the same fossil and primate information as the "man the hunter" theorists do.¹⁸ Tanner and Zihlman simply abandon the assumption of natural and universal male dominance and ask: "How did human males evolve so as to complement the female role?"¹⁹

These examples show how the introduction of a feminist perspective with in a field facilitates criticism of the assumptions within that field. The assumption by anthropologists and biologists of universal male dominance is found to be neither supported nor necessary to the explanation of what we know. Obviously then, science from a feminist perspective contributes to the objectivity of a field, because it makes possible the articulation and, hence, criticism of the assumptions within that field. The assumption by anthropologists and biologists of universal male dominance is found to be neither supported nor necessary to the explanation of what we know. The objection that the introduction of a feminist perspective into scientific inquiry is subjective is sometimes expressed through the complaint that such a perspective improperly politicizes science. What even this brief discussion of examples shows is that, on the contrary, its introduction reveals that science is already politicized. The collective subjectivity of the scientific community is expressed in assumptions that grow out of and continue to support sexual political and social inequalities. A scientific community is objective not when its work is totally free from politicization, but when it recognizes the possibility of such politicization and adopts for itself methods that facilitate its recognition (i.e., methods involving the exposure and criticism of background assumptions). Recognition, while necessary, is not, however, sufficient for objectivity: it is only to the extent that a particular community is capable of responding to criticism by

defending, modifying, or abandoning, its assumptions that it can be said to satisfy the ideal of objectivity.

FOOTNOTES

¹Israel Scheffler, *Science and Subjectivity* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1967), p. 1.

²Rene Descartes, *Discourse on Method, Optics, Geometry, Meteorology* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), pp. 49-62, 263-68. For the empiricist account of theories, see Rudolph Carnap, *Foundations of Logic and Mathematics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939), pp. 29-69.

³C.G. Hempel, "Studies in the Logic of Confirmation," *Aspects of Scientific Explanation* (New York: The Free Press, 1965), pp. 3-51.

⁴*Ibid.*, p. 37.

⁵Cf. R. Carnap, *op. cit.*, pp. 61-69, and C.G. Hempel, "The Theoretician's Dilemma," H. Feigl, M. Scriven, G. Maxwell, eds., *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1964).

⁶Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 2nd ed., (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970). Paul Feyerabend, "Explanation, Reduction and Empiricism," H. Feigl, and G. Maxwell, eds., *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, vol. III (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1962), pp. 28-97.

⁷T. Kuhn, *op. cit.*, pp. 156-57, and "Postscript," Feyerabend, "Against Method," Radner and Winokur, eds., *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, vol. IV (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1970), pp. 17-130.

⁸See the critiques by Dudley Shapere, "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions," *Philosophical Review*, vol. LXXII, and "Meaning and Scientific Change," R. Colodny, ed., *Mind and Cosmos* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1966), pp. 41-85, and Peter Achinstein, *Concepts of Science* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968), pp. 91-98.

⁹Hempel, "Studies in the Logic of Confirmation," pp. 14-20, R. Grandy, "Some Comments on Confirmation and Selective Confirmation," *Philosophical Studies* (1967), and Nelson Goodman, "The New Riddle of Induction," *Fact, Fiction, and Forecast*, 2nd ed., (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), pp. 99-83.

¹⁰H.E. Longino, "Evidence and Hypothesis," *Philosophy of Science* (March, 1979), pp. 35-56.

¹¹See Lewis Thomas, "Natural Science," *The Lives of a Cell* (New York: Bantam, 1975), pp. 116-120, for an eloquent rendition of this view of scientific activity.

¹²Nancy Weisstein, "Psychology Constructs the Female," V. Gornick and B. Moran, eds., *Woman in Sexist Society* (New York: Basic Books, 1971), pp. 133-146.

¹³Ruth Bleier, "Bias in Biological and Human Sciences: Some Comments," *Signs* (Autumn, 1978), pp. 159-162.

¹⁴*Ibid.*

¹⁵Ruth Hubbard, "Have Only Men Evolved?" in *Women Look at Biology Looking at Women*, Ruth Hubbard, Mary Sue Henfin, Barbara Fried, eds. (Cambridge: Schenkman Publishing co., 1979), pp. 7-35.

¹⁶Sherwood Washburn, "The New Physical Anthropology," *Transactions of the New York Academy of Sciences*, ser. 2, vol. 13, no. 7, "The Analysis of Primate Evolution with Particular Reference to Man," *Cold Spring Harbor Symposium on Quantitative Biology*, 15 (1951), with C.S. Lancaster, "The Evolution of Hunting," Lee and DeVore eds., *Man the Hunter* (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1968), cited in Donna Haraway, "Animal Sociology and a Natural Economy of the

Body Politic, Part II," *Signs*, vol. 4, no. 1 (Autumn 1978), pp. 4-20.

¹⁰For a useful discussion, see Donna Haraway, *op. cit.*

¹¹Ruth Hubbard (*op. cit.*, p. 31) has, in a similar spirit, noted that while the development of speech is probably the most interesting and powerful evolutionary phenomenon, it is largely ignored by theorists of evolution. She suggests that this may well be because males and females are equally proficient in speech which thus offers no way to conceive of the male as superior or as being the "vanguard" of human evolution.

Why Should More Women be Scientists?*

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In a good part of the world the number of natural and social scientists who are men is very much larger than the number who are women. There is a growing (but still weak) consensus that more women should be scientists, and in support of this view various arguments have been offered. I am going to analyze a few of these arguments with the purpose of discovering the right reason that more women should be scientists.

What I call *the normative argument* is based on the idea that in a good society the distribution of benefits and burdens is not determined along sexual lines. Our own society is far from satisfying this condition, in that women have been systematically excluded from a wide range of activities which provide benefits (the professions, science) and have been confined to activities which involve a disproportionate share of the burdens (housework, waitressing). From the point of view of social justice, or of equality of treatment, or even of the moral rights of women, this situation is offensive. The social pressures and institutional restraints which direct the lives of women should be eliminated in order that women have equal opportunity with men to achieve desirable positions. Note that this argument does not entail that the number of women scientists must eventually be equal to the number of men scientists. It is compatible with an overall nondiscriminatory distribution of benefits and burdens that most scientists, say, turn out to be men and most lawyers women. The argument entails only that women and men have *equal opportunity* to become scientists, and that if most scientists turn out to be men it is not because there is institutional discrimination against women. Even so, we can expect that with fuller equal opportunity more women will become scientists than are becoming scientists now.

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A major problem with the normative argument is that its basic premise is controversial. Many people reject the idea that there are never reasons for discriminating along sex lines in the distribution of benefits and burdens. Many people also deny that in our society the exclusion of women from some activities and their concentration in others constitutes keeping them from benefits and saddling them with burdens. A different argument for the view that more women should be scientists avoids this controversy by appealing instead to epistemological considerations. What I call the *epistemological argument* claims that more women should be scientists because the quest for truth in science is hindered, if not made impossible, by the exclusion of a distinctive perspective of women.¹ Women carrying out the work of science, not as lab assistants but as senior investigators, make a special contribution to the discovery of truth, a contribution which is necessary for science to achieve its goal and which cannot be provided by anyone but women. It is often suggested about the social sciences in particular that the chief sources of falsehoods—the invisibility of women, the ignoring of women's concerns and experiences, and observer bias in the gathering and interpretation of data²—can be corrected only by increasing the number of women scientists. Because "an exclusively male study . . . is usually incomplete,"³ the "necessary first step is . . . to establish and promote women in their professional scientific disciplines, for only then will a more thorough examination of omissions and a better distribution of knowledge . . . be possible."⁴ If women *qua* women have different cognitive and intellectual skills and interests, and if they are able to discover different data and interpret and explain them in such a way that the partial truths of the science done by men are turned into complete truths, then the perspective of women scientists is essential.⁵

Although it is not entirely free of normative assumptions, the epistemological argument recommends itself because its own normative assumptions are more deeply entrenched in our society than are the assumptions about social justice made by the normative argument. The epistemological argument appeals to the apparently innocuous idea that the goal of scientific research ought to be truth and to the general utilitarian justification of the value of truth and therefore of science. If it were true, then, that the input of women were essential to the discovery of scientific truth, we would have a very powerful argument supporting the view that more women should be scientists. Indeed, the argument (so it seems) demands a definite equality between the sexes in all the sciences. If truth is as important as we think it is, and if women do provide a necessary contribution to the achievement of truth, then equal opportunity is too weak. Any departure from equality in result would produce false science.

Underlying the epistemological argument must be an explanation of how it is that the perspective of women is essential for scientific truth. One explanation is that the cognitive differences between men and women originate in their respective natures.⁶ This appeal to natural cognitive sexual differences is at first glance an ingenious tactic, for those who have been opposed to the movement of women into

science have often themselves relied on the existence of such natural intellectual differences. The epistemological argument intends to show that even if (or because) there are natural sexual differences, there should be sexual parity in the sciences. The argument is remarkably attractive in its ability to stand the conservative on his or her head.

But this ingeniousness is an illusion; the tactic is double-edged and dangerous. The explanation, based on natural cognitive sexual differences, of how it is that the perspective of women is essential for science, could very easily undermine the argument and force an abandonment of feminist goals. The conservative, we know, wishes to use the purported existence of natural cognitive sexual differences to support a sexual division of labor in which men become scientists and women stay at home or assist in the lab. But in rejecting this particular sexual division of labor, the epistemological argument cannot avoid being committed to a sexual division of labor (or at least a division of task) within science itself. The conservative division of labor is merely transposed from "between domains" to "within domains." Furthermore, where there must be a sexual division of labor it is senseless to speak of promoting women's equal opportunity with men to perform those tasks for which only men are prepared by their cognitive nature. Equal opportunity becomes largely pointless.⁷ Put another way, the point is that even if the perspective of women is essential for truth in the sciences, this claim could not mean nor does it follow that the formulation, interpretation and testing of every scientific theory requires the input or review of the perspective of women. Because that perspective is essential only for particular, individual truths and not for scientific truth *simpliciter*, some branches of science remain the province of men from which women by their cognitive nature will be excluded, while only certain branches of science will be reserved for women. There is too strong a suggestion here that women's studies is to be segregated from rather than integrated into the bulk of the sciences.⁸ Thus part of the original problem—how to overcome the untruthfulness of a science which ignored women's issues?—is solved by women scientists investigating women's issues.

Another version of the epistemological argument claims that the cognitive differences are not natural, but are generated sociopsychologically.⁹ Accompanying such a view is also an explanation of why it is that socially-produced sexual cognitive differences are continually misrepresented and misperceived as being natural.¹⁰ But replacing natural with socially-produced cognitive differences does not improve the epistemological argument.

Even though the natural-based version of the argument had difficulty getting women into some areas of science, at least it was not forced to make any distinctions among women. But the social-based version has difficulty getting some women into science at all, even if they have¹¹ the proper educational credentials. If there are natural cognitive differences then it is reasonable to assume that (almost) every woman has the appropriate abilities and interests and that, therefore, "the perspective of women" is homogeneous. But if the cognitive

differences are socially-produced then it is far from guaranteed that all or even most women will exhibit the same perspective. The existence of a large number of anti-feminist and non-feminist women, women whose perspective is closer to the perspective of men, is widely recognized.

Their existence means that the social-based argument must distinguish among women and refuse to support the movement of certain women into science. The argument must reject the idea that the perspective of non-feminist women is essential for scientific truth, for such a perspective neither complements nor counterbalances the perspective of men in science and so cannot correct the errors of their science. The perspective of these women is more of the same.

If the change from a natural-based to a social-based argument involves the exclusion of some women from science, it also involves the inclusion of many other persons. The natural-based argument, in presupposing the existence of natural cognitive difference between the sexes, did not also have to assume, say, that there are any natural cognitive differences between the races or among ethnic groups. Thus it can consistently claim that the addition only of women to science is necessary. But the social-based argument must admit that the kinds of social facts which generate a distinctive perspective of women also generate other equally distinctive perspectives which are essential for science. The natural-based argument does not have to admit that there are natural cognitive differences between the white male redneck and the white male flower-child; but the social-based argument must take this suggestion seriously. Indeed, if we consider only sex, economic status, race, ethnicity, politics, age, religion and geographical location, the number of perspectives and of potentially distinct cognitive abilities and interests becomes enormous.¹²

It is possible to admit that these factors do generate different cognitive perspectives, and yet assert that the social-based argument is simply concerned to make sure that 50% of all scientists are women, and that, say 50% of all urban Catholic Republic scientists are women. But this reply is not fully adequate. It marks an important departure from the point of view of the epistemological argument. For if it is essential that there be some scientists who are urban Catholic Republic women, these women should be scientists but not exactly (and not even mostly) because, or in virtue of the fact that, they are women. The social-based argument is driven to a pluralism in which the perspective of women as women dramatically recedes in significance.

The fundamental problem is one of paradox. The underlying assumption of the epistemological argument is that "the perspective of women" is essential for science. But the phrase "the perspective of women" is a reifying phrase; it implies that there is a homogeneous perspective which enables women *qua* women to view the world in their own distinct way. It is built into that phrase that racial, ethnic, political, geographical, and religious factors are irrelevant in understanding women as women and in determining the cognitive and intellectual abilities and interests that women as women have. but there is no such thing as "the perspective

of women." In concentrating on the properties of women as women, the social-based epistemological argument is guilty of reifying women's experiences, interests, and social ties in exactly the same way that social science has been guilty of reifying women with its well-known claims about stereotypical femininity. At the same time, as I argued above, the elaboration of the social-based argument involves an erosion into epistemological pluralism.¹³

The argument just discussed, in either of its versions, is best called the *moderate* epistemological argument, to distinguish it from the argument I am about to discuss, which I call the *radical* epistemological argument. The radical argument does not assert the same thesis that more women should be scientists because their perspective provides a contribution to truth in science. First, to speak in terms of what should or should not be the case is naive. It is precisely because women's substantial participation in science would force male-dominated science to revise its content, that women are being excluded from science. What is required is political power. The lack of control women have over the content of science is just a reflection of their lack of power generally, and it is hopeless to expect women to be admitted into science by those who do have power and who have an interest in the content of science remaining the same.¹⁴ Second, it is not that women doing science make a contribution to truth, but rather that those having the feminist perspective are the *only* scientists who could ever discover the truth.¹⁵ Although this is to misrepresent the purpose of the radical argument, while the normative argument calls for equal opportunity, and while the moderate epistemological argument calls for equal result, the radical epistemological argument calls for the predominance of women. Women having the feminist perspective have privileged access to scientific truth and are better equipped, cognitively, to produce a true content for science.

The social-based argument was plagued by the problem of identifying discrete perspectives and collapsed into a trivial pluralism. It did not have the theoretical machinery to deny that because many other perspectives are socially-produced, they, too, are as much deserving of acknowledgement in the composition of science as the perspective of women.¹⁶ The radical argument bites the bullet by asserting that the nonhomogeneity among women and the existence of multiple socially-produced cognitive differences do not yield an epistemological pluralism, because, in a nutshell, one perspective is better than the others, one perspective is more likely to produce the truth.

The radical argument is based either on a Mannheimian or on a Marxian sociology of knowledge. In the former case women scientists are in a privileged epistemological position because they are in both camps at once; they have one foot in the "male" world of science and the other in the "female" world of everyday life. Only this inbetween woman scientist has the ability to evaluate objectively competing theories and to produce nonideological accounts of the world. For this version of the radical argument, then, the woman scientist plays the role of Mannheim's *intelligentsia*, which Mannheim believed was able to rise above the

conflicts of class society. I have some difficulty both in understanding Mannheim's principle and in applying it to contemporary women scientists. He does claim that the intelligentsia is "socially unattached," and is rather united in virtue of a common education which suppresses the influence of birth, class and status.¹⁷ But he also suggests quite differently that the intelligentsia is detached because as a group it is composed of ("subsumes") all social perspectives.¹⁸ On either account of why the intelligentsia can be expected to produce nonideological views of the world, however, it is difficult to see how women scientists can be epistemologically superior. As a group the intelligentsia of women is not socially unattached, especially if its commitment to feminism is sincere; the common education they have does not, for the same reason, suppress the influence of their birth as women; and the intelligentsia of women does not subsume all social perspectives simply by being the intelligentsia of women. If we focus instead on individual women scientists, their being situated in both camps at the same time does not so much mean that they are free of class loyalties, as they are internally split by contradictory loyalties. Individual detachment does not always (does it ever?) result from internal conflict.¹⁹

The other version of the radical argument, which draws on Hegel and Marx, claims that women are in a privileged epistemological position because of their status as the oppressed group. The correct view of social phenomena, the "totality of the set"²⁰ of social relations between oppressor and oppressed, is visible only to those who examine the world from the point of view of those who are oppressed, who have nothing to lose and everything to gain by exposing the truth, and it is invisible to those who have an interest in maintaining the *status quo*. The paradox of feminism relying on such Marxist reasoning, of course, is that if it is claimed that women as an oppressed group have, when class-conscious, a privileged epistemological position, it can scarcely be denied that the proletariat, that mixture of working-class women and men, has a similar privileged position. Perhaps this means that the perspective of working-class women is doubly privileged, and the paradox disappears. At any rate it is clear that if the Marxist radical argument is to succeed, a working relationship between Marxism and feminism at least at the theoretical level must be sustained.²¹ Furthermore, the existence of groups such as the Tri-Lateral Commission makes it doubtful that the oppressors must remain ignorant of the totality of social relations or even that it is in their interest to continue to obscure the totality.

In its emphasis on the usurpation of political power by women, the radical epistemological argument is refreshing. Yet I fear that in claiming that political power needs to be exerted so that the feminist perspective can bring forth a truth only it can discover, the argument is asking us to bite off more than we can chew. I deny that the feminist perspective has a privileged epistemological status, but I would not revert to the "contributory" and "counterbalancing" views of the moderate argument. I would prefer to say that political power is required in order that women can enter the sciences and exert pressure in the *creation* of truth. I

assert this in contrast to all three epistemological arguments, all of which accept the assumption that the goal of science is the *discovery* of truth and that science is for this reason valuable. The first assumption is false primarily because science contains essentially contestable concepts and because scientific theories are underdetermined by "the facts." I also believe that the claim that science is valuable is wildly misleading. The claim smacks of what is known as "scientism," the worshipping of scientific knowledge for its own sake and the domination of human relationships by scientific rationality. If I am correct, it is not very important for the women of future generations that more women now become scientists. Rather, it is much more important for women today to become a politically significant force. What is needed is not more research, whether it is done by men or women, but political action.²³ To continue to assert otherwise is to continue to rehearse the old delaying tactic: first know the world, then change it. In agreement with Marx's Eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach, I would turn this conventional piece of wisdom on its head.²⁴

FOOTNOTES

¹It is possible to understand the epistemological argument as drawing an analogy between the composition of juries and legislatures and the composition of the scientific community. "Why . . . is it important . . . that women have equal representation on juries—or . . . on the bench, in parliament, or in the professions? If men and women are the same, interchangeable, in the important respects, then it shouldn't make any difference whether a particular body is wholly male, wholly female, or half of each. It is only in so far as men and women do differ, bringing different concerns, interests and skills to bear, that underrepresentation of either presents a problem" (Locke, p. 1455). Appropriately, the epistemological argument does claim that there are either natural and/or social cognitive sexual differences. But the analogy with the composition of a jury or of a parliament is problematic. First, if it is difficult to decide such a question for the composition of science. Second, it is clear that the function of a parliament, unlike science, is not to determine truth but rather to make policy so the analogy breaks down. The analogy could be maintained by arguing that it is also not the function of science to discover truth, but this idea cannot be held by the epistemological argument. At the end of the paper I do suggest that science creates rather than discovers truth.

²Discussion of these sources of error can be found in Kelly-Gadol, Macoby and Jacklin, Sherif, Tiffany (1979), Weissstein, Westcott, and Williams.

³Rohrlich-Leavitt, et., p. 110.

⁴Daniels, p. 370.

⁵Bits and pieces, hints, and somewhat full statements of the epistemological argument can be found also, for example, in Oakley (p. 21); Millman (p.274); Tiffany (p. 1979, p. 24, and 1980, p. 380), who claims that the perspective of women can "counterbalance"—rather than "complete"—the scientific results of men; and, I think, in Keller (1974, p. 19, 1978, p. 432, and 1980, pp. 344-345). See also D. Smith's comment on Oakley (*Prism*, p. 147), and Westcott (pp. 424-425, fn. 12-15).

⁶The only one who bases the epistemological argument on natural cognitive differences, as far as I know to date, is Erikson (p. 239, pp. 241-243). But there is nothing to prevent some feminists—those who wish to re-legitimate the naturally feminine—from embracing Erikson's position, though they might want to emphasize different properties as the natural ones.

⁷Suppose we had perfect equality of opportunity throughout society (this means, in addition to the standard policies, different childraising practices, practices which involve fathering as well as mothering; see Keller (1978). If there were natural cognitive sexual differences objectionable. But from

the point of view of the epistemological argument it represents a departure from feminist ideals. (See Eichler, p. 14.)

*Consider the fact (reported by Sherif, p. 97) that the only women in psychology at the University of Iowa in the 1940's were in the Child Welfare division. From the point of view of the normative argument, such occurrences of segregation (then, now, and in the future) are not necessarily objectionable. But they are embarrassing to a "feminist" epistemological argument.

*Keller's papers, because they combine an account of the genesis of cognitive sexual differences with (what I take to be) the epistemological argument, are especially interesting. Many others, of course, agree that there are non-natural cognitive sexual differences and even propose that these differences have epistemological implications, yet they prefer not to advance this epistemological argument.

*See Lowe and Hubbard, p. 108; Star, pp. 116-117ff. (on the new biological basis of natural cognitive sexual differences, brain lateralization); Sherman, pp. 13-14; and Keller (1974, p. 19). I believe it is well-known that Marx enjoyed debunking the defense of a natural economic order offered by the apologists of capitalism.

*Perhaps because they have the proper educational credentials. Such is the effect of the Ph.D. factory.

*I am arguing that the social-based epistemological argument degenerates from feminism to pluralism, the philosophical counterpart of the massive heterogeneity of American society and its theoretical rationale. The social-based argument must tell us how to identify discrete perspectives. How specific must a description of a person's "social location" be? Which of his or her infinite characteristics are characteristics indicative of a perspective? One must be wary of circularity in picking out discrete perspectives. It might follow from the fact that person A and person B have different perspectives that they will interpret and explain the facts of science differently, but it does not follow from the fact that person C and person D interpret and explain the facts differently that they have different perspectives. One needs a handle on "perspective" which is independent of how a person treats scientific material. Otherwise the identification of perspectives will have no predictive power.

*The genesis of the reifying mistake on the part of the epistemological argument is interesting. Noticing that social science traditionally had nothing to say about women, that it ignored women, the first step in correcting social science seemed simple: treat women as a sociological group and systematically study the properties of women as women, as members of this class. (H. Smith has gone so far as to *define* the feminist viewpoint in history as the attempt to understand women as a sociological group; see pp. 370-371. See also Daniels, p. 368. This definition very neatly excludes from "feminism" a good deal of what is known as "radical feminism"; see Jaggar and Struhl. Excluded, for example, would be Firestone's *The Dialectic of Sex*. Westcott provides a careful analysis of the dangers of a sociology of women, of treating women as the objects of concerted research activity.) But this has had the effect of overemphasizing the properties of women as women, and the enforced homogenization has been transferred from women as the objects of research to women as the subjects or initiators of research. At the same time, emphasizing sex as a crucial variable has led to the proliferation of differences between the sexes (if one looks very hard for differences one will find some; see Star, pp. 114-115) and, via "trait" analysis (see Sherif, pp. 114-117), to a "distortion of differences over the similarities of the sexes" (Eichler, p. 14; see also her critique of the phrase "sex-role" on p. 10). To overcome the invisibility of women, women were studied. But studying women as a discrete sociological group has produced an understanding of women which ignores the influence of race, class, politics, geography, religion, etc. It is true that this exaggeration of the sole importance of sex-class is being reversed, but this is no consolation to an epistemological argument which turns on the promise of the perspective of women as women. (In the 1970s it was common to say of the women's movement that it was too concerned with white middle-class problems and ignored women with other social ties and properties. That, too, has been reversed, but at the cost of abandoning a comfortable appearance of homogeneity.)

*Stimpson (p. 10) rather surprisingly says that "The new scholarship about women . . . audaciously asks that a significant number of women . . . be incorporated into the academy." Asking for something as important as this is as naive as expecting institutional power to respond to the "should" of the

normative argument (and is hardly "audacious"). Stimpson warns the powers that unless changes occur women will mete out "punishment" (p. 12), but she doesn't say what kind.

¹⁶Bare statements of the epistemological superiority of women scientists, without any theoretical argument, can be found in Bleier (women offer "more rational" accounts; p. 161) and Stimpson (women can do scholarship with "more cogency and depth"; p. 4). Just a little argument is provided by Roberts (p. 9) and Daniels (pp. 343-344; but see fn. 17), both of whom rely on Mannheim. Full statements of the radical epistemological argument are offered by Hartsock and D. Smith, who rely on Marx.

¹⁷It is symptomatic of the collapse into pluralism that feminists feel the urge to openly admit their biases and justify them on the basis that bias is unobjectionable if it is made visible and if it operates to counterbalance other biases. See Maccoby and Jacklin (pp. 12-13) and Oakley (pp. 2-3), both of whom cheerfully recite a view similar to that of C. Wright Mills (p. 21). See a trenchant comment by Sherman (p. vii) and a sarcastic one by Bleier (p. 162). Parsons attempts in the early part of her paper to give a taxonomy of bias, and more of the same can be inferred from Sherif's paper on bias in psychology.

¹⁸Mannheim, p. 155 (see generally pp. 153-164).

¹⁹Mannheim, pp. 156-157. Here Mannheim seems to fall into the "additive" synthetic epistemological pluralism he condemns (at p. 152). Earlier in this paper (fn. 4) I said that Daniels advances the social-based moderate epistemological argument. This is true, I would argue, because of her attraction to a Mannheim read as a pluralist rather than to a Mannheim read as giving an account of epistemological superiority.

²⁰Thus I am dubious about Roberts' claim (p. 9) that Mannheimian women scientists have "a detached perspective." I should mention that even though I speak of D. Smith as relying on Marx's sociology of knowledge, it is also true that she sees individual women scientists as being in both camps at the same time (especially in her 1874 paper). But in her paper in *Prism* she is more explicitly Marxist and rejects Mannheim (at p. 162).

²¹D. Smith, *Prism*, p. 164. See also Hartsock, pp. 2-9.

²²On socialist feminism, see Jaggar (1977) and Jaggar and Struhl, just for starters. On socialist feminist methodology in the social sciences, see Gould's survey.

²³See my (1981).

²⁴See my (1977).

²⁵Eichler, surprisingly, asserts the conventional wisdom: "... feminist efforts are geared towards the exploration and charting of sex roles ... in order to be able to understand and ultimately to overcome them" (p. 9). Similar sentiments are expressed by Sherman (pp. ix, 172, 179). I like to paraphrase the Eleventh Thesis as "the point is not to understand the world, but to change it."

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Sexual Dimorphisms in the Brain and Behavior: Reflections on the Concept

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Sex and gender are highly salient characteristics of individuals in our world. The question of sex differences is of considerable interest to men and women, to scientists and laypersons alike. This interest continues to be reflected in a steady flow of scientific and popular accounts of the most recent advances in the study of sex differences. For example, a recent edition of *Discover* magazine told us in the subtitle of one article that "Men and women think differently. Science is finding out why." (Weintraub, 1981) That article summarized several lines of recent psychological research which focus on biochemical and neuroanatomical factors in sex differentiation. Other articles have discussed sex differences in specific skills, such as quantitative and mathematical ability, commenting on the degree to which brain differences might account for observed or assumed sex differences in those skills (Kolata, 1983).

The neurobiology of sex differences is an area of scientific research which has recently shown rapid expansion. Though our scientific understanding of the nature and origin of sex differences in behavior and physiology logically need not have an impact on individual self-concept or on social policy (Levy, 1981; Lambert, 1978), it would be naive to think that in practice the public's interest in sex differences is merely frivolous curiosity, or that our beliefs regarding the nature and origins of sex differences have no impact on personal or public decision-making (Tiefer, 1978). Thus as scientific information on gender becomes increasingly complex, it is likewise increasingly essential that the process of communication accurately convey the richness and intricacy of that information. Neurobiological scientists are generally aware of the complexity of coinfluences on behavior but, as Star (1979a) has noted, "such realizations are rarely put forth clearly or forcefully in the popular . . . press, and even careful researchers . . . slip into the culturally condoned and readily available language of sex differentiation to describe brain functions."

This paper comments on four issues: 1) the history of research on sexually

dimorphic brain structures underlying behavioral functions; 2) the concept of 'brain centers' as regulators of behavior; 3) some sociological/philosophical issues in the interpretation of data relating to sex differences in brain function and behavior; and 4) the necessity for an "interactive" or "dialectical" or "epigenetic" framework for both scientific and general discussion of the psychobiology of gender.

At this point several questions could arise: What is a female? What is a male? What do we mean by gender? To what qualities are we referring when we speak of the sex of an individual? It is interesting that we rarely reflect on such questions. The recognition and identification of an individual as "male" or "female" is, in most cases, easily and unconsciously accomplished regardless of the age of the individual. This ease, however, belies the complexity and multiplicity of characteristics which comprise sex and gender. Clinical and experimental observations have shown us that these characteristics, though generally highly correlated, are never-the-less separable (Money and Ehrhardt, 1972). In fact, we can speak independently of 1) genetic (or chromosomal) sex, 2) gonadal sex (presence of testes or ovaries), 3) genital sex (presence of vagina or penis), 4) secondary sexual characteristics (body shape, breasts, facial hair, etc.), 5) gender identity (sense of self as male or female), 6) sexual orientation (choice of partner for sexual activity), 7) masculinity versus femininity (e.g. aggressiveness is often seen as "masculine" and gentleness as "feminine"), and 8) gender roles (societal functions prescribed for individuals of each sex). Thus, though sex/gender of an individual is generally treated as dichotomous, it is clearly multifaceted. Indeed, each of the above characteristics could, and should, be further analyzed in the course of exploring questions of sex and gender.

The Biological Paradigm: Organizational Effects of Hormones

An enormous body of literature exists which tests for behavioral differences between the sexes in both humans and animals (c.f. Maccoby and Jacklin, 1974). In some cases the research is designed to test long-standing assumptions about male and female behavior. In other cases the primary goal is the understanding of the behavior itself, since identification of any source of variability in a behavior, such as occurs with gender, provides a 'tool' for analysis of the origins of that behavior.

When sex differences are demonstrated, we are faced with many choices regarding research strategy or focus if we wish to understand how those differences came about. Scientists who are familiar with research on reproductive physiology might naturally refer, by analogy, to work done on the differentiation of the gonads and the genitalia (Baum, 1979; Wilson, 1978), particularly to a process known as the "organizational effects" of hormones or alternatively referred to as the process of "androgenization" (Carlson, 1981; Baum, 1982; Goy and McEwen, 1980; Levy, 1981). This operating assumption was defined succinctly by Arendash and Gorski (1982) as the concept that "the mammalian brain is inherently female or bipotential,

with sexual differentiation of its reproductive functions largely determined by (presence or absence of) testicular hormones secreted during perinatal development". In other words, in the presence of androgens a male develops; in their absence a female develops.

This role of sex hormones in 'organizing' or inducing perinatal development of the male and female reproductive physiology has been studied for over forty years. The paradigm for the study of perinatal sex differentiation involved neonatal manipulation of gonadal hormones and subsequent observation of the capacity of the treated adult to ovulate (Wilson, 1978; Pfeiffer, 1936). The ovaries of adult female mammals show a regular release of oocytes (eggs), a process known as ovulation. This capacity is not merely a consequence of the existence of a functioning ovary since an ovary transplanted into a normal female rat will show ovulation while the same ovary transplanted into a male will not ovulate. If a genetic female rat is implanted with a testes neonatally, in adulthood it loses its capacity to maintain ovulation. If a male rat is gonadectomized neonatally, it has the capacity to maintain an ovulating ovary as an adult. The same paradigm can be developed using pharmacological techniques rather than surgical ones. Female rats can be injected with androgens (androgenized) neonatally and will show the 'masculine' anovulatory pattern. Males can be treated with an androgen blocker and will show the 'feminine' cyclical pattern.

The effect of this neonatal 'organizing' effect of testicular androgens could theoretically occur at several levels. It apparently does not occur in the gonad itself, since the nonovulating (anovulatory) ovary of an androgenized female rat will function normally if implanted into a normal female or a perinatally gonadectomized male rat. Nor does the effect occur at the level of the pituitary (the endocrine gland located at the base of the brain which releases the surge of gonadotropin necessary to stimulate ovulation); the pituitary of an androgenized female rat, or a normal male rat, which in its intact state does not show cyclical release of the gonadotropic hormones, will function cyclically if transplanted into a normal female or a perinatally gonadectomized male (Levine, 1966; MacKinnon, 1978).

Recent work has demonstrated that cyclical release of gonadotropic hormone is regulated by a "releasing hormone" localized in the region of the hypothalamus. Ovulatory cycles and cyclical release of gonadotropin seen in female rats apparently depend on the responsiveness of this brain area to feedback from hormones released by the ovaries (review: Goldman, 1978). The exact biochemical and physiological nature of this communication is still under study. However, it is clear that these specific brain areas function differently in female and male rats. Based on such observations, researchers have come to speak of "masculine" and "feminine" brains (e.g. Levine, 1966; Levy, 1981; Gorski, 1979).

Researchers speculate on the relevance of this "concept of sexual differentiation", as Gorski (1979) has called it, for understanding sex differences in behavior of both animals and humans, and even suggest that such phenomena as career choice, desire to parent or homosexuality might be explained by hormonally induced brain

differences (Money and Ehrhardt, 1972; Reinisch, 1976) Are those speculations empirically grounded? Is this conception of sexual differentiation, developed during the study of biochemical and morphological phenomena, appropriate to the analysis and description of behavioral phenomena?

Kuhn (1962) describes the "normal progress of science" as involving the extension of "paradigms" such as those found in the study of the "androgenization" effect. The Kuhnian notion of paradigm extension, though controversial, provides a useful framework for structuring the discussion of the neurobiology of behavioral sex differences and gender.

Extension of the Paradigm: Rat Lordosis and Mounting.

Shortly after the establishment of the theoretical and methodological paradigm by Pfeiffer (1936), Vera Dantchakoff (1938) reported that female guinea pigs exposed neonatally to androgens showed increased levels of mounting behavior, a behavior which is more frequent in male than female guinea pigs. Following this early observation of changes in behavioral predispositions as a function of perinatal hormone environment, little work was done for over 20 years. In the 60's interest in behavioral "organization" by hormones increased following work such as that of Harris (1964) and of Young *et al.* (1964).

Much fundamental work has used a sensory-motor sexual reflex, "lordosis", as the behavioral index of interest (Gorski, 1979). Lordosis is a highly stereotypic arching of the back performed by the female rat in response to male mounting or mounting attempts (Pfaff, 1980). In rats the lordosis posture is not performed by males, and the performance by females is dependent on the presence of gonadal hormones. Because of the stereotypic nature of lordosis and the consequent ease in scoring its occurrence during behavioral observations, and because it is, in rats at least, complete sexually dimorphic, it is a useful behavior pattern with which to evaluate the applicability of Pfeiffer's paradigm to behavior. In fact, exposure to androgens perinatally has the predicted effect of reducing or blocking lordosis in female rats and perinatal castration of males made them responsive to gonadal hormones (Gorski, 1979; Goldman, 1978).

While the sensory-motor neural substrate of the lordosis posture has been well analyzed (Pfaff, 1980), the mechanism by which the shift in behavioral predisposition occurs following hormone exposure is not understood. Though sensory changes in genitalia might be involved, most attention has focused on brain mechanisms.

In this context, "feminine" is the appropriate demonstration of lordosis response, while "masculine" is absence of such a reflex following appropriate hormonal and sensory stimulation. Though only a few species have been studied, clear species differences exist (Baum, 1979). For example, in the hamster, the lordosis posture is quantitatively but not qualitatively sexually dimorphic; male hamsters show lordosis. Primates do not show a lordosis response, although pelvic movements

may be analogous. Communications to the general public regarding research on psychobiology of gender should acknowledge such current limits to our knowledge while extolling the developments in that knowledge.

The "masculine" sexual behavior which has been studied extensively, again primarily using rats, is "mounting" (Hart, 1974). Mounting is less dichotomously a "masculine" behavior pattern, since in rats and many other species females also engage in this behavior, though less frequently. Mounting frequency, as predicted, increases in "androgenized" genetic females and declines in neonatally castrated genetic males. Again, the mechanism of that change in behavioral predisposition is not yet understood, though attention has focused on possible brain mechanisms.

Extension of the Paradigm: Nonsexual Behaviors

A variety of other sexually dimorphic behaviors have been examined for their response to perinatal hormone exposure: "aggressive" behaviors, "play" behaviors, urination posture in the dog, food intake, body weight regulation, "territorial marking", activity, maze learning, and avoidance learning (Gorski, 1978; Goldman, 1978; Hart, 1974). Several mammalian species have been studied, including primates; however, the rat continues to be the most common experimental animal. The behaviors studied are (unlike lordosis and gonadotropin cyclicity) statistical, nondichotomous sex dimorphisms. And, with the possible exception of "aggressive" behaviors, less experimental work has been done on the endocrinology of these behaviors than has been done on lordosis and gonadotropin cyclicity.

Using a variety of measures, "aggressiveness" is a sexually dimorphic trait the frequency of which is influenced by perinatal hormone environment in rodents and possibly in primates. Whenever psychobiology of aggression is discussed the elusiveness of that behavioral phenomenon is initially acknowledged; "aggression" is a very complex construct. For example, Moyer (1976) has identified several quite distinct categories of aggression, including maternal defense and a category he calls "male-male aggression". Though Moyer's categories were a major advance in the discussion of psychobiology of aggression, they represent only the beginning of the necessary conceptual analysis.

In several mammalian species, the expression of "aggressiveness" is influenced by early exposure to androgens (Hart, 1974; Moyer, 1976). In rats and mice, androgenization increases the likelihood of interspecific attacks, regardless of the adult hormonal state. The mechanism of the effect is not understood but is complex.

Extension of the Paradigm: Humans

Species differences exist in the magnitude of sex dimorphism of various physiological and behavioral traits and the impact of early hormone exposure on those traits. For example, unlike male rats, male primates show gonadotropin surges ("cyclicity") similar to females, if they receive appropriate hormone stimuli. The comparative study of species differences promises to provide insight into the diversity and mechanism of perinatal hormone influences (Baum, 1979). However,

at the moment, comparative studies are relatively few; the majority of studies of organizational effects have used the white rat as the behavioral model.

Can this "androgenization" principle be extended to human physiology and behavior? Evidence regarding perinatal hormones on human physiology and behavior comes from clinical studies of sex hormone abnormalities. Observations of genetic females with adrenogenital syndrome, of genetic males with androgen insensitivity, and of genetic females whose mothers were treated with steroids early in pregnancy to prevent miscarriage are most commonly cited to suggest that human sex differentiation follows a pattern largely similar to other mammals (Kaplan, 1980; Parsons, 1980; Money and Ehrhardt, 1972; Ehrhardt and Baker, 1974). The development of genitalia in the human fetus occurs at about 6 weeks postconception. A genetic female fetus with an abnormally active adrenal gland is exposed to high levels of adrenal steroids during that period and shows masculine genital development. Conversely, genetic males which lack receptors for androgens are born with female genitalia.

Hormonal influence on human genitalia is not controversial. Controversy begins when the question of hormonal influences on human behavior is broached. Are elements of human behavior modified by the prenatal hormonal environment? If so, can those hormonal influences directly structure behavior? Answers to such questions will not be greeted neutrally.

In answer to these questions, it is often noted that clinical studies have reported behavioral differences between "androgenized" females and their normal sisters; they are reported by their mothers to be more career oriented and tomboyish (Money and Ehrhardt, 1972). It less often noted that the retrospective reports of these mothers might be distorted in a variety of ways and that the postnatal medical treatment for adrenogenital syndrome might confound interpretation of prenatal hormone exposure (Sayers, 1982, p 75). Moreover, interpretation of such clinical observations are influenced by underlying presuppositions about the nature of gender and appropriate sex roles (Kaplan, 1980).

Unlike genitalia and the behavioral predispositions mentioned above, gender identity, the experience of oneself as male or female, has been thought to be independent of prenatal hormones (Carlson, 1981). Money and Ehrhardt (1972) have concluded that gender identity is determined by socialization; they note that androgenized genetic females still perceive themselves as female, if they are raised as females, despite partially masculinized genitalia and despite the "masculine" behavior mentioned above. They also note cases of female gender identity in genetic males, normally androgenized prenatally but reared as females for various clinical reasons.

This socialization view of gender identity has, however, recently been challenged by Imperato-McGinley (1979), a biochemist from Cornell University who has been studying a unique disorder. In this "male pseudohermaphrodite" syndrome genetic males are born with ambiguously female genitalia as a consequence of an inability of their body to properly synthesize the androgens necessary for male genital

development. These individuals are then reared as females. However, at puberty their body begins responding to available androgens and male genitalia develop along with male secondary sexual characteristics (facial hair, voice change, etc.). Though these individuals had been reared as females, a large proportion of them reportedly shift their gender identity and begin to function as males (Imperato-McGinley, 1979). Imperato-McGinley views this as evidence that early rearing conditions do not permanently structure gender identity; interestingly, she suggests that gender identity might therefore be due to a hormonal structuring of brain centers which determine gender identity.

Extension of the Paradigm: The Brain

Based on the kinds of research discussed above, researchers have long spoken of "sex differences in the brain" (c.f. Levine, 1966). However, those brain differences were inferred and functional differences. It was only ten years ago that physical, morphological sex differences were directly observed in the rat brain (Raisman and Field, 1973). Recent work has shown that the size and density of the sexually dimorphic nuclei in the subcortical, preoptic area are affected by perinatal hormone exposure (Jacobson, Csernus, Shryne and Gorski 1981).

The region of the anterior hypothalamic/preoptic area (AH-POA) in which morphologic sex differences have been observed had previously been implicated in reproductive physiology and behavior. Electrical stimulation of the preoptic region facilitates male sexual behavior, inhibits female sexual responsiveness and inhibits gonadotropin release in rats (Carlson, 1981). The POA influences the tuberal region of the anterior hypothalamus which is implicated in regulation of the gonadotropin surge in female rats. Again, the physiological function of the AH/POA region is less controversial than its behavioral function. Yet the mechanisms of the behavioral functions of these brain areas in rodents are still unclear.

Recent attention has focused on possible sex differences in the cerebral cortex, the brain area most extensively developed in humans and generally associated with consciousness and intellectual functioning (Levy, 1981; Sayers, 1982; McGlone, 1980). The "organizational effect" of early hormone exposure could theoretically affect cortical development; however, the types of sex differences in cortical structure are unclear and their meaning is presently difficult to interpret (Star, 1979b). Thus, though the study of hormone effects on brain structure is a promising research area, we are only in the early stages of understanding those effects. Moreover, there is still much work to be done before we will understand the relationship between brain structure and gender. However, it is unlikely that we will find that relationship to be simple or unidirectional.

Discussion

In popular humor, an extension of one of "Murphy's Laws" goes as follows: "A workable, understandable falsehood is always preferred over a complex, incompre-

hensible truth." When coping with the complexities of brain-behavior relations, we, as scientists, may operate according to that dictum more than we are comfortable admitting. Scientists who study psychobiology of reproduction or of gender will acknowledge that the origins of gender are multiple. However, as empirical scientists, we fragment the phenomenon of interest in order to systematically analyze it. Moreover, we operate on the assumption that the fragments which are independently studied indeed operate independently. Such an assumption may be necessary for the performance of daily science; however, it should be acknowledge and re-evaluated when we return to the general interpretation and communication of our empirical results.

If the workable, understandable falsehood we prefer is the assumption of simple direct causal relations between brain and behavior in the determination of gender, what then is the complex truth? Rose (1976) has suggested that the problems lay in the confusion of hierarchical levels of explanation, and that the "truth" lay in the awareness of such levels. However, "the problem" may extend beyond mere confusion of levels of explanation. The simple notion of hierarchical levels of explanation carries in it the implication that those levels can be treated as discrete, independent and static in their explanation of behavior. Moreover, the metaphor of levels implies a linear priority of control. Rather, the metaphor of a "web" of interconnected explanatory factors seems more appropriate for the psychobiology of gender.

That researchers studying psychoendocrinology assume a simple nature-nurture dichotomy, that we often assume *direct* behavioral actions of hormones or of socialization, and that we often do not attend to interactions between contributing factors is illustrated by the differing opinions regarding the effects of prenatal hormone exposure on gender identity. Where gender identity was congruent with sex of rearing, socialization was considered the determining factor (Money and Ehrhardt, 1972). Alternatively, where gender identity diverged from the sex of rearing, biological factors were invoked as the key determinant (Imperato-McGinley, *et al.* 1979). Surprisingly, little attention is paid to the possible interrelation of factors (such as genital structure and social expectation) in the initial assignment of sex or in the later potential for shifts in gender identity.

The advocacy by mainstream psychobiology of overly simple models in the explanation of gender is further illustrated in a recent and highly respected textbook in psychobiology (Carlson, 1981). After discussing the organizational effects of hormones on rat brain and behavior, and commenting on the observations of prenatal hormone effects on human behavior, Carlson comments that "presumably these behavioral effects (of hormones on human behavior) are produced by structural changes within the brain, but we lack direct evidence." (page 330) If we continue with the strained presumption that the effects of early hormone exposure are mediated solely and directly by brain structure, we will continue to examine our evidence in that context and we will miss the obvious, richer explanations of gender.

The psychobiology of sex differences must continue development of theoretical frameworks which encourage and legitimize more dynamic, interactive treatment of factors contributing to gender differences (e.g. Peterson, 1980; Star, 1979a). A full understanding of gender will require the continued development of a theoretical framework which not only allows incorporation of biological, psychological and sociocultural factors, but more importantly, acknowledges the dynamic, interactive relationships between biological, socio-cultural, cognitive and environmental factors which contribute to gender. Commenting on scientists studying hormones and behavior, Tiefer (1978) has noted a tendency to overlook more complex socio-cultural mediation of biological influences. Conversely, the socio-cultural view is at other times overemphasized and the biological dimensions of gender undervalued (Sayers, 1982). Scientific research will continue to analyze the "components" of gender; however, we must begin to develop a more sophisticated view of the interactions between those "component parts". To do otherwise is to risk increasing distortion of our collective understanding and knowledge regarding the nature and origins of gender.

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Darwin and Sexism: Victorian Causes, Contemporary Effects

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Like all scholars, scientists hold, either explicitly or implicitly, certain beliefs concerning their enterprise. Most scientists believe, for example, that the laws and facts gathered by scientists are constant, providing the experiments have been done correctly. As Rose and Rose put it, they seem to feel that "Science is the pursuit of natural laws, laws which are valid irrespective of the nation, race, politics, religion, or class position of their discoverer."¹ If the observations of science reflect natural law, they stand outside historical context. Both the facts and the theories based on them are, according to this kind of view, affect- and effect-free, having come from sheer attentiveness to the outside world unmolded by opinion or desire, and leading only to those applications which others might wish to make of them. While some scientists, to be sure, neither hold nor profess such views, science itself, perhaps because of these attitudes, enjoys tremendous public prestige.

Historians of science make us aware that the individuals who make observations and create theories are people who live in a particular country during a certain time in a definable socio-economic condition, and that their situations and mentalities inevitably impinge on their discoveries. Even "facts" are contingent. Aristotle "counted fewer teeth in the mouths of women than in those of men—adding this dental inferiority to all the others."² Galen, aware of the account in the book of Genesis, "discovered" that men had one less rib on one side than women did.³ Clearly, observation of what would appear by today's standards to be easily verifiable facts can vary depending upon the theory or paradigm, to use the terminology of Thomas S. Kuhn⁴ under which the scientist is operating.

The paradigms are far from value-free. The values of a culture heavily influence the ordering of observable phenomena into theory. The world view of a particular

society, time, and person limits the questions which can be asked and thereby the answers which can be given. Kuhn has demonstrated that the very acceptance of a particular paradigm which may appear to cause a "scientific revolution" within a society, depends in fact upon the congruence of that theory with the institutions and beliefs of the society.

The theories of Charles Darwin constitute such a paradigm, one which has deeply influenced the thinking of both natural and social scientists from his time to our own. To take a notable example, "sociobiologists" use many of Darwin's observations and paradigms to support their constructs. This paper is a feminist critique of the theory of sexual selection, a concept which assumes and provides a scientific explanation for female inferiority. Insofar as the attitudes imbedded in it still remain with us, it calls for our critical understanding.

In the *Origin of the Species* (1859)⁶ Darwin brings in the theory of sexual selection as a secondary agent to explain how descent with modification, or evolution, has taken place. The primary agent of change, in that first version of the theory, was natural selection, a paradigm laden with the values of nineteenth-century England. As Rose and Rose suggest, "its central metaphors" (and we shall have occasion to return to the idea of theory as metaphor) "drawn from society and in their turn interacting with society were of the competition of species, the struggle for existence, the ecological niche, and the survival of the fittest."⁸ These metaphors reflect Victorian society and were acceptable to it because they, and the "social Darwinism" quickly derived from it, seemed to ground its norms solidly in a biological foundation. (Compare also Ruse, 1979.)⁷ When Darwin depicts the fittest as the individuals who pass on their genes to the greatest number of offspring, one thinks of the importance of the passing on of property in this society. One can hardly overlook an upper class perspective and appeal when, in the *Descent of Man* (1874) Darwin implores that "both sexes ought to refrain from marriage if they are in any marked degree inferior in body or mind; . . . All ought to refrain from marriage who cannot avoid abject poverty for their children, for poverty is . . . a great evil . . ."⁹ The upper class of Victorian England had self-serving reasons for finding his theory attractive; it gave a biological rationale for their very position in society.

In like manner, the theory of sexual selection reflected and reinforced Victorian social norms regarding the sexes. By this theory Darwin set out to explain a phenomenon still not fully understood, that of secondary sex characteristics. He claimed that "when the males and females of any animal have the same general habits of life, but differ in structure, colour, or ornament, such differences have been mainly caused by sexual selection." (*Origin of the Species*, p. 89.) Expanding considerably on the theory first presented in the *Origin*, Darwin specifies, in the *Descent of Man*, how the process functions and what roles males and females play in it.

The sexual struggle is of two kinds: in the one it is between the individuals of the same sex, generally the males, in order to drive away

or kill their rivals, the females remaining passive; whilst in the other, the struggle is likewise between the individuals of the same sex, in order to excite or charm those of the opposite sex, generally the females, which no longer remain passive, but select the more agreeable partners. (p. 64)

According to the theory, the males who triumph over their rivals will win the more desirable females and will leave the most progeny, thereby perpetuating and increasing, over numerous generations, those qualities which afforded them victory. The females who succeed in being chosen will also procreate best and pass on their characters. As a result, by the time evolution has produced modern man and modern woman, the two are considerably different, men being superior to women both physically and mentally. They are not only "taller, heavier, and stronger than women, with squarer shoulders and more plainly pronounced muscles" but also they attain to a "higher eminence" in whatever they take up. (p. 564) The theory reflects the Victorian age, with its depiction of active males competing and struggling with each other for passive females. That depiction of male/female interaction would have seemed quite obvious to most segments of Victorian society and its grounding in scientific fact most reassuring.

However, the process of sexual selection involved in the theory encountered much resistance. Biologists of Darwin's own time came up with numerous counter-examples. Alfred Wallace, who had independently arrived at the theory of natural selection, fundamentally disagreed with the theory of sexual selection. Even Darwin himself gives proof, in the *Descent of Man*, of considerable difficulty with many of the assumptions and necessities of his theory and admits that, especially as applied to the history of man, it "wants scientific precision." (p. 605) Antoinette Blackwell (1875)⁹ attacked his theory on a number of points. In her understanding that a central problem of the theory was Darwin's own limited perspective as a male observer, she may be said to have made the first feminist criticism of it.

In order to arrive at that understanding we make an analysis of the language and linguistic procedures Darwin used. Donald Symons, the self-styled "Darwinian psychologist" whose work has been so deeply influenced by his great predecessor, claimed recently that language is of secondary interest and is brought into play only after the perception is in place.¹⁰ The writer consciously chooses whatever words best suit his/her purposes. If, as we claim, language is one of the factors that shapes perception, a close analysis of language reveals inner workings of thought, even those aspects of which the writer might be unaware or which s/he may prefer to conceal.

To make an adequate contemporary analysis and critique of the theory of sexual selection, one must ask why Darwin needed such a theory. Where, in his enterprise of affirming, proving, strengthening the principle of evolution in the mind of the reader, does sexual selection, as an agent of such change, fit in? Indeed, Darwin asserted and demonstrated, both in the *Origin of the Species* and in the *Descent of Man*, several means by which species advance and differentiate, sexual selection being a quite minor one in the former work and yet taking on primary importance in

the latter. Why did he invent such a theory in the first place? Why did it acquire more prominence in his mind over the nearly fifteen years which passed between the publication of the *Origin* and that of the *Descent*? In examining that question, one begins to understand the patterns of thought, both manifest and covert, which characterize it.

Let us look, then, at Darwin the writer. Though he is not particularly renowned as a stylist, his wording especially in the *Origin* is quite interesting. It is enhanced by his insight into language as a metaphor. Let us define metaphor as the application, by analogy, of terms ordinarily associated with one realm to another. It was by metaphor that Darwin chose at least some of his key terms, natural selection, to take a first notable example.

I have called this principle, by which each slight variation, if useful, is preserved, by the term of Natural Selection, in order to mark its relation to man's power of selection . . . Natural Selection . . . is a power incessantly ready for action, and is as immeasurably superior to man's feeble efforts, as the works of Nature are to those of Art. (*Origin*, p. 61)

Variation under domestication, Darwin claims, provides the best clue to variation under nature. In so claiming, he proceeds metaphorically, generating a concept of nature from a concept of art.

The term "struggle for existence" was also, by Darwin's own assertion, a metaphorical one. "I should premise that I use the term Struggle for Existence in a large and metaphorical sense." (p. 62) The sort of case in which one might apply the term literally would be that of two dogs struggling with each other to get food and live during a time of dearth, Darwin explains. Or, one might say, literally, truly, or properly, that several seedling mistletoes, close together on the same branch, struggle with each other. But Darwin states his intention to use the term in many other sorts of situations.

As the mistletoe is disseminated by birds, its existence depends on birds; and it may metaphorically be said to struggle with other fruit-bearing plants, in order to tempt birds to devour and thus disseminate its seeds rather than those of other plants. In these several senses, which pass into each other, I use for convenience sake the general term of struggle for existence. (p. 63)

That Darwin spoke metaphorically is one way to explain the easy passage even in his own time from Darwinism to Social Darwinism, for indeed Darwin himself was much given to the passing or transferring of terms from realm to realm, including, notably, the natural to the social and vice versa. The adaptations of which he speaks in the natural world are readily seen at work in society: "In social animals it (i.e., natural selection) will adapt the structure of each individual for the benefit of society." (p. 87) Thus Darwin's presentation of nature is a metaphorical or, we might say, poetic vision generated in part by his conception of the human.

The metaphors by which Darwin, in the *Origin*, describes the process of sexual selection are borrowed from human society. Indeed, even as he speaks of separation

of the sexes in plants he immediately brings in a principle of economics, claiming that the separation becomes advantageous because it is a "physiological division of labor." (pp. 93-94) As he moves toward the animal realm, the relationship between the sexes is depicted in a quite anthropomorphic manner. In the case of some animals, such as stags, cocks, and alligators, the relationship is warlike, the animals being described as equipped with weapons and shields. In the case of birds, the metaphor is that of a theatrical performance on the part of the males, a performance designed to charm and seduce the females. The seduction itself is a male prerogative; the females wait until the battle or the act ends, finally choosing the males who have performed most valiantly or most delightfully. Having described animals in human terms, Darwin goes on, and at much more length, in the *Descent*, to differentiate between male and female human beings in those same terms which he "discovered" in the animal world.

In the *Descent*, Darwin expands his theory considerably, attributing more importance to it in the process of evolution than he had in the *Origin*, and amassing an impressive amount of detail in order to demonstrate it. But detail notwithstanding, his highly favored theory encountered difficulty, not only because of the criticism it evoked but also in his own mind, though he did not admit the latter in any overt way. He does confess at least twice in the *Descent* that it is difficult to affirm whether given structures have been developed through natural or sexual selection. (pp. 210 and 615) Natural selection operates "in relation to the general purposes of life" whereas sexual selection comes into play "in relation to the propagation of the species." (p. 615) "Hence secondary sexual characters, when equally transmitted to both sexes can be distinguished from ordinary specific characters only by the light of analogy." (*loc. cit.*) Again Darwin proceeds metaphorically. Only by metaphor can one discern the action of sexual selection at all. That Darwin appeals to metaphor as a last resort at a moment of difficulty in his theory is not surprising, since the whole theory is grounded on metaphorical procedures. In doing so, he points out the profoundly metaphorical nature of his thought process. But when metaphors function poorly, as they do in the *Descent*, the comparisons become mere examples. This is perhaps why the *Descent* is a long tedious recital of cases which never quite seem to reinforce the theory adequately.

Why, then, one wonders, did Darwin insist on the theory so much? What role did it play in his total conception of change in nature? Initially, in the *Origin*, Darwin used the theory as a secondary agent to explain the means by which evolution takes place.

Amongst many animals, sexual selection will give its aid to ordinary selection, by assuring to the most vigorous and best adapted males the greatest number of offspring. (p. 127)

The reader understands readily that sexual selection is a minor support to natural selection. But s/he may be surprised to see that males only are mentioned as the bearers of the desirable characteristics which are sexually selected. At this point in the text Darwin adds a second benefit of sexual selection: "Sexual selection will also

and vice versa. Here he stressed cooperation and difference rather than competition and likeness.

The desire to distinguish came to be an increasing obsession with Darwin after the *Origin*. The context in which he places his agent of differentiation in the *Descent of Man* is not a coincidence. This book consists of two major parts, the first a discussion of human evolution which ends with a consideration of whether the different races should be classified into the same species. He stresses that it is difficult to accept that one should do so, because of the prodigious differences among them. He decides that in fact they should be considered as sub-species. At this point in the book he begins to introduce his second topic, sexual selection in the natural and human realms. This juxtaposition of ideas—classification of the races and sexual selection—suggests that Darwin was as reluctant to view the races metaphorically as he was the sexes. Here is a second area in which he dislikes to think of analogies, gradations, similarities, where he introduces instead a procedure to explain differences. His familiar agent of differentiation, sexual selection, makes a second and even more prominent appearance here than in the *Origin*. Darwin provides an excellent locus to study Shulamith Firestone's claim that "racism is sexism extended."¹¹

A rather bizarre and apparently gratuitous passage in the *Origin* takes on some meaning in the light of Darwin's difficulty with metaphor in the case of race and sex. It is in his chapter on the importance of descent or family in the establishing of categories (Chapter Thirteen) that Darwin remarks specifically on the vast differences between the sexes of a species. Having made that remark, he introduces an imaginary interlocutor who asks him how, since he emphasizes the importance of descent in classifying, he would classify a species of kangaroo which had been "produced by a long course of modification from a bear?" Darwin calls this imaginary objection "preposterous" and states "I might answer by the *argumentum ad hominem*, and ask what should be done if a perfect kangaroo were seen to come out of the womb of a bear?" Darwin repeats the word "preposterous" in his characterizing of that "reductio ad absurdum." (p. 425) What is all this talk about bears and kangaroos? Who would have made such an objection? What made Darwin think of it? The context of the passage is revealing. He had just been commenting on the differences between the sexes. Perhaps it seemed as absurd to him that a male should be born of a female as that a kangaroo be born of a bear. We have seen how, in the *Descent*, he shows the same repugnance to identify himself with other races as with the other sex.

The astonishment which I felt on first seeing a party of Feugians on a wild and broken shore will never be forgotten by me, for the reflection at once broke into my mind—such were our ancestors . . . For my own part, I would as soon be descended from that heroic little monkey, who braved his dreaded enemy in order to save the life of his keeper . . .
(*Descent*, pp. 618-619)

We maintain that the theory of sexual selection was necessary for Darwin in his

give characters useful to the males alone, in their struggles with other males." Again, the focus is entirely on the male half of the species. The only activity envisioned in this expression is bound up in a masculine world.

Later in the same work (pp. 156-158) Darwin stresses the variability of secondary sexual characteristics. He wonders why there is more variability in these characters than in those of other parts of the organism. Sexual selection has "wide scope for action." At this point, Darwin expands on the possible benefits of sexual selection.

Variations of this part would, it is highly probable, be taken advantage of by natural and sexual selection, in order to fit the several species to their several places in the economy of nature, and likewise to fit the two sexes of the same species to each other, or to fit the males and females to different habits of life, or the males to struggle with other males for the possession of the females. (pp. 157-158)

The verb "to fit" is used three times, in this society-oriented description. Darwin speaks as if places have been somehow previously marked out for the species and the sexes. As the sentence continues, he increasingly stresses the differences between the sexes and again depicts a world in which the males actively struggle for passive females, who become the property of the winning males.

What seems to have struck Darwin most when he observed males and females of species throughout the natural world was the tremendous difference between them: "How enormously these sometimes differ in the most important characters is known to every naturalist." (*Origin*, p. 424) What amazed him was the fact that such different beings belong to the same species. When viewing the human world in the light of other natural realms, he was even surprised to note that even greater differences still had not been evolved.

It is, indeed, fortunate that the law of the equal transmission of characters to both sexes prevails with mammals; otherwise it is probable that man would have become as superior in mental endowment to woman, as the peacock is in ornamental plumage to the peahen. (*Descent*, p. 565)

As Darwin depicts male/female interaction, it seems that the former constitute something like a separate group, interacting mainly with each other in relation to another quite separate group, the members of which have relatively fewer secondary sex characteristics. In order to make the differentiation between males and females as strong as possible, the theory of sexual selection is needed. It is the agent of differentiation, that which assures an ever-increasing separation between the sexes, their operation in two quite distinct realms which touch only for the purpose of procreation.

Thus whereas the functioning principle of Darwin's thought is metaphor, whereby beings are constantly compared with each other, analogies constantly established, when Darwin comes to the intra-specific sexes, he abruptly stops the process of metaphor. He eliminates metaphor as a way of thinking the moment it might suggest that analogies drawn from the male world might apply to the female

attempt to arrest the consequences of his own metaphorical procedures, necessary because of his desire not to compare himself with beings (members of the other sex, members of other races) he could not consider his equals and because of his repugnance in contemplating his ancestral ties with them.

Sexism and racism were part of Darwin's way of viewing the world. They deeply influenced the elaboration of his theory, keeping him, in fact, from following his own insights to certain of their conclusions which threatened his world view. Instead of pursuing the implications of his theory, he arrested its development at crucial points, attempting to set the sexes into pre-determined roles, the races into discrete categories.

Historians might advise us not to be excessively upset by this and urge that we try to understand theories in the context of their times only, not to judge them. Darwin himself, by way of justifying his forays into the extra-scientific and the non-verifiable, in the *Descent of Man*, claimed that whereas false facts may be harmful to the progress of science, false views are not. We do not agree. It is unfortunate that a scientific justification for sexism and racism can be found in such a creditable source as the father of modern biology. And this father has numerous descendants. A reflection of his manner of thinking is to be seen in the work of sociobiologists today.

Sociobiology is the study of the biological basis of behavior. It attempts to show that human social institutions and social behavior are the results of biological forces acting through prehuman and human evolution. The theory is based on Darwin's theory of evolution through natural selection, which sociobiologists claim to extend and amplify.¹²

Sociobiologists describe human sex roles and behaviors as innate and programmed into the genes. They base these roles and behaviors on examples of social interaction in lower animals, which, not coincidentally, remind us in their turn of the human world: "aggression," "selfishness," "male dominance."¹³ In following a procedure like that of Darwin, current sociobiologists tend toward a rigidifying of social structures, as Darwin did. It is therefore important now as always to analyze critically the influence of social and psychological context on the scientific observation of natural phenomena and the generation of scientific theory. A close examination of the language and linguistic procedures which underlie the presentation of theory can bring non-explicit attitudes to the surface and allow one to expose some of the prejudice and preconception which formed and deformed the theory itself.

FOOTNOTES

¹Rita Arditti, "Feminism and Science," *Science and Liberation*, (Boston: South End Press, 1980), p. 17.

²*Loc. cit.*

- ³D. Webster and M. Webster, *Comparative Vertebrate Morphology*, (New York: Academic Press 1974).
- ⁴Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 2nd Edition, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970).
- ⁵Charles Darwin, *On the Origin of Species: A Facsimile of the First Edition*, (New York: Atheneum, 1967).
- ⁶Hilary Rose and Steven Rose, "The Myth of the Neutrality of Science," *Science and Liberation*, (Boston: South End Press, 1980), p. 28.
- ⁷Michael Ruse, *The Darwinian Revolution*, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1979).
- ⁸Charles Darwin, *Descent of Man*, (London: Murray, 1871), p. 618.
- ⁹Antoinette B. Blackwell, *The Sexes Throughout Nature*, A reprint of the 1875 edition, (Putnam, New York: Hyperion Press, 1976).
- ¹⁰Donaly Symons, *The Evolution of Human Sexuality*, (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979).
- ¹¹Shulamith Firestone, *The Dialectic of Sex*, (New York: William Morrow & Company, Inc., 1970).
- ¹²Marian Lowe and Ruth Hubbard, "Sociobiology and Biosociology: Can Science Prove the Biological Basis of Sex Differences in Behavior?" *Genes and Gender II*, (New York: Gordian Press, 1979).
- ¹³E. O. Wilson, *Sociobiology. The New Synthesis*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975).

Women and the Changing Norms of Health and Disease

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It is the traditional view taken by many medical professionals that medicine is a science on a par with the other sciences. If this is so, then health and illness can be defined in purely biological or physiological terms, so that the definition of health is as "scientific" as any of the definitions of physics. There is a good deal at stake in defending this claim, for if medical science is like physics—objective and value-neutral—it can lay claim to the high status which physics as a pure science has always enjoyed.

In this paper I will argue against this scientific view of medicine. My argument will center on an example drawn from the history of women, namely the ways in which norms of health-related behavior changed for American upper-middle class women from the nineteenth to the twentieth century. Consideration of this change, I believe, provides a clear counter-example to the view that the concepts of health and illness can be analyzed on a scientific model. Only by adopting a non-scientific model of health can such a change in norms be explained. Thus, by implication, this example provides a persuasive argument for accepting the view that health is relative to particular societies, culturally-determined at least in part, and in this sense, value-laden.

* * * *

Let me begin by drawing for you the pictures of two very different women who would seem familiar to different generations of American society.

The first is the pale, languorous, beautiful Mimi. Her white skin is almost transparent, her eyes burning with other-worldly luster, her lips too red. She is frail but has deep emotional responses. She will die a tragic tubercular death, but while she lives she embodies a Romantic ideal.

The second is the modern American woman who smiles out at us from the dimensions of the TV screen. She is dressed in a business suit, and she moves efficiently through the family breakfast scene early in the morning, and then goes off briskly and cheerfully to the office. She takes Geritol to ensure that her energy

level remains high, and she embodies a contemporary, superwoman ideal.

These are, of course, exaggerated pictures. Not all pale, languorous women of the nineteenth century died of tuberculosis and not all strong, vigorous contemporary women try to combine motherhood and career. But these pictures do represent a norm, a standard, an expectation. Each, in her own times, is considered "normal."

We could ask, Which is the "correct" norm of health? A better question is: Is there such a thing as a "correct" standard of health? What is health? What kind of a concept is the concept of health? How do we know what is healthy and what is not?

As far back as Aristotle it was recognized that the different kinds of knowledge could be divided into two classes. Theoretical knowledge, *episteme*, is pure scientific knowledge. It is disinterested, objective, universal, and worth having simply for its own sake. Aristotle was a great naturalist and enjoyed classifying the different objects in nature, discovering in the world the relationships which hold between things. To define something, for Aristotle, is to classify it by genus and species, and a definition, for him, is a real, as opposed to a linguistic or stipulative definition. Definition reflects the reality of the world.

Contrasted to theoretical knowledge is *techné*, or practical knowledge. Practical knowledge is knowledge which is for the sake of doing something. It is directed toward a practical end or goal. The goal of a particular action Aristotle thinks is set for us: all men necessarily aim at the good. But choosing the means to that goal is a matter of deliberation and choice. Aristotle points out that no one deliberates about things that cannot be other than they are.

Practical wisdom also must consider particulars as well as universals; the aim of practical wisdom is to know what to do here and now, in this particular situation. To recognize a general principle but not be able to apply it to the appropriate circumstance is to fail in practical wisdom. Thus, since practical wisdom involves deliberation and choice and perception of particulars, it cannot be objective and universal in the same sense as theoretical wisdom is.

Gilbert Ryle has developed Aristotle's distinction between theoretical and practical knowledge by calling attention to the difference between knowing that and knowing how. We know that ice melts at 32° F, but we know how to ride a bicycle. Practical knowledge is a special kind of knowledge, a knowing how. It is a skill, or an art, or a craft.

Aristotle also claims that theoretical knowledge is aimed at things that are valued most highly—presumably, following Plato, eternal and universal truths. Practical knowledge, however, is aimed at human goods, which is of lesser value. Thus, however useful practical knowledge is, there seems to be a hint that it is of lower status, as knowledge, than theoretical or scientific knowledge.

Aristotle classifies the art of the physician as the *techné* or practical knowledge, the aim of which is to produce health. I will argue for this general view of medicine. Medicine is in many ways a skill, an art, or a craft. The physician who says he knows, but cannot do, is not a physician. The study of medicine is a training, an apprenticeship, a learning how. Even medical research, as opposed to clinical

practice, is aimed at some practical goal—to cure, to change, to alleviate pain; it is not engaged in for the sake of knowledge alone. I think a good case can be made for saying that medicine is not a pure science.

What are the implications of saying that medicine is not a pure science? The most important thing to note is that in practical knowledge value judgements are being made. Aristotle would say about the means to the good, we would say about the subsidiary goals to be aimed at. True, all men aim at the good, but what they see as good differs from person to person, thus the immediate end-in-view differs for different people.

In the pure sciences, on the other hand, one could say that the one goal is truth or knowledge, and although it is true that science assumes the validity of the empirical evidence, these assumptions are held universally and define what science is. Anyone who rejects these goals and methods, it could be said, is simply not doing science. There is, by definition, only one set of rules of method and only one goal for pure science.

When it comes to values, however, what we must say is that, for better or for worse, we live in a pluralistic society. We do not all hold the same values, nor do we think that we necessarily should. We also do not all necessarily share the same goals.

Thus, if medicine actually is practical knowledge, but is mistakenly taken to be pure science, then value judgements are being made but hidden. Under the guise of doing pure science, the physician makes decisions which are accepted as pure knowledge, but actually incorporate value judgements which may or may not reflect values which the patient holds.

A simple example of the problems as I understand it is this. The patient who has chest pains goes to a physician. The physician discovers that the patient has had a mild heart attack and prescribes bed rest, diet, and curtailment of both mental and physical activity. The patient who regards medicine as a pure science accepts this information as the one and only right answer to the problem, and either obeys or refuses to obey the doctor's orders.

But, what has been assumed here? The physician has assumed that the goal of medicine is health and that means that the only thing to do is adopt that regime that will restore the bodily organs as closely as possible to their normal functioning. Rest and diet will allow the heart muscles to repair themselves, therefore he prescribes rest and diet.

However, what if the patient has as her primary goal in life to finish a manuscript she is working on or complete an archeological dig before the government retracts permission or allows the area to be flooded? Perhaps she is willing to risk her bodily health permanently in order to do this, just as the basketball player is willing to risk permanent damage to his knee by finishing out a game after being injured.

The proper role of the physician, if you acknowledge that medicine involves value judgements, would be to say something like this: You have suffered some damage to your heart. If you follow a regime of bed rest and diet, you will be restored to nearly-normal health which will last for a long time. If you continue to work, you

can take medicine to relieve the pain, but you will risk permanent damage to the heart and a shorter life span. What is more important to you? What are your values? The choice is yours.

The question of the status of medicine as a science is thus seen to have direct implications for the question of medical paternalism. Paternalism, or the making of decisions for someone for his own benefit, when that person is competent to make his own decisions, might be justified on the assumption that both physician and patient share the same goals. One could say that the single goal of medicine is health. But if, as I will argue, the concept of health is itself relative and value-laden, then this assumption cannot be made and some adjustment must be made in that model of the doctor-patient relationship which places the physician in the role of sole decision-maker.

The argument for the patient's role in decision-making has been made in cases relating particularly to the problems of women's health in alternative methods of childbirth, between radical and modified mastectomy, and the recent decision by Blue Cross to cover the expense of second opinions before surgical procedures such as hysterectomy. The analysis I am offering here helps provide the theoretical framework underlying such arguments for change.

I come now to the central argument of this paper, to show that the concepts of health and disease are indeed value-laden. Because the idea of medicine as a science is so deeply entrenched in the medical establishment, elaborate arguments must be advanced to dispell this notion. These arguments, most often, take the form of showing something about the analysis of the concepts of health and disease. On the scientific model, health can be defined in objective, scientific terms, and is assumed not to change from time to time or from place to place. When a concept in science does change, it is in response to new information, new dimensions. On the non-scientific model, what health is can be seen to be different in different times and places. On the non-scientific model, health is relative, and the change or difference in concepts is explainable by differences in values and attitudes, not by differences in factual information.

Engelhardt uses the example of sickle cell anemia trait which, it has been discovered, confers on the carrier an advantage for survival in malaria-infested areas, where most sickle cell carriers originally lived, but constitutes a disadvantage for those who must survive in high altitudes. He writes:

...sickle cell trait may be a state of health in an environment where falciparum malaria is endemic and antimalarial drugs are not available; the same trait would be a disease in a high mountain village with low oxygen pressure.¹

Thus, this is an example of a bodily state which would be considered a healthy state in one circumstance but an unhealthy state under different circumstances. So, one could not give a scientific definition of health as either including or not including sickle cell trait.

In a slightly different kind of example, Feinberg considers a hypothetical society whose general values are different from ours, and whose definition of health reflects those values. He writes:

...our culture identifies bodily health with vigor and vitality. But we can imagine a society of mystics or ascetics who find vitality a kind of nervous distraction...²

Thus, what is considered healthy in one society is not considered healthy in another. What is considered healthy is what promotes the goals of that society, but the goals of the two societies differ.

These writers need to draw on such exotic samples to contrast the standards of our society because it is assumed that in the Western, developed nations, the norms of health have been universal and unchanging; that is, the scientific model of medicine has been assumed. Thus, Kass can say,

...health is "the well-working of the organism as a whole," or again, "activity of the living body in accordance with its specific excellences."³

and Boorse:

the health of an organism consists in the performance by each part of its natural function.⁴

These definitions reflect the view that there is one way in which the organism, i.e. the human body, works well and that therefore this is the goal all people should strive for. It is assumed that norms of health are universal and unchanging. This may, indeed, be historically true when we look at prevailing norms of health for the male population across several generations. The scientific model of medicine is entirely compatible with norms of health for men. Indeed, as we shall see, it is built on and embodies a male bias.⁵ The American health ideal for men has remained the same across different historical periods: the male has always been expected to be strong, competent, untiring, able to survive on the wilderness frontier or on the corporate ladder.

The picture is different, however, when we look at the norms of health for women. History reveals a profound confusion about what constitutes a healthy state for women, or whether indeed women can ever be healthy. Ehrenreich and English, in *Complaints and Disorder: the Social Politics of Sickness*, make out a very good case that the upper-middle class American women of the nineteenth century were expected to adopt what we would now regard as an "invalid" role.

The affluent women normally spent a hushed and peaceful life indoors, sewing, sketching and reading romances, planning menus and supervising servants and children. Her clothes, a sort of portable prison, prevented activity any more vigorous than a Sunday stroll. Society agreed that she was frail and sickly.⁶

It was acceptable, even fashionable, to retire to bed with 'sick headaches,' 'nerves,' and a host of other mysterious ailments.⁷

Apart from merely social role-playing, there were theoretical "scientific" medical beliefs which help to explain how this concept of women's health was established.

According to the prevailing medical opinion at the time, all typically female biological processes were considered sicknesses. Puberty, menstruation, childbirth, and menopause were all defined as illnesses, requiring medical care. Thus, illness was considered a necessary part of the female life process. There was no way to escape this kind of sickness. The woman was in a real conceptual dilemma: there was no way to be both healthy and female.

There was, moreover, a real confusion about what was "real" sickness and what was illusory. If a woman felt weak and nervous, was she really ill or, since there was no organic cause to be found, was it not a real illness? On the one hand the medical profession wanted to claim an organic, physiological, scientific definition of health; yet the social climate was such that it characterized as "ill" conditions which did not meet this criterion. The expectation was that the female would adopt the invalid role, whether or not her invalidism could be explained scientifically.

This confusion about the definition of illness is nicely illustrated in the beginning pages of Charlotte Perkins Gilman's *The Yellow Wallpaper*. John, the husband in the story, is a physician, and as such

he scoffs openly at any talk of things not to be felt and seen and put down in figures.

You see he does not believe I am sick!

And what can one do?

If a physician of high standing, and one's own husband, assures friends and relatives that there is really nothing the matter with one but temporary nervous depression—a slight hysterical tendency—what is one to do?

My brother is also a physician, and also of high standing, and he says the same thing.

Yet, though the physicians declare that there is nothing wrong with her and do not believe that she is sick, they treat her as if she were.

So I take phosphates or phosphites—whichever it is, and tonics, and journeys, and air, and exercise, and am absolutely forbidden to 'work' until I am well again.⁶

If she is not sick to begin with, how can she be expected to get well again? There is no answer to this paradox.

One cannot simply say that in the nineteenth century there was one standard of health and women did not or were not expected to be able to live up to it. The situation is much more complicated than that, for in the special cases where individual women did live up to the norm, they were then classified as abnormal. Not only were the intellectually vigorous or physical or athletically vigorous women viewed as aberrations, but those who were sexually vigorous were somehow classified as unhealthy and subjected to medical treatment to restore them to a more nearly normal female state. The use of clitoridectomy for this purpose was not unknown.¹⁶

By contrast to the nineteenth century woman with her phosphates and health

spas, the contemporary feminist ideal of women's health is well-known to us all. We aspire to be strong, energetic, vigorous, emotionally stable. The female biological processes are not considered illnesses and there is movement away from the dependency on professional medical care, even in childbirth. I will not spend time here detailing the contemporary view, but it is my opinion that Wall Street has recognized the feminist changes in the health model for women and is doing its best to capitalize on them in images such as the Geritol TV commercial.

My argument is now complete. I have shown that we have within our own culture a good and clear example of a socially-determined, value-laden, non-scientific model of health and illness. Whether or not we agree with Ehrenreich and English about the specific causes of the health-related behavior which was imposed on and accepted by an earlier generation of women, I think we can accept their thesis that "Medical science has been one of the most powerful sources of sexist ideology in our culture."¹¹ As the ideology changes, so does the model of health. I have shown, by this example, reason for rejecting the view that medicine is a science which operates logically on the model of the other pure sciences, like physics.

* * * *

As a kind of epilogue to the main argument of this paper, I would like to draw out some practical implications of what I have said. If the health concepts are value-laden and not dictated by the unchangeable principles of pure science, then it is possible for women to initiate and control changes in the meaning and use of these concepts. Instead of health-related behavior being imposed on women by others in the society, women can consciously choose and set the goals themselves. It seems to me that this is what the women's health movement is all about.¹² The movement toward greater self-knowledge and away from dependence on the professional medical establishment, the movement toward less medically-oriented modes of childbirth, the demand for stepped-up medical research to dispel once and for all the mysteries and myths of female biological, hormonal, systems—and so on—all illustrate this. The role of the philosopher is to analyze and clarify; but this is one place where theoretical clarification should give encouragement and motivation to the practical movement toward change.

FOOTNOTES:

¹H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., "Human Well-Being and Medicine: Some Basic Value-Judgments in the Biomedical Sciences," in Thomas A. Mappes and Jane S. Zembauty, ed., *Biomedical Ethics*, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981), p. 215.

²Joel Feinberg, "Disease and Values," *Ibid.*, p. 212.

³Leon R. Kass, "Regarding the End of Medicine and the Pursuit of Health," in Tom L. Beauchamp and LeRoy Walters, ed., *Contemporary Issues in Bioethics* (Encine, Calif.: Dickenson, 1978), p. 108.

⁴Christopher Boorse, "On the Distinction between Disease and Illness," *Ibid.*, p. 124.

⁵For a critique of the scientific model of medicine which notes a different kind of bias, see Howard

Waitzkin, "A Marxist View of Medical Care," *Science for the People*, (Nov.-Dec. 1978), p. 36. Waitzkin notes that "Modern medical science views the human organism mechanistically...The mechanistic view of the human body deflects attention from environmental causes of disease, including work processes or social stress."

⁸Barbara Ehrenreich and Dierdre English, *Complaints and Disorder: The Sexual Politics of Sickness*, (Old Westbury, N.Y.: The Feminist Press, 1973), p. 15.

⁹*Ibid.*, p. 18

¹⁰Charlotte Perkins Gilman, *The Yellow Wallpaper* (Old Westbury, N.Y.: The Feminist Press, 1973; reprint of the 1899 edition), pp. 9-10.

¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 10

¹²See Russell, G.H. and N. Van deVen, "The Castration of Females: Clitoridectomy, Excision, and Infibulation," in *Crimes Against Women* (Les Femmes, 1976).

¹³Ehrenreich and English, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

¹⁴For an overview of the women's health movement, set in its historical perspective, see Helen I. Mariesskind and Barbara Ehrenreich, "Toward Socialist Medicine," *Social Policy* (Sept.-Oct. 1975).

¹⁵For a review of recent research on women's medical problems, see Malkah T. Notman and Carol C. Nadelson, "Women and Biomedicine" in *The Encyclopedia of Bioethics*, Warren T. Reich, ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1978).

SECTION B

RESEARCH ABOUT WOMEN IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND THE HUMANITIES

Women and Social Security: Social Policy Adjusts to Social Change*

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The paper I submitted for presentation to this conference, is based on a larger study on economic security of older women prepared for the National Aging Policy Center at the Heller School, Brandeis University. The Center, one of several funded by the Administration on Aging (another of which I believe is located here at the University of Maryland) seeks to bring scholars, policy makers, and interested citizens together to talk about and make recommendations with respect to policies on income maintenance and aging.

Perhaps it will help to listen to the paper if I put first the two major conclusions I come to after reviewing the data and policy alternatives. First, problems facing elderly women are different from those of elderly men, stemming from different life experience and different social institutions—institutions that may be even handed in treatment of women and men, but are based on provisions that fit men's and not women's life styles. Second, policy solutions are not simple, even when one states as a goal the development of policies to benefit women. There may need to be trade offs for groups affected by policies. And some of those trade off groups are groups of women—one earner versus two earner families, or widows versus divorced women versus wives of retired workers.

The order of the paper will be as follows, I will make some general comments about aged women and their sources and levels of economic security and then turn to a consideration of social security. In the next fifty years we can expect a

*Drawn from a larger monograph prepared for the National Aging Policy Center on Income Maintenance at the Florence Heller Graduate School, Brandeis University.

continuing trend in the aging of our population and an increase in the proportion of older women to older men. The causes of their poor economic status must be understood and an appropriate level of economic adequacy planned for.

The disadvantaged status of elderly women is not caused by a lack of programs although the current proposed cuts in some of these programs may seriously impair the protection they provide. Rather, the problem is partly caused by issues relating to lack of participation in and receipt of income from available income sources. It is also partly related to failure of programs to respond to the particular patterns of women's market work and to acknowledge with retirement credit home and other non-market productive contributions that may be made in several different family partnerships over the life course. These facts affect women's benefits both as retirees and as survivors. Individual retirement provision has been insufficient to compensate for program deficiencies.

Introduction

The changes that are taking place in the economic and social roles of women make it imperative that in the years ahead we adjust institutional structures and social policies to permit and reflect the totality of women's productive contributions to society. This is of importance to all women, whether their work is in the home or in the paid labor market. But the need is most crucially felt by older women whose personal life and work patterns have coalesced in ways to provide neither adequate economic provision based on their partnership in a family enterprise nor as an autonomous contributor to the market economy. Their increasingly dual roles and multiple activities have met human needs, but have been out of tune with the reward structure of the society.

Elderly women age 65 and over, a group which is increasing in numbers, increasingly important as a proportion of the elderly population, and increasingly aged, is also a severely economically disadvantaged population group.

Sources of Economic Security

What do we know about the sources of income available to elderly women?

Earnings. Data on earnings receipt and labor force participation each confirm that earnings are a much less important component of income for women age 65 and over than they are for men and that this fact is a major reason for the disadvantaged economic status of older women. A newly inaugurated series based on data from the Current Population Survey indicates, e.g. that in 1976 although 41% of married couples age 65 and over had some earnings, that the proportion was 21% for nonmarried men and only 14% for nonmarried women. Within this last category, 27% of divorced women, 21% of never married women and only 12% of widows had some earnings. In 1979 the labor force participation rate for women age 65 years and over was 8.3%, less than half that of men in the same age bracket (20%).

Even when they work for pay, earnings of unmarried older women are low, they are less than those of older married couples and older unmarried men. The Current Population Survey biennial series reveals that 29% of married couples had earnings

of less than \$2000 in 1976, but that the proportion was as high as 45% for elderly unmarried men and 49% for elderly unmarried women. Women's median weekly full time earnings—about 60% of men's for all ages combined—also decrease with increasing age.

Private Pensions. Although private pensions have expanded to the point where 43% of all adult workers are participants in an employment based retirement plan, women's protection is considerably less than that of men.

In addition to general considerations of the great variability of benefits among plans, and to inflation-eroding problems which affect all retirement plans, there are particular ways in which coverage and benefit provisions impact on women as a group. For one thing, women tend to work in those occupations and industries (e.g. services, retail trade) and in small-sized firms where private pension coverage is less prevalent for all workers. They have a greater tendency to be employed in non-unionized firms where coverage is less. Greater discontinuities in employment, lower tenure in their current job, and earlier severance from this job, further adversely affect women's vesting rights and service credits. Access to survivor benefits are also not great.

Assets. Asset ownership is not uncommon among elderly persons and the degree of ownership remains stable as age increases in the later years. But the value of assets is low, particularly for unmarried women as contrasted with married men (and their wives). This is partly because fewer persons are in the contributing family unit and partly because asset ownership is positively associated with income level.

Financial assets (e.g. bank accounts, stocks and bonds) are the most common asset form. For those with such assets, median value was \$3,600 for men compared with \$2,300 for unmarried women.

Ownership of a home, another form of asset, is an insignificant source of income for unmarried women. One recent survey indicates that one-half of non-married women, contrasted with one-third of married men, had no income from assets at all. When present, asset income was less than \$1,000 for 60% of unmarried women compared with 46% of married couples.

Social Security. Social security is a somewhat technical program and its limitations and proposed revisions will have more meaning if we go through the present provisions before embarking on the alternative proposals for change.

Social security is a federal insurance program, financed by employer and employee contributions based on earnings, designed partially to replace earnings lost due to old age, disablement, or death. In 1981 the tax rate for employers and employees is 6.65% paid on covered earnings up to \$29,700. There is compulsory insurance coverage for almost all jobs. An employee in an insured job earns quarters of coverage—one for each \$310 (in 1981) of annual earnings up to four quarters in a year.

Benefits to eligible retired workers and dependents and to the several identified categories of survivors are based on the amount of the worker's covered earnings (minus five years of lowest earnings) averaged over the possible period of work

since 1950 (or age 21, if later) in covered employment. Time spent out of the paid labor market for any purpose, including child rearing, counts as periods of zero earnings. For those becoming eligible for benefits after 1979 a correction for inflation is made by updating (indexing) earnings in each year to take account of increases in wage levels current just before the worker becomes eligible for benefits. The primary benefit amount is based on a fixed formula (which is also adjusted to reflect growth in covered wages) applied to this adjusted average earnings figure. The ratio of primary benefit to monthly taxable earnings for a worker and wife at age 65 is about 87 percent if the annual income is low and about 50 percent if the annual income is equal to the maximum taxable amount. Benefits are periodically adjusted to take account of increases in the cost of living. Benefits are paid to retired workers, to their spouses, to widows of retired workers and to several other categories of beneficiaries.

Despite almost universal coverage, the attention paid to goals of both equity and income adequacy in the design of the legislation and the absence of gender differentiation in the computation of benefits even though women have greater longevity than men, the protection afforded elderly women is still inadequate and according to some, inequitable. What are the issues? How adequate is the economic protection for elderly women? At the end of 1977 over 50% of women had primary benefits (based on own earnings) of less than \$200 per month (PIA) compared with 46% of men. On the other hand, only 16% of women compared with 48% of men, had primary insurance amounts of \$300 or more. Women's low monthly benefits are in part due to their low earnings while working. They are further adjusted downward when women retire before age 65, a not uncommon occurrence for them. Low benefits are also partly due to other provisions of the law which are based on assumptions of an earlier social convention of a once-in-a-lifetime marriage, a full-time income earning husband and a full-time homemaker wife. Wives who choose to work in the home do not accrue retirement credits for this work that they do; they receive a benefit of 50% of the husband's primary benefit, paid to them as a dependent wife. Wives who engage in paid work receive a primary benefit based on their own earnings, plus the difference in amount, if higher, that would have been paid to them as a dependent wife. Wives who take time away from paid market work to attend to home duties or other activities are disadvantaged often by both low market earnings and also by the adverse effect of work intermittency on their average monthly wage on which benefit computation is based. In addition, for a significant number, tax contributions do not create additional benefits because the dependents' benefits based on the husband's earnings are already higher than those based on the wife's own earnings. For these married working women there is no benefit return to their tax contributions. Women's rising labor force participation rates and work continuity are expected to influence their benefits only somewhat and only gradually. For many women, benefits based on husband's earnings will continue to be higher than benefits based on own earnings.

Divorced women face problems in addition to those of low earnings and paid work discontinuities. Although they are more apt to work "year-round full-time" than married women, their families are more often plagued by poverty.

Even if eligible, benefits for the retired divorced wife are paid only when the divorced spouse is at least 62 years of age and retired. Benefits are only 50 Percent of the retired husband's benefit, although a separate household unit must be maintained.

Widows are slightly better off than divorced women in that benefit entitlement is not limited by the length of previous marital status and may be equivalent to 100 percent of the worker's benefit (if widowed after 1972). But they face other economic problems. They are members of a beneficiary group—now averaging age 75—many of whose lives were lived as traditional homemakers and they have low earning capacity, even if they wish to work. Social security benefits when they reach beneficiary age are frequently based on husband's rather than their own earnings. These have been updated in terms of wage increases in the society (indexed) only to the year of his death and are then adjusted in benefit computation only for cost of living increases. They therefore reflect the standard of living prevalent at the time of the husband's death and do not include any productivity growth of more recent years, that may be reflected as rising real wages to working members of society. Widows are less likely, also, to receive asset income or private pension benefits than are family units of married women; when they do, the amounts of such income are smaller.

Proposals for Reform

Let me comment on proposed changes for reform not specifically directed to women alone, but which would impact on women's benefits.

Two-tier Benefit System. The two-tier system is designed to increase equity in the allocation of social security benefits in relation to contributions. A Tier I benefit, a means-tested minimum monthly income similar to Supplemental Security Income (SSI), would provide a socially adequate retirement base for each U.S. resident at age 62 or upon disability, irrespective of labor force participation. In addition, a strict earnings Tier II benefit, directly related to earnings, at age 65 (or reduced benefit at age 62) would be assigned. In the simplest form of the Two-Tier system, dependent and survivor benefits would be eliminated. But because termination of Tier II benefits due to a spouse's death could result in economic hardship for the survivor (particularly for a homemaker), it would be possible to include an elective joint and survivor annuity option whereby an individual could choose to take a reduced Tier II benefit (about 12% lower) in order that the surviving spouse would receive additional retirement income at the time of his/her death.

Double Decker Benefit System. This approach which substitutes a "demogrant" for the means-tested Tier I benefit, is similar to programs in Canada, New Zealand, and Scandinavia. In this case, Deck I benefits would meet the adequacy requirement by providing flat rate pensions ("demogrants") payable without a

means test to all elderly and disabled persons at age 65, regardless of previous contributions or earnings. The benefits could be financed from general revenues and could perform the same function of benefit adequacy as do currently provided dependents benefits and SSI. Deck II benefits would be provided only to workers in the labor force and would be proportional to past earnings in covered employment. Survivor benefits could be retained in this proposal as in the current system, as could an earnings-sharing provision still to be described.

Homemaker Benefits. A number of issues are raised by the proposal of homemaker benefits. For example, how should they be defined and which groups should be eligible for their receipt? Is a blue collar working mother to be denied credits while a college-educated at-home mother, perhaps with a maid in the home, is given them? Are such credits to be financed by a special tax (a new burden which some can ill afford) or from general payroll taxes (raising an issue of equity between single vs. married persons.)

A variety of proposals suggest ways in which homemaker benefits would replace the current system of dependent spouse and/or survivor benefits. One proposal would post credits towards the pensions for periods spent out of the labor market in homemaking duties. Another would provide for dropout of years in the earnings averaging period corresponding to years spent in child care at home. They would be excluded from the years used in averaging earnings. How would one evaluate each of these in terms of equity? Would they either more adequately than the present system address the issue of income redistribution for wives and widows in poverty. Can the issue be resolved without unduly compromising other aspects of the program's operation? Whatever the other merits of a particular proposal, homemaker credits have the important advantage of explicitly acknowledging the economic value of homemaking by providing benefits to homemakers as a matter of right, based on the non market home productive contribution they make.

Earning Sharing. The 1979 Advisory Council on Social Security acknowledges that this concept was the most reasonable of all proposed reforms but was not prepared to endorse full-scale earnings sharing. Several of the proposals already discussed have included earnings sharing which gives explicit recognition to the partnership relationship of a marriage whereby market-related roles and non-remunerated work in the home are given equal value in assigning benefits. The household rather than the individual is seen as the insured unit and household earnings are averaged so that benefits of each marital partner are based on one-half of the combined earnings. An individuals Social Security benefit would be based on his or her earnings while unmarried plus one-half the couples total earnings during marriage. There would be no need for spousal benefits.

Each of these proposals would raise the benefits of some groups, of which women might be a part, and reduce benefits for other groups. For example, the two-tier benefit system would benefit aged and disabled poor men and women, but not all not-poor women. But it would come at the expense of a means test, which many abhor. The double decker system benefits low income, aged poor and would

particularly help the very old non-institutionalized widows. Homemaker benefits, though seemingly desirable, bear no relation to need or to equity, and would be very expensive. Earnings sharing has an appeal as a concept, whereby the household rather than the individual is seen as the income earning unit, but it is claimed by some that such benefits will have relatively little impact on total benefit expenditures and income redistribution aspects of the program. The implications of each of these proposals need detailed study, including simulation studies—a process which is now going on. The current political situation brings additional complexity to the development of desirable programmatic improvements.

Some Immediate Improvements

Where does all this leave us with respect to social security amendment to improve the economic security of older women? It is clear that major structural reform involves more than a possible increase in benefits for women. It is inevitable that unless there is agreement that no amendment should result in benefit reduction, a basic change in program philosophy and provisions will increase benefits for some at the expense of others. This is especially true if amendments are subject to the restriction that aggregate expenditure liability be unchanged, a likely possibility in this era of budgetary awareness.

But while these discussions of proposed basic change in programmatic orientation go on, it does not mean that no immediate improvements in women's security are possible. I would like to close by referring to several possible amendments which would adapt the system in ways to improve women's economic security without significantly altering that of other individuals.

1. Inheritance by the surviving widow (or widower) of a deceased spouse's earnings credits for the years they were married. The survivor would receive benefits based on 100% of the couples' combined earnings in addition to credits accrued on the basis of his/her own earnings record before or after marriage. Such a proposal should go far to improve the economic status of widows who have spent a major part of a lifetime working as homemakers to make possible the market work of the income-earning spouse.

2. Splitting of earnings credits for divorcing partners in a marriage that has lasted a minimum of 10 years, to be applied to eligibility or to increasing the amount of retirement benefits. The acknowledgement of the partnership aspect of such marriages should improve the economic status of divorced spouses at retirement as a result of combining credits earned during the marriage with those earned before and after.

3. Provision of periodic adjustments in benefits of survivors to take account of increases in productivity reflected in a rising real standard of living that could occur over time after the death of the spouse. This should permit widows to share in rising living standards that accrue to working members of the society. Many widows live for long periods following a husband's death, with the benefit being computed once at time of death and increased thereafter only to take account of changes in the cost

of living.

4. Evaluation of the status of groups of women who, even with these reforms, would remain below the poverty line at age 65 to see whether other reforms should be adopted (e.g., raising benefits for widows, equal entitlement to benefits at time of retirement applied to the period of the marriage) or whether assistance programs should be re-designed to more adequately protect these groups of women. It is already clear that special attention needs to be given the plight of elderly widows, so vulnerable and even with a multitude of programs, still so economically deprived.

What interim concluding comments can be made about a discussion such as this that is just now entering the public arena? There is no disagreement between those interested in strengthening women's economic status and those concerned with social security policy that there presently exists an unfortunate disjunction between the assumptions upon which present social security provisions are based and the contemporary roles and lifetime living patterns of women. The issue then becomes one of how best to adapt the program to current social realities, how to provide economic security for women based on their productive contributions without developing inequities for other groups, and how to do so in ways which are financially sound. Although the issues of revision focus on women's needs because it is largely the changes in the pattern of their lives that have caused provisions to become outdated, policy evaluation requires a broader perspective. Any proposed change must be evaluated not only in terms of its equity and adequacy for each of the groups covered by the program, but also in terms of financial considerations affecting the program in both the short and long run. It is a challenge that will keep researchers and policy makers busy for some months to come.

Work Satisfaction Among Women in Non-Traditional Occupations*

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Introduction

The 1970's was a decade of change and unrest among the U.S. labor force. Economic stagnation and periods of high unemployment brought an end to the economic optimism of the sixties. The young, better-educated, and minorities among the work force, in particular, expressed, in a variety of ways, increased levels of dissatisfaction with, and alienation from, the labor process under advanced industrial capitalism (Aronowitz, 1973; HEW, 1973). At the same time, the government, and a variety of social reform groups were attempting to consolidate and further the movements of the 1960's toward equal opportunity, through Executive Orders, legislation, and court decisions. Particularly important and controversial were the affirmative action policies designed to facilitate the movement of minorities and women into occupations and industries from which they had previously been excluded. One facet of this effort was the attempt to integrate women into "non-traditional" skilled and semi-skilled blue-collar occupations. Compared with the jobs traditionally available to women, these jobs held the promise of greater economic rewards, stronger union protections, and increased intrinsic satisfactions for non-professional women (Bibb, 1975; Kanter, 1977).

While the numbers of women actually entering fields such as the construction crafts and industrial trades has remained extremely small (women made up .6% of the skilled craft work force in 1968; and 1.8% in 1977 (Smith, 1979)), their experiences have begun to provide social scientists with data which are of considerable interest, both to those studying sex roles, and as a contribution to the literature on work and occupations, organizations and stratification.

This paper addresses both issues—dissatisfaction among blue-collar workers,¹ and the movement of women into non-traditional blue-collar occupations—by exploring the attitudes toward their jobs reported by a sample of 86 women entering non-traditional skilled and semi-skilled occupations in 1975. It will describe the

*Data for this study were gathered under a grant awarded to Mary L. Waslahok, Ph.D., by the Center for the Study of Metropolitan Problems (Grant #27685-01:02), National Institute of Mental Health. The author wishes to thank Mary Waslahok for permission to use the data. Responsibility for any errors or omissions in this paper rests with the author, who is solely responsible for its contents.

sources of satisfaction and dissatisfaction reported in the first year of the study; then compare those patterns with the reports of the 39 members of the sample who remained in non-traditional occupations and who were re-interviewed one year later.

It will be argued that the challenge of surviving and succeeding in a non-traditional job—mastering skills, bolstering self-confidence, and getting along with (often troublesome) male co-workers and supervisors—was the predominant concern of the respondents in the first year, and was their primary source of both satisfaction and dissatisfaction. In contrast, by the second year, those women who remained in non-traditional jobs had become less concerned about their status as women in male-dominated occupations, and more concerned with the traditional sources of satisfaction and dissatisfaction common to blue-collar workers, e.g., the nature of the work itself, working conditions, and relations with management.

The Literature on Work Satisfaction

The concept of work satisfaction, in its various forms, has long been a topic of theory, research and debate in the social sciences, and can be found in several quite different traditions, including: 1) 19th and 20th Century Marxist theory, with its concern for the plight of the worker and the problem of alienation in industrial-capitalist work settings (e.g., Marx, 1964; Braverman, 1974); 2) Non-Marxist reformulations of the concept of alienation (Seeman, 1959), and its relationship to bureaucracy (Weber, 1968; Aiken & Hage, 1966; Argyris, 1964), and to technology (Blau, 1964; Woodward, 1965); and 3) Organizational and industrial sociology (and psychology), with its largely management-oriented concern for worker satisfaction and motivation as a means to increased productivity and stability in the organization, (e.g., Glaser, 1976; Srivasta, 1977; Vroom, 1964; Gruneberg, 1976). This latter group has utilized a number of theoretical models including the "Human Relations" theories which grew out of the Hawthorne studies (Blau & Scott, 1962; Roethlisberger & Dickson, 1939); Herzberg's "Motivation Hygiene" theory (1959); and the more recent "Socio-Technical" theories (Barrett, 1978; Goldthorpe, *et al.*, 1968; Davies, Dawson & Francis, 1973).

These long-standing traditions have been injected with a renewed sense of urgency and social relevance in the past decade. Worker satisfaction and dissatisfaction has become a public issue, and one which reflects both management/government concerns for productivity and social stability; and humanistic/radical/feminist/counter-cultural concerns for the needs and problems of blue-, white-, and "pink-collar" workers.

Problems of special concern to management and government officials have recently included declining productivity, increased absenteeism, sabotage, alcohol and drug-abuse in the workplace, and labor militancy. On the other hand, the frustration of limited and limiting work opportunities and organizational environments experienced by the young, by women and minorities, and by an increasingly

well-educated labor force generally, have come to the attention of a variety of social reform interests. The result of these concerns has been a merging of private, public and academic energies in reviews of past research, in the undertaking of new studies, and in proposals for new policies and programs (Mortimer, 1979; O'Toole, 1973).

My purpose here is not to carry out a thorough review or evaluation of the products of these endeavors, past or present. However, in order to provide a context for the findings to be presented in this paper, it is necessary to very briefly summarize the major findings on work satisfaction which have emerged from this growing body of literature.

Work satisfaction is notoriously difficult to measure, and traditional indicators have come under considerable criticism recently (O'Toole, 1973; Seashore & Taber, 1975; Mortimer, 1979). Nevertheless, there is considerable evidence that dissatisfaction with various aspects of work is a significant problem today, especially in blue-collar occupations, and among the young, black, female and better-educated segments of the labor force. (O'Toole, 1973; Sheppard & Herrick, 1972; Aronowitz, 1973; Mortimer, 1979).

It also appears that the level of dissatisfaction increased substantially during the 1970's for all segments of the labor force, after at least 20 years of relative stability (Quinn & Staines, 1978).²

Many factors have been identified, both theoretically and empirically, as sources of job satisfaction and/or dissatisfaction. On the one hand, factors *external* to the worker are stressed—factors located either in *the content of the work itself* ("intrinsic"), e.g., the extent to which it provides interest, variety, challenge, responsibility, self-direction, etc. (Sohn & Schooler, 1973; Tannenbaum, 1974; Stone, 1976); or in *the work environment* ("extrinsic") including organizational structure and relationships, working conditions, pay and benefits, and social status (Newman, 1975; Shepard, 1973; Herman, 1975; Ivancevich & Donnelly, 1975); or both (Gruneberg, 1979; Shostak, 1980; O'Toole, 1973; Voydanoff, 1978; and the Marxist and non-Marxist studies of alienation cited earlier.)

Herzberg's (1959) influential work addressed primarily external factors, as well. He differentiated between factors which, when present, create satisfaction ("motivation" factors, which are largely intrinsic to the work itself); and those which, when absent, create dissatisfaction ("hygiene" factors, which reside largely in the work environment), arguing that the sources of satisfaction and dissatisfaction are not the same.

Other studies have stressed factors *internal* to the worker—factors such as reward values, psychological needs and socio-economic characteristics (e.g., education, age, sex, race), which create differences in levels of satisfaction among different psychological and social types (Locke, 1976; Wright & Hamilton, 1978; Shapiro, 1977; Russell, 1975).

Debates over the relative importance of these factors continue, but the studies

taken as a whole point to some characteristics of both workers and work settings which are significant contributors to work satisfaction. These include: 1) Tasks which require skill, and promote involvement; and which provide challenge, variety, autonomy, control, prestige and feelings of self-worth for the workers; 2) work environments characterized by positive relationships with co-workers and management, good pay and benefits, job security, safe and pleasant working conditions, recognition for achievement, and opportunities for advancement; and 3) the extent to which the needs, expectations and aspirations of the worker coincide with the rewards and demands of the job—i.e., social-psychological factors which can vary individually, but which are also shaped by socio-economic variables such as social class, education, race, sex, and age. It is also clear that as we move downward on the occupational ladder, away from professional and managerial occupations with their generally high levels of skill, autonomy, authority, prestige and monetary reward; we find progressively fewer of the sources of work satisfaction cited above.

In the discussion that follows, we will see that in the first year, the respondents' status as women in non-traditional occupations created some special concerns for them; and that, while the sources of satisfaction and dissatisfaction they reported were similar to those reported in the studies cited above, they were given a particular shape and substance by that non-traditional status. There were, moreover, some significant changes in the reports of those women who remained in non-traditional occupations at least until the second-year interview. The nature of the changes suggest that the unique status of these respondents was diminishing, and that, in the process, their attitudes toward their work and work environments were becoming even more similar to those of their male counterparts in those occupations, and to those of the skilled and semi-skilled blue-collar labor force, generally.

Methodology

The data for this study were collected from 1975-1977, by means of structured, open-ended interviews, supplemented with demographic information obtained through questionnaires, with 86 women who were working in, or training for "non-traditional" (i.e., male-dominated), non-professional occupations. The sample was self-selected and is thus not necessarily representative. Respondents were solicited from private and public employers and vocational training programs in the three largest metropolitan areas of California—San Diego, Los Angeles, and San Francisco. The occupations represented are shown in Table 1; Table 2 presents some characteristics of the respondents.

Table 1. Occupational Distribution of Respondents

Occupation Categories	First Year		Second Year	
	f	%*	f	%
Technical Categories	7	8	2	5
(Technicians, Draftpersons, Surveyor, Photographer)				
Clerical Workers	4	5	3	8
(Production Controller)				
Craftpersons	48	56	24	62
(Mechanics, Repairpersons, Machinists, Pipefitters, Cabinet Makers, etc.)				
Operatives	13	15	3	8
(Welders, Machine Operators)				
Transport Equipment Operatives	4	5	3	8
(Delivery Drivers, Bus Driver, Fork Lift Operator)				
Laborers	7	8	2	5
(Gardeners, Truck Loader, Helpers)				
Service Workers	3	3	2	5
(Chefs, Maintenance Workers)				
TOTALS	86	100	39	101

*Percentages in this and all other tables are rounded off. Totals will therefore sometimes exceed 100%.

Table 2. Characteristics of Respondents (N=86)

	f	%		f	%
Age			Family Income		
16-21	4	5	\$5,000 or less	20	23
22-30	62	72	\$5,001-\$10,000	22	26
31-40	9	10	\$10,000-\$15,000	18	21
41 & over	9	10	\$15,001 & Above	15	17
Unknown	2	2	Insufficient Information	7	8
TOTAL	86	99	TOTAL	86	100
Racial/Ethnic Background			Marital Status		
Black	13	15	Married	14	16
White	62	72	Ever married	19	22
Latin	6	7	Never married	37	43
Asian	2	2	Unknown	16	19
Unknown	3	3	TOTAL	86	100
TOTAL	86	99			
Education			Number of Children at Home		
0-8 years	1	1	0	54	63
9-11 years	6	7	1	13	15
High School Grad	14	16	2	9	10
Some College	42	49	3	2	2
B.A./B.S.	16	19	4	1	1
Adv. Degree	5	6	Unknown	7	8
Unknown	2	2	TOTAL	86	99
TOTAL	86	100			

The respondents were interviewed twice—first in the winter or spring of 1975-76, and again in the spring of 1977. The data utilized here deal with the respondents' reported experiences in the work or training setting, specifically: 1) their attitudes toward paid employment generally; 2) their feelings about their current work/training situations, including the work itself, and the social and physical work environment; and 3) changes, if any, in work experiences and attitudes, between the first- and second- year interviews, for the 39 women who remained in non-traditional occupations.

Content analysis and coding and tabulation of the data were carried out. It should be noted that, while the interviews yielded rich descriptive information about respondents' experiences in their work/training settings, the data are subject to limitations in analysis and interpretation. Questions were general, and the specificity and completeness of responses varied. Frequencies reported here will not always be exhaustive; for example, regarding *specific sources* of satisfaction and dissatisfaction. They will reflect, instead, the number of women who volunteered the specific information in answer to general questions like: "What are the good things/bad things about this job (or training program)?"

In addition, the findings reported are the result of content analysis and coding of large portions of the interview transcripts, rather than answers to one or two specific questions. For example, if a respondent expressed dissatisfaction over interactional problems with male co-workers *at some point* in the interview, she was included among those who reported dissatisfaction about relationships with co-workers, whether or not she mentioned it in answer to the specific question, "What are the bad things about this job?" This is a simultaneous strength and weakness of qualitative data: It is more unwieldy, less subject to straightforward coding and tallying; yet it makes possible a more thorough and multifaceted exploration of the experiences and attitudes of respondents than is possible, for example with a fixed choice questionnaire.

Before describing the respondents' attitudes toward their non-traditional work experiences, it may be helpful to know something of their attitudes toward work more generally. When asked, "What are the pluses of employment for you (as opposed to not working)?", their responses indicated that (in order of their frequency): 1) money; 2) being active and/or getting out of the house; and 3) emotional gratifications, i.e., a sense of accomplishment, self-worth, etc., were the most valued aspects of paid employment for them. Mentioned less frequently were: 4) independence (financial and/or emotional); and 5) social contacts. (See Table 3 for frequencies and percentages.)

Respondents were also asked, "What things do you look for in a job?", a question which addresses more directly their criteria for work satisfaction. As indicated in Table 4: 1) intrinsic aspects of the work, e.g., variety, challenge, etc., were cited by a large majority; followed by 2) good relationships with co-workers and/or supervisors; 3) good pay and/or benefits; and 4) autonomy and/or control in the work process. Less frequently mentioned were: 5) potential for future

advancement; 6) specific characteristics of the job, such as outdoor, manual work, etc.; and 7) good performance on their own part; and good hours or scheduling.

Table 3. "Phases of Employment," Reported by First-Year Respondents (N=86)*

	f	%
1. Money/Benefits	45	52
2. Activity/Escapes from House	28	33
3. Emotional Gratification	24	28
4. Independence	20	23
5. Social Contacts	12	14

*Totals are omitted in this and the following tables, since respondents often cited more than one item.

Table 4. "Things Looked for in a Job," Reported by First Year Respondents (N=86)

	f	%
1. Work Intrinsic	39	45
2. Good Social Relationships	34	40
3. Good Pay/Benefits	27	31
4. Autonomy/Control	17	29
5. Future Advancement	14	16
6. Job Specifics	12	14
7. Good Performance Good Hours/Scheduling	10	12

Job Satisfaction and Dissatisfaction: Year 1 and Year 2

The interview data indicates in a number of ways that the respondents who remained in non-traditional jobs at the time of the second-year interview were experiencing their work situations differently than had the respondents a year earlier. When asked, "Are you more satisfied or less satisfied with your job now than last year?", the majority (62%) responded, "More satisfied", and much smaller groups responded, "Less satisfied" (15%); "The same" (13%); or gave hard-to-classify answers (10%). However, we should bear in mind that: 1) simple measures of job satisfaction, such as the question here, have received considerable criticism for their validity problems as mentioned earlier, and should not be relied upon exclusively; and 2) the finding, even if valid, would need further exploration for qualitative meaning. That is, what was it about the jobs that made them more (or less) satisfying to the respondents and was there a change in the sources of satisfaction and dissatisfaction from the first year to the second? It is therefore necessary to examine additional indicators, and to explore these qualitative issues if we are to obtain a full understanding of the respondents' attitudes toward their non-traditional jobs.

In the first year interviews, the respondents' primary concerns regarding their jobs revolved around the challenges they faced, and the rewards they experienced or anticipated, as women in non-traditional occupations. Most were in the early stages of on-the-job or classroom training, and were struggling to learn new skills for which they had little or no preparation through socialization or educational experience; to adjust to unfamiliar work processes and environments; and to cope with interactional difficulties as they sought acceptance by their male co-workers and supervisors (and often by both male and female members of the public).

On the other hand, they were entering an occupational realm of potential opportunity, reward and social status previously denied to the majority of working women. They were excited about the possibilities offered by non-traditional work for higher pay, and for greater intrinsic satisfaction and social recognition than was available to them in traditionally female occupations. These factors, involving both the problems and potentials of their movement into non-traditional jobs, appear to have been their major sources of satisfaction and dissatisfaction with their work during the first year.

Respondents cited, as aspects of their jobs that they like (in order of their frequency): 1) *Good training, and/or the learning of valuable skills*; 2) *intrinsic aspects of the job*, especially the challenge of difficult, demanding work; and the autonomy, sense of accomplishment, and interest it provides; 3) *the pay and/or benefits*; 4) *good relationships* with co-workers, supervisors, and/or customers; 5) *specific features of the job*, e.g., outdoor, manual work; and 6) *the potential for future advancement*; and the *status and satisfaction received from being in a non-traditional job*. Mentioned less frequently were 7) *good working conditions*; and 8) *job security*; and *good hours or scheduling*. (See table 5 for frequencies and percentages.)

The factors most often mentioned as negative aspects of their jobs (in order of their frequency) were: 1) *Poor relationships* with co-workers, supervisors, and/or customers; 2) *inadequate training programs*; 3) *difficulties with the physical, mechanical or technical aspects of the work*; 4) *poor working conditions*; 5) *their own insufficient task-related backgrounds*; 6) *their lack of self-confidence*; and 7) *the lack of job security*. Respondents also cited, though considerably less frequently: 8) *specific aspects of their jobs*, e.g., that it left them physically exhausted, and that it kept them indoors; *management practices*, such as the arbitrary authority of supervisors, and unethical business practices; and 9) *work intrinsics*, e.g., its repetitive, unchallenging nature.

Table 5 Sources of Job Satisfaction Reported by Respondents

First Year (N=86)		
	f	%
1. Learning/Training	40	47
2. Work Intrinsics	34	40
3. Good Pay/Benefits	30	35
4. Good Social Relationships	22	26
5. Job Specifics	19	22
6. Future Advancement Non-Traditional Status	16	19
7. Good Conditions	7	8
8. Security Good Hours/Scheduling	2	2

Sources of Job Satisfaction Reported by Respondents

Second Year (N=39)

	f	%
1. Work Intrinsic	33	85
2. Good Pay/Benefits	21	54
3. Good Social Relationships	16	41
4. Job Specifics	14	36
5. Learning/Training	8	21
6. Good Conditions Good Hours/Scheduling	5	13
7. Security Future Advancement	7	8
8. Non-Traditional Status	2	5

These items clearly reflect the concerns of these respondents with their unique status as women in non-traditional occupations. The emphasis is overwhelmingly on the quality of their training, their relationships with co-workers, their own ability to succeed at the job, and the perceived rewards (present and future) of non-traditional work.

By the second-year interviews, which occurred from one to one and a half years after the first, 59 of the original 86 respondents were still in non-traditional occupations, although some had moved from classrooms to jobs, or from one occupation or employer to another. Thus, more than two thirds (69%) had succeeded in remaining in a challenging, often difficult work situation, despite the problems involved. Unfortunately we were only able to reinterview 39 of these women. However, among those 39 respondents there is a consistent pattern in their second year interviews—a pattern of changing sources of satisfaction and dissatisfaction, coinciding with changing experiences in the work setting.

These women had accomplished a great deal in a year or more, and they knew it. They expressed considerable satisfaction over their ability to survive in a non-traditional job; to master the skills involved and win the gradual, if often grudging acceptance of many of their co-workers and supervisors. In fact, to the extent that these women identified themselves as "more satisfied" than the previous year, most of them referred in their answers specifically to their feelings of success and accomplishment as the source of their increased satisfaction. This finding is

consistent with other studies which report an association between success at the job and satisfaction (Gruneberg, 1979)

With increased competence, self-confidence, and acceptance by co-workers, however, came a shift in the expressed concerns of the respondents about their work. They showed considerably less concern about training, learning, and the challenge of the work; their earlier concerns about social relationships and about the physical or technical demands of their jobs continued to figure prominently in their discussions, indicating that their work had yet to become non-problematic in these respects;³ but they were now expressing increased concern about some of the traditional sources of job satisfaction and dissatisfaction to which they had made little or no reference the previous year.

The following factors were the most frequently mentioned sources of satisfaction in the second-year interviews (in order of their frequency): 1) *Intrinsic qualities of the work itself*—although instead of citing the challenge and sense of accomplishment most often, they now talked most frequently of the interesting, enjoyable nature of the work, and of the variety involved; 2) *good pay and/or benefits*; 3) *good relationships* with co-workers, supervisors, and/or customers; 4) *specific features of the job*, e.g., outdoor, manual work; and 5) *good training, and/or the learning of valuable skills*. Also mentioned, though much less frequently, were: 6) *Good conditions; good hours*; 7) *Security; potential for future advancement*; and 8) *the status and satisfaction received from being in a non-traditional job*. (See Table 5.)

The negative aspects of the job mentioned most frequently by the second-year respondents were (in order of their frequency): 1) *poor relationships* with co-workers, supervisors, and/or customers;⁴ 2) *difficulties with the physical, mechanical or technical aspects of the work*; 3) *poor working conditions*, e.g., unsafe, unpleasant environments; 4) *work intrinsics*, especially its repetitive, boring nature; *management practices*, especially discrimination toward and harassment of workers. Cited somewhat less frequently were: 5) *Insufficient task-related backgrounds*; 6) *lack of self-confidence*; and 7) *poor hours or scheduling*.⁵

Thus, the respondents who remained in non-traditional occupations appear to have become more focused on the work itself, its monetary rewards, and the conditions of the work setting; and while social relationships and the physical and technical demands of the job were still important concerns, management practices had become a significant source of dissatisfaction, and the non-traditional status of the job had become considerably less important as a source of satisfaction.

Moreover, while in the first year, slightly less than half, (47%) said they didn't want or expect to remain in the same type of work for a long time (although some of these said they'd stay if their situations improved in specific ways); by the second year, nearly two thirds of the respondents (59%) expressed such sentiments. And while the jobs mentioned as most desirable by both groups were most often management (including small business ownership), and professional or technical

occupations—indicating desires for more highly skilled and autonomous work, for more authority, income and social status than they were currently enjoying—such desires were more frequently expressed by the second year respondents (33%) than by the first (24%) which suggest a diminishing of their earlier expectations and hopes about the rewards of the occupations they had entered. In addition, a desire for white collar work, not necessarily at a higher level, was expressed by a considerably larger proportion of the second-year respondents (15%) than of the first-year group (2%), suggesting that a small group had decided that blue-collar work was not for them.

It would appear that for these women, at least, the advantages of their non-traditional blue-collar jobs over traditionally female occupations were counteracted to some extent by the dissatisfactions inherent in them; and perhaps their non-traditional experiences had served to raise their expectations for work satisfaction in ways that could not fully be met by these jobs in which they had struggled to survive.

Conclusion

The constellation of concerns and desires expressed by the second-year respondents looks remarkably like those reported for blue-collar workers generally, and less like those of a unique and marginal group of workers. It would appear that these women, now more accepted in their work settings, and more confident of their capabilities, were, by the second year interview, beginning to share more of the rewards and frustrations, and dreams of independence long experienced by their male counterparts in these skilled and semi-skilled occupations (Chinoy, 1955; O'Toole, 1973; Blauner, 1964). As some of the problems involving their status as *women in non-traditional jobs* were diminishing, they were becoming increasingly aware of their status as *blue-collar workers*—a status which carries with it both pride and pain.

The findings reported here thus suggest that, while the entry of women into non-traditional blue-collar occupations is a positive and necessary step if we are to reduce occupational segregation in the work force, and if women are to gain greater economic and social equality—it nevertheless has real limitations which must be recognized. The U.S. occupational structure contains considerable inequality in the opportunities for work satisfaction available; and as the labor process of advanced capitalism has become ever-more automated and divided, work at many levels has become less satisfying (Braverman, 1975; Toole, 1973). Given this situation, while the movement of women into areas previously closed to them will yield concrete benefits, it will not, of itself, eliminate the problems of work dissatisfaction shared by their male counterparts in those occupations.

FOOTNOTES

¹While I will use the term, "blue-collar workers" throughout this paper, many of the work satisfaction issues discussed here apply as well to other sectors of the labor force, in particular to lower-level-white- and "pink collar" workers. (Braverman 1975; Howe, 1977).

²Mortimer (1979) believes that the earlier stability itself may have been more apparent than real, and largely a product of inadequate measures.

³For a more complete description and discussion of the interactional and task-related experiences of the respondents in the first and second years, see McIlwee, 1980.

⁴The persisting concern with social relationships may be artificially inflated relative to other variables, because the interview questions emphasized this issue, while not specifically addressing others.

⁵The same patterns of change are found when the reports of only those respondents who remained in non-traditional occupations the second year are considered. This rules out the possibility that the changes are merely artifacts of the loss of respondents from the sample.

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The Emerging Theory of Institutional Discrimination

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Introduction

In 1958 John Kenneth Galbraith observed that "while it continues to have a large ritualistic role in the conventional wisdom of conservatives and liberals, inequality has ceased to preoccupy men's minds" (Galbraith, 1958:12). Subsequent events have proved the influential Galbraith in error, for as Krislov (1974:2) notes in his discussion of inequality, "It is precisely as a preoccupation that it has survived . . . It is, to employ an overused analogy, something of a secular religion, evoking devotion, sacrifice, and intensity." This intensity was fueled by the unprecedented unrest of the late 1960's and 1970's which focused attention on many aspects of inequality within American society. As the thrust of the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960's seemed to diminish, violence unpredicted by social science researchers abruptly appeared in many cities throughout the country. Emotional debates regarding the ideal nature of equality in the United States ensued. Protestors presented the evils permeating American society as so great that almost any response seemed inadequate (Lockard, 1968:1). Intense pressure to resolve past inequities resulted in a swift proliferation of anti-discriminatory programs. In some cases, attempts were made to reconcile such projects with existing social theory. Often, however, the social theories themselves were under attack. In 1972, Blauner observed that the social theories of the time not only failed to predict events, but actually made them more difficult to comprehend and interpret (Blauner, 1972:2).

Radical sociologists accused the profession of neglecting or avoiding the social policy implications of their research. The profession addressed this issue in

Conferences, (Santa Barbara California, 1965; Chicago, 1967; Stonybrook New York, 1968; Carmel California, 1972) special Journal issues (*The American Sociologist*, 6, June, Supplementary Issue, 1971) and monographs (Coleman, 1971; Etzioni, 1968, 1971, 1976; Demerath, Larsen and Schuessler, 1975) without resolution.

The costs of avoidance were high. By 1976, Etzioni (1976:61) noted that the annals of public policy were littered with "multi-million-dollar wrecks" created by social science theory. Knowles and Prewitt described the analysis of social problems at this time as an unscientific hodge-podge of amateurs "spurred on by a number of different ideologies and rationales . . . only tenuously related to each other" (Knowles and Prewitt, 1969:116). The impact of this general lack of knowledge in the area of social policy was reflected by former assistant to President Johnson Joseph Califano. In hearings before a joint U.S. Congress-Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Mr. Califano compared U.S. Cabinet officers to benevolent African tribal leaders who relied upon "intuitive judgement" rather than sophisticated data to expand or eliminate social programs (Bezold, 1974:452).

Increasingly, social scientists were requested to shift their attention from the world of ideas to the world of action. It was suggested that sociological research should leave the value free arena to be prescriptive as well as descriptive; advocating what should be as well as describing what is. Traditional sociology was criticized for reinforcing the status quo, thus becoming a part of the problem rather than a part of the solution (Alford, 1975:33; Rossides, 1978:530). It was maintained that the times and needs of society were such that social policy itself could be regarded as "the test for sound theory, with bad policy reflecting bad theory" (Demerath et al., 1975:345). In brief, the unsettling social problems of the times created a push for sociology to be active, applied, and ideologically based. This was especially true in areas related to minority disadvantage where social science research has often been used as the basis for or the justification of governmental action. New perspectives often emerged as researchers attempted to bring order out of the chaos of the times. In the area of discrimination, emphasis rapidly shifted from studies of attitude and prejudice to studies of discriminatory behavior, especially those forms which had become an institutionalized part of American life. Reflecting the egalitarianism of the times, a new theory of institutional discrimination appeared which emphasized and damned the results of such practices. Commissions, committees and legislative pressure were alternately employed as attempts were made to remove discriminatory practices from the American social fabric. The lack of clear causal models however, often meant that there was no consensus on what specific actions would achieve this goal.

The problem of establishing effective priorities was not readily resolved. Once equality was adopted as a goal, there still remained great diversity in how that term should be defined. Traditionally, Americans viewed equality in civic and moral

terms, linking it with the opportunity to achieve (Lipset, 1976:14). In this framework, the inequity that results from "fair" competition is condoned. However, the 1960's witnessed the emergence of a more radical form of egalitarianism, that challenged the earlier viewpoints. Reflected in the writings of Gans (1973) and Jencks et. al. (1972), this "new egalitarianism" maintained that equality of opportunity was not sufficient, that only "equality of results" was truly just. The new approach legitimated affirmative action programs and was reflected by President Johnson's promise to minorities that equality should be "not just a right and a theory" but a "fact and result" (Franklin and Starr, 1967:226). The new approach also rejected the rewarding of achievement, performance, and merit because this ultimately created and maintained inequity (Jencks et. al., 1972:8,195-96,230). Instead, the new advocacy called for an active social leveling throughout society (Connor,1979:16). Often, the priorities advocated in the "equality of opportunity" model were not compatible with those of the "equality of results" approach. Thus, during much of the 1960's and 1970's, attempts to identify social priorities became contests of ideology, with each side attracting articulate and powerful supporters. Traditionalists were now referred to as "neo-conservatives". Nathan Glazer, Daniel P. Moynihan and Seymour Martin Lipset, opposed the "equality of results" approach because in their view it threatened basic American values, freedoms, and institutions which should be preserved (Connor,1979:17). In response, the "new egalitarianists" advocated a more equal redistribution of societal resources through affirmative action-type programs.

This ideological debate greatly complicated efforts to eradicate discrimination. As power and ideologies shifted, dramatically divergent legal opinions were rendered and often contradictory social theory emerged.¹ It is upon this complex matrix that studies of the problem of discrimination will be superimposed and reconciled in the 1980's. These incongruities provide the backdrop for future attempts to modify institutional discrimination, and themselves become a confusing factor in planning social change. Within this context, it is appropriate to examine the emerging theory of institutional discrimination carefully. This paper reviews social theory in the area of discrimination with special emphasis on the theory of "institutional discrimination" developed by Joseph Feagin while he was Scholar in Residence at the United States Commission on Civil Rights during 1974-1975 (Feagin and Feagin, 1978). The Feagin perspective was chosen for an in depth study for: (1) it was both descriptive and prescriptive, (2) was cited and reflected in federal government literature dealing with discrimination² and (3) seemed to be reflected by officials of the United States Department of Education in compliance hearings for federal funds. At the same time, it seems to represent a perspective important to women & other minority groups that has been abandoned by the current Reagan administration.

Theories of Discrimination and Institutional Discrimination

Herbert Gans (1973:xi) once described America as "unequal society that would like to think of itself as equal." This contradiction is seated in the perspective that while there are indeed natural differences between men, these inequalities can be compensated for through striving and hard work (Handlin, 1957:186). By the 1800's, the American ideology was already quite clear. It may have been true, as John Drayton noted in 1802, that nature had made:

"some to be poor, and others to be rich; some to be happy and others to be miserable; some to be slaves and others to be free" (Handlin, 1957:25).

However, it was also believed that man was perfectible, progress was inevitable, and reason could transform the world (Handlin, 1957:186). Within this framework, unremedied inequality is tolerable as the manifestation of either the naturally ordained hierarchy or personal laziness. In either alternative, the less fortunate are different, and their inferiority justifies the diminished rights accorded them.

Early studies of discrimination linked that phenomenon to attitudinal and personality variables. Special emphasis was placed upon the factor of prejudice. In 1950, Adorno, et al., identified six different types of prejudiced personalities (Newman, 1973:196), and in 1958 Allport's work *The Nature of Prejudice* posited a clear causal relationship between "salient attitudes" and discrimination (Allport, 1958:48). This view was expanded by many theorists including Myrdal (1944) DeFleur (1958) Westie (1965) and Merton (1949) and resulted in the standard view that linked prejudice with discrimination.

This approach, epitomized by the work of Simpson and Yinger in *Racial and Cultural Minorities: An Analysis of Prejudice and Discrimination*, emphasizes ideology and personality and presents discrimination as the result of conflict in belief systems (Rokeach, 1960). It is referred to as "standard theory" by Feagin (1978) and is represented by the simple causal assumption that prejudice leads to discrimination (Prejudice → Discrimination). The unprecedented unrest of the 1950's and 1960's brought the adequacy of this approach into question.

According to Feagin and Feagin (1978), the general inadequacy of the discrimination theory just reviewed encouraged the emergence of three distinct streams of divergent thought regarding the nature of discrimination. Each of them questions the causal significance of prejudice and emphasizes instead the importance of the social and organizational environment in which discrimination tends to occur. These three perspectives are: (1) interest theory; (2) internal colonialism; and (3) institutional racism/institutional sexism. They constitute the framework from which the relatively nebulous concept of "institutional discrimination" subsequently emerged. A brief description of each view of discrimination as presented in the Feagin and Feagin (1978) work follows:

1. *Interest theory* grew out of the work of Herbert Blumer (1960), Robin Williams (1966) and David Wellman (1977) and viewed discrimination as the

manifestation of a primary drive to protect one's privilege and power. In 1956 Rose suggested that society's structural features rather than individual attitudes were the key to understanding discrimination (Rose, 1956:173-176). By 1960, the work of Antonovsky was distinguishing between prejudice motivated discrimination and gain motivated discrimination (Antonovsky, 1960:81). This view was also held by Blumer (1960) who portrayed prejudice as a "sense of group position" rather than an expression of hostility. Robin Williams (1966) also saw group prejudice as a rationalization for protecting ones vested interest in current privilege. Wellman (1977) continued this analysis, noting that "without the notion of privilege, the concept of discrimination is static" (Feagin and Feagin, 1978:9). In this framework, "Discrimination is more than the imposition of barriers at a given point in time; it entails a process of constantly defending one group's privileges gained at the expense of another" (Feagin and Feagin, 1978:9).

2. The second and closely related perspective is that of *internal-colonialism*. While it is possible to trace the origins of the concept of internal colonialism to at least as far back as the 1930's when it was used to characterize the relations between North and South in the United States (Khleif, 1978; Stone, 1979:255), its more recent emergence is seated in the work of Carmichael and Hamilton (1967) and Blauner (1969). It was further popularized by Michael Hechter (1975) in a book entitled *Internal Colonialism*. This view has been connected with world systems theory through the work of Wallerstein (1974, 1979, 1980) and Bergesen (1980).

The perspective itself underscores the creation of privilege by White Europeans' forcible appropriation of resources through the colonial process as the source and motivation for discrimination. There is little emphasis on prejudice. Rather, according to Hechter (1975:39), "The superordinate groups, now ensconced as the core, seeks to stabilize and monopolize its advantages through policies aiming at the institutionalization and perpetuation of the existing stratification system." As Blauner notes (1972:9), "... racism is institutionalized. The processes that maintain domination-control of whites over non-whites are built into the major social institutions ... Thus there is little need for prejudice as a motivating force."

While this concept has become increasingly popular in the analysis of race and ethnic relations, it has most often been applied to areas outside of North America (Hechter and Levi, 1979; Reese, 1979; Alapuro, 1979; Palloni, 1979; Verdery, 1979). Little has been done to extend this analysis to the contemporary United States. In this area, Ritter (1979) has applied this approach to industrial development in dealing with "sexual colonialism" where "what goes largely unexamined and often even unacknowledged (yet is institutionalized nonetheless) in our social order, is the birthright priority whereby males rule females" (Millett, 1969:25; Feagin and Feagin, 1978).

3. Portions of interest theory as well as internal colonialism have contributed to the joint concept of *institutional racism/institutional sexism*. The term "institutional racism" appears to have been coined by Carmichael and Hamilton (1967).

They were mainly concerned, once again, with the effects and mechanisms (methods) of contemporary discrimination rather than its origins. Hamilton and Carmichael expanded their perspective past the "individual acts of bigots and racist attitudes to acts by the total white community; a society where racist institutional policies can occur without the presence of conscious bigotry, and both may be masked intentionally or innocently" (Knowles and Prewitt, 1969:4). It is this model in particular that has generated the concept of "institutional discrimination."

One of the clearest academic and applied attempts to clarify the concept of institutional discrimination is found in the joint work of Feagin and Feagin (1978). This work rejects the traditional view of discrimination as acts with harmful effects, precipitated by prejudice, or concern for the prejudice of others. Instead, discrimination is defined as:

"... actions or practices carried out by members of dominant groups, or their representatives³ which have a differential and negative impact on members of subordinate groups" (Feagin and Feagin, 1978:20-21).

They do not include "reverse discrimination" in their definition of discrimination. In addition, the authors assume that race and sex discrimination are unjust and should be remedied (Feagin and Feagin, 1978:21). Once terms have been defined, attention is directed toward clarifying their emerging perspective of institutional discrimination. They do this by comparing it to the traditional prejudice discrimination model. Feagin and Feagin note that in both perspectives of discrimination, a discriminator, an act, and victim are necessary. In each case, however, the institutional discrimination perspective emphasizes a larger scale. One finds that while the traditional approach views discrimination as overt, individualistic, and sporadic in nature, the institutional discrimination perspective accentuates the routine, continual and sometimes more subtle character of discrimination.

Discriminatory actions may thus vary in their degree of social imbeddedness, with larger scale settings involving "sets of inter-related actions prescribed by well institutionalized organization rules" (Feagin and Feagin, 1978:24). In this view, "both actions and organizational regulations or policies directing actions can be taken as examples of institutionalized discrimination" (Feagin and Feagin, 1978:24). The organizational environment can "add legitimacy to discriminatory actions which individuals might not otherwise engage in or can sometimes provide an organizational 'screen' which enables individual discriminators to hide their actions" (Feagin and Feagin, 1978:25). It might also be said from this comparison that the traditional view of discrimination sees it as a deviation from the norm, whereas the institutional discrimination view of the process sees it as being a part of the norm (Feagin and Feagin, 1978:21-27).

In order to continue their analysis, Feagin and Feagin develop a typology with four categories to deal with forms of discrimination from the institutional perspective. A brief description of this typology follows (Feagin and Feagin,

1978:29-33):

1. Type A = isolate discrimination and refers to intentionally injurious action taken by an individual against members of subordinate groups (e.g. minorities or women) without being immediately imbedded in a large scale organizational context.

2. Type B = small group discrimination and refers to intentionally injurious actions taken by a small group of individuals acting against members of subordinate groups without the support of the norms prevailing in a larger organizational or community context. This is presented as a some-what larger-scale version of Type A.

3. Type C = direct institutional discrimination and refers to organizationally prescribed or community prescribed actions which have an intentional differential and negative impact on members of subordinate groups. Typically, these actions are not sporadic in nature, but may be overt or covert.

4. Type D = indirect institutionalized discrimination and refers to practices having a negative and differential impact on minorities and women even though the organizationally prescribed or community prescribed norms or regulations guiding those actions were established and are carried out with no prejudice and no intent to harm lying immediately behind them. Two forms of this type of discrimination are said to exist: a. side effect discrimination where practices in one institutional area have a negative impact due to linkage to direct discriminatory practices in another institution. b. past-in present discrimination—where apparently neutral practices in an institutional area systematically reflect or perpetuate the effects of intentional discriminatory practices in the past in that same institutional area (e.g. being fired due to a lack of seniority).

Once this typology has been established, Feagin and Feagin explore several other dimensions. They suggest the presence of feedback loops and observe that: (1) various combinations of the types of discrimination can coexist in a given organizational or community setting, (2) that discrimination is made up of a complex web, interactive in character, and (3) that the effects of (1) and (2) are often cumulative, integrating political, economic and social organizations in a systematic way so that:

"No one organizational complex stands alone, and the interlocking phenomenon insures that the negative impact of the web of racism or sexism is much greater than it would be if discrimination were limited to one organizational sector" (Feagin and Feagin, 1978:35).

They close their discussion of institutional discrimination theory with a call for further work in that area. They note that the process of discrimination remains "fuzzy" and needs to be integrated into the cultural context within which it operates (Feagin and Feagin, 1978:37). Several chapters follow in the Feagin and Feagin work which present examples of how the process of institutional discrimination functions within American society. Examples are presented in the areas of employment (chapter three) housing (chapter four) and education, health,

social services, politics and the courts (chapter five). These examples are not exhaustive but are presented to illustrate the broad range of discrimination in the United States, and to dispel the concept that racism and sex discrimination do not currently exist (Feagin and Feagin, 1978:142).

The final chapter of the Feagin and Feagin text (chapter six) discusses possible remedies for the problem of discrimination in the United States. The initial suggestion is that future research be continued in this area. It is suggested that this research be "action research" on the day to day character of discrimination (Feagin and Feagin, 1978:166). Further, it is suggested that the results of such research be made public.

Several "action-strategies" are also suggested. They include the expansion of civil rights laws and anti-discrimination penalties (Feagin and Feagin, 1978:170). It is suggested that merit-based selection procedures be modified to give greater attention to minority capabilities (Feagin and Feagin, 1978:173), and that "more-than-token-numbers" of minorities be brought into institutional settings (Feagin and Feagin, 1978:176).

The authors do not expect these changes to actually occur. However, not unimportantly, they are clearly supportive of the "new egalitarianism" previously discussed. In their perspective, the true eradication of institutional discrimination would result in altering the foundations of the current "racist-capitalist and sexist-capitalist society," replacing it with a "humanist democratic socialism" (Feagin and Feagin, 1978:179). They close their text noting that: "not only is eternal vigilance necessary in order to expand liberty, but eternal organization and effort as well" (Feagin and Feagin, 1978:181).

To summarize, the Feagin and Feagin (1978:164) theory postulates the existence of the following types of discrimination:

1. Isolate discrimination
2. Small group discrimination
3. Direct institutionalized discrimination
 - a. Blatant type
 - b. Covert type
4. Indirect institutionalized discrimination
 - a. Past-in-present type
 - b. Side-effect type

Types one through three can be associated with prejudicial attitudes or the intent to harm. Type four is unintentional, and is perpetuated in society by the day to day mechanics of the status quo (Feagin and Feagin, 1978:164). They assume additionally that while discrimination should be remedied, it only will be remedied if public and private action in this area is sharply increased (Feagin and Feagin, 1978:168). They suggest therefore that research be continued on how to accomplish this aim. This research remains to be done.

Conclusions

My conclusions are brief but I think important. Additional research is needed to build upon the Feagin and Feagin work. Currently President Reagan has initiated a firm break with the social values and programs held by the prior administration and legitimated, in part, by this theory. Discriminatory practices have been "eradicated" through redefinition. The institutional discrimination model just reviewed has been firmly rejected. This has meant a terrific setback for women and other minorities. Progress toward equity made in the 1960's and 1970's has been reversed. The reinterpretation of acceptable federal programs and behavior dealing with minority groups has already begun. An ongoing and heated debate continues between neo-conservatives and others regarding the definition of "equality" and "discrimination". It is time for those of us concerned with these issues to do our homework and strengthen the paradigm of our choice.

FOOTNOTES

¹ - For example, the 1980 election of Ronald Reagan represented an abrupt rejection of the "equality of results" view supported by the Carter administration. Reflecting this, the Reagan administration has revised the direction and funding of numerous federal programs dealing with federal discrimination guidelines.

² - For example, see *Affirmative Action in the 1980's: Dismantling the Process of Discrimination. A proposed statement of the United States Commission on Civil Rights*. Clearinghouse Publication 65, January 1981, Washington D.C.

³ - According to Feagin and Feagin (1978:21), "Representative could include subordinate groups members carrying out the directives of dominant group members, co-opted persons who are not fully in the dominant group but are used by it."

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Collegiate Women and Institutional Change, 1875-1920

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One of the themes of this conference is the new scholarship about women and how to integrate that new knowledge into the liberal arts curriculum. I want to discuss with you a research effort now under way which relates to inter-disciplinary methodologies and which, in addition, points toward the kind of work that is a possible outgrowth of inter-disciplinary courses. Three colleagues and myself, with the aid of a grant from NIE, are currently preparing an analysis in book form on *Collegiate Women and Institutional Change, 1875-1921*. We are excited about our collaborative effort and the synergism it has generated among us. I think (one never knows such things for sure) that what interested the people at NIE was: the inter-disciplinary nature of the methodology; the focus on women as actors in institutions; the collaborative effort by four scholars, one clearly the mentor for the rest of us; and the comparative analysis.

During the time that the principal investigator on the project (Kathryn Moore) was a faculty member at Cornell University, two other graduate students (Gailyn Casaday and Charlotte Shea) and myself were participants in the higher education program. We all worked together on a common seminar on Academic Women as well as independent study. Each of the three of us developed dissertation topics related to the work we had begun with Professor Moore. We continued to meet on a bi-weekly basis about our work and, during this time, we began to see the commonalities in what we were doing and the commonalities in the women we were studying. Not only could a comparative study integrate the individual scholarship but it would utilize the methodologies of history and sociology in developing a female-centered organizational theory. I should point out that virtually all studies of organization, not just those in higher education, focus almost exclusively on the behavior of men.

Our historical case studies detail three institutions in which collegiate women in many roles (students, faculty, administrators, trustees, alumnae) exerted significant

authority. Through this means several intriguing questions about organizational change are addressed. For example, what was the differential effect of particular social issues in the larger society on each institution, especially those pertaining to women such as suffrage? How did each institutions' unique history and vision of itself enter into the process of creating the future? What accounted for the different ways in which the women in each institution reacted to their status and roles? In order to answer these questions each of us is addressing three themes: leadership and authority, as it was experienced by women in the institution; the impact of the college mission/saga/culture on women as a specific group; and, finally, actions or strategies that were used by women in bringing about change in their own behalf. Bridging the separate case studies is a theoretical concern for organizational change which draws upon recent work by selected social scientists who have successfully applied the theoretical approaches of their disciplines to higher education.

Each of the institutions included in the analysis is an example of a separate approach to the higher education of women. Cornell University was founded as a "pioneer of coeducation", while both Mt. Holyoke and Wells College, the other two institutions in the study, were designed for women only. Yet, even the two women's colleges shaped their missions differently. Mt. Holyoke was guided in its initial stages by women who possessed a marked evangelical fervor. Wells College, on the other hand, was founded by Henry Wells and E. B. Morgan, businessmen-entrepreneurs, to provide genteel, albeit equal, education so that women might be better wives and mothers. By the end of the period under study all three institutions had undergone transformations, important portions of which must be attributed to the efforts of the women affiliated with them. The struggles at all three institutions involved women who were not necessarily in formal leadership or authority positions yet who learned how to exert leadership, how to gain power or access to it, and how to obtain their objectives, although not without frustration and compromise.

Helen Fairchild Smith, the dean who is central to the shift from male to female governance at Wells College, used the subversive strategies developed by female leaders in the seminary movement. That is, she helped to subvert the intentions of the founders, E. B. Morgan and Henry Wells, in order to promote the advancement of women and the enlargement of their role. This continued use by Helen Fairchild Smith of self-abnegation and passive-aggressive strategies, i.e., the explicit behaviors employed by such women, sometimes resulted in temporary failures. Smith's covert attempts at manipulation were always subject to manipulation by male authority figures who, because of their public power, were able to employ more direct means to achieve their ends.

Nevertheless, under Smith's tutelage, Wells College evolved a female subculture whose members involved themselves in the affairs of the school as policy makers, faculty, and concerned alumnae. During Smith's tenure, Henry Wells's concepts of a school "home" and "family" were expanded to include public roles for Wells alumnae, particularly in the governance of the college. With the support and

authority granted by the board of trustees, Helen Fairchild Smith was instrumental in creating the institutional forms of the college even though the presidency of the school remained in the hands of male authority figures whose perceptions of the proper educational experience for women remained relatively unchanged.

After the Civil War, Mount Holyoke Female Seminary confronted serious questions about its mission and educational priorities. The emphasis of new universities on empirical research conflicted with values inherent in evangelicalism and the classical course that served as Mount Holyoke's *raison d'être*. For Mount Holyoke, the period from 1875 to 1910 was one of crisis and adaptation. The institution and the women in it were obliged to confront the implications of its traditional sources of authority, within the dual context of domesticity and evangelicalism, and to create new bases for maintaining social control and institutional commitment.

At Cornell University women students were not integrated into the life of the University. After 1884 they were required to live in a particular place, Sage College. They had their own self-government, thirty years before the male students had a student government organization. They had separate class events. They had their own clubs. This organizational separation from men had many beneficial results and it is not surprising that women graduates continued to have organizations separate from male alumni. Another logical consequence of this separation of women as students was the alumnae's sense that they were a community with special interests. The fact of being women in a male-dominant society influenced both the selection of issues and the ways in which Cornell alumnae worked to forward those issues in the early Twentieth Century.

When compared the changes effected by women at Cornell, Mount Holyoke, and Wells amply demonstrate the simple truism that women willingly and relatively quickly change their strategies depending on their varying circumstances. These college-educated women, while their lives remained distinct from their male peers, developed similar values and behaviors among themselves. This is evident in the ways they "politicked" at all three institutions. They developed a group leadership style and carefully garnered support for their efforts. Governance styles, the ends they sought, the networks developed, the important role of single women in their varying quests—all demonstrate like behaviors. All three groups of women soundly disprove the myth that, unfortunately, women have never known (and do not know now) how to co-operate and compete at the same time, a skill essential for success in organizations and developed, supposedly, in men through their participation in sports. That these women at Cornell, Wells, and Mount Holyoke continued to compete in such overtly "ladylike" ways for so long is strong testament to their socialization and to the overt pressures they experienced.

Many of these women, unfortunately, have been labelled "anti-feminist" by traditional historians who, because of their training in political and economic history, were unable to recognize their often covert group strategies and consequent successes. In addition, the women themselves, consistently emphasized gender

differences in order to get their agenda considered in the most inimicable of settings. By so doing they lost the respect and support of many of their more directly politically activist sisters who believed that only by *de-emphasizing* sex differences could women achieve justice. These combined developments led to obscurity for these college women and to obfuscation of their significant role in effecting organizational change.

As all of us at this conference know, women scholars' dissatisfaction with the past, and with the history of the past, has led to new inquiry, new syntheses, new intellectual frontiers. The case studies and discussion presented in this project will, hopefully, bring new insight to the process by which women exerted significant influence on higher education in the early years of this century and, thereby, enable us to understand how other women in our time may achieve similar objectives.

How does our work relate to the themes of this conference? As with much of the historical scholarship about women, our project challenges the time frame of traditional historical writing. It also negates the notion that there has been steady progress for women in gaining access to and increased participation in higher education during the transition decades from the nineteenth to the twentieth century. And, it reveals the long distance yet to be covered before the full opportunity of higher education can be realized for all women to the limits of their abilities, motivation, and purposes.

Most significantly, to me, it reveals a way of *doing* research and writing that takes into account the multi-faceted lives of many women scholars. Our collaborative effort enabled us to undertake an in-depth study none of us had the time or resources to conduct alone. The intellectual energy generated has been a continuing source of inspiration to me and I think to my colleagues as well.

Finally, this research can affect curricular development. "Team-teaching" is nothing new to anyone involved in women's studies. "Team-publishing" is a simple extension of that process and can provide academic materials essential for the integration of scholarship about women into the various disciplines. After all, many of us are working in closely related areas on work that does not fit "neatly" into departmental lines. By asking common research questions we can produce materials which integrate knowledge across disciplinary lines. This does not mean it will be unacceptable. Rather, it enhances its potential for use, particularly for the undergraduate curriculum as it is evolving today, with a core of "general courses" surrounded by professional studies. These courses lend themselves to materials aimed at the common themes in human existence. Ours, as is obvious, is organizational behavior. The question that emerged was an historical one—what constituted a female-centered organizational theory in the period when higher education for women developed? Courses that might develop around comparative analyses of central themes which illuminate women's experience can be offered in a variety of disciplines and departments (history, sociology, other social sciences, education, industrial relations, etc.) and can have a wide variety of prerequisites that enhance their clientele. I realize, of course, as we all do, the controversy among our more

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traditional colleagues that such approaches generate. But higher education is in hard times and there is a historical axiom which states that women do better when bureaucracies are in disarray. We have a fresh vision to bring to the academy.

Aztec Women in the Sixteenth Century: Kinship and Religion

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A growing anthropological literature suggests that new light can be shed on social structure, kinship, and religion if scholars focus on women as key social actors. The work of Margery Wolf on Taiwan (1972) and Edwin Ardener's paper "Belief and the Problem of Women" (1975) suggest that the study of women is important not simply for itself—or for the addition of information in the traditional academic disciplines—but because it can fundamentally alter conventional conceptions of society. The anthropological study of Aztec society has been characterized by a male focus and orientation and in this paper I hope to show how a concentration on women's experience profoundly alters more traditional pictures of Aztec life.

Like Silverblatt (1978), I believe that analysis of kinship and gender can shed light on sex roles and relations in other areas of social life in preindustrial precapitalist state societies. I am particularly interested in examining how kinship, as it relates to gender, influenced Aztec women's roles and participation in the prehispanic religious system. We must look to the structure of the Aztec kinship system to analyze the ways in which Aztec women participated in the religion of their society and state in the late prehispanic era.¹

The Aztec Kinship System and Gender

Early colonial documentation reveals that the Aztec kinship system was cognatic rather than patrilineal or patrilineal. In this kinship system men and women were "structurally equivalent." By "structurally equivalent," I do not mean that men and women were equal but, rather, that in the establishment of rights and claims based on one's place in a line of descendants, men and women were considered to be equivalent. Four lines of evidence suggest such a conclusion—only two of these will be discussed here: kinship ideology and kinship-related terms.² Although some of this evidence dates from the colonial period, much of it either refers to prehispanic society or refers to cultural practices which can be shown to be distinct from Spanish cultural practices, and therefore are considered "indigenous."

That the ideology of the Aztec kinship system was cognatic is not difficult to demonstrate. Evidence from the *Florentine Codex* shows that the child was conceived of as connected to both the mother and the father, that is, a child was seen as sharing the substance of both (Dibble and Anderson 1969:6:175,216). This biological connection was made use of metaphorically in other realms of social organization. Thus, leadership was often characterized as being like motherhood and fatherhood—a leader was to be both mother and father to his people. The structural equivalence of men and women is further exemplified in the belief that women who died in childbirth were like men who died in war. They went to the same afterworld, and young warriors were said to want a finger, or some hair, from such a woman, so that they might place such relics on their shields and be brave in battle. Continuing the metaphor, after a woman had a child

... the midwife shouted; she gave war cries, which meant that the little woman had fought a good battle, had become a brave warrior, had taken a captive, had captured a baby (Ibid., 167).

Thus, in leadership, warring, and birthing women and men were described as standing in equivalent structural positions; such evidence is viewed as indicative of a cognatic ideology for the kinship system.

That relatively shallow, lower level corporate descent units existed in prehispanic and early colonial Aztec society seems to be demonstrated by early colonial legal documents. Both men and women would have been members of such groupings. One unit was referred to by the term "*tlacamecayotl*" which means literally "rope of people." The use of the term for rope and the rope as a pictorial symbol of genealogy by Aztec witnesses in early colonial court cases is based on a metaphor connecting kinship to birth and the umbilical cord. The term *tlacamecayotl* is a cognatic descent concept, similar to that of "descent line" (Periano 1961:97). It expressed the relationship between an ancestor/antecedant and his or her descendants traced through one or more male or female connecting links. Such descent lines were probably the basis for shallow descent groups, three to four generations in depth, which shared legal responsibility for each others' actions, defined household membership and inheritance patterns, and organized economic activities.

The term "*teixuiuan*" was a descent rather than ascent focused concept and literally meant "someone's grandchildren." This descent-based concept was formulated on the notion of a group formed by a person's children and grandchildren and these groups, too, included males and females. These, too, were important units in the inheritance of property. Like *tlacamecayotl*, the principle of the equivalence of *all* siblings underlay the concept of *teixuiuan*. Both of these terms denote structurally significant groupings and boundings within any person's kin universe in which women and men had equivalent membership rights.

Such an abstract statement is relevant to understanding the roles and status of Aztec women because I envision some connection between the structure of the Aztec kinship system and women's status as well as their roles and activities in other realms. My point is simply that when women are structurally equivalent to men as

in cognatic societies, or structurally central in kinship organization, as in matrilineal societies, their roles and statuses in other realms will be influenced. Their statuses will tend to be higher in these societies than in patrilineal societies.

Therefore, because relationships, rights and duties through the mother were recognized and valued, the status and influence of Aztec women was higher and greater than is often recognized. Women's "structural equivalence" in the kinship realm in turn effected other realms. One area in which the cognatic nature of the kinship system reveals its influence was in the prehispanic religious realm. We might divide the *functioning* of the religious system into three critical aspects: deities; temples; and the priestly hierarchy. If one looks closely at women's roles, we can learn new things about each of these aspects of Aztec religion.

Aztec Women in the Religious Realm

While no one would deny that there were female deities in the Aztec pantheon, one sometimes has the sense that Tezcatlipoca, Huitzilopochtli, and Quetzalcoatl were the only true gods. Female deities were important, however, in both ideology and many kinds of ritual. Female deities were important, not only to women, but to the whole society. The major deities of sustenance, dedicated to maize, salt, and maguey, were female. While Tlaloc is always discussed as the god of rain, Whalchiuhtlicue, his wife, was also a water deity to whom the first monthly calendrical ceremony was also dedicated. Duran, when discussing the deities who symbolized the four elements, lists her as representing water and Toçi as representing earth. Fire and wind were male. In the *Florentine Codex*, the monthly ceremonies to Chalchiuhtlicue are described and this is also said:

... in the same manner they honored the image of the maize, named Chicomecoatl; and the image of the salt, named Uixtociuatl. Thus they remembered the three. For they become indeed the livelihood of the people; through them the people are satisfied; through them they can live (Dibble and Anderson 1970:1:22).

Therefore, each of these particular female deities was worshipped in monthly calendrical ritual, and each was worshipped by both men and women. Of eighteen monthly calendrical ceremonies, female deities were worshipped in at least ten of them. In addition to public and private ceremonies honoring female deities, they were honored by specific occupational groups as well, some of whom were female, some male. On her feast day, the goddess Toçi was worshipped not only by midwives but by warriors as well.

Some of these female deities were honored in their own temples—that is, just as there were temples devoted to male deities there were temples devoted to female deities. The temple of Toçi was described by Duran as an "*oratorio de mujeres*" ("women's chapel") where her image was kept. It was said to have no priests but was instead cared for by people of the *barrio*; a female victim was sacrificed there however. Other shrines (or small temples) were built in all *barrios* where two streets crossed in honor of the *cihuateto* (literally, "women gods") who were goddesses, women who had died bearing their first child. The small edifices were called

cihuateocalli ("women's temples"). In Book Two of the *Florentine Codex*, many different kinds of temples are listed, several of which are dedicated to female deities or husband-wife pairs of deities. At most of these temples, female sacrificial victims were slain after having lived for some days as the image and personification of the deity (Dibble and Anderson 1951:2:170-177). That these female temples were staffed by a hierarchy of female religious functionaries is a possibility for which there are some intriguing hints in the data to be discussed below.

Data on temples and on the female priestly hierarchy seem to suggest that women had a somewhat separable religious hierarchy that paralleled the male religious hierarchy. Women appear to have been particularly active in calendrical ceremonies dedicated to female deities. For example, during the eighth month of the calendar, the goddess Xilonen, goddess of tender maize, was honored, and a woman dressed in her image was slain. male and female captives were also slain and women and men who served in temples danced together (Duran 1967:1:266; Dibble and Anderson 1951:2:96). These women who danced were closely guarded so that the men would not sleep with them. There is also a reference in the description of this ceremony to women who served in temples.

While women who participated in the Aztec religious hierarchy have traditionally been described as nuns, rather than priestesses (Las Casas 1957-8:24; Duran 1967:II:544), their titles and activities indicate that they would best be viewed as priestesses. Clavijero said, in describing the women of the temples:

Neither was the priesthood limited to the masculine sex; there were also women dedicated to the prompt service of the temples; they offered incense to the idols; they watched the sacred fire, they swept the courtyard, and prepared the offering of food that was made daily, they even presented it themselves to the idols; but they were excluded from the ministry of sacrifice and from the preeminent dignities of the priesthood (1976:168/ my translation).

There were at least two distinct levels of women's participation in religious institutions and in the religious, priestly hierarchy. One level consists of those women, attached to the *calmecac* (school for priests and noble children) who "guarded" and taught young girls. These girls were dedicated by their parents to a deity, and would live and do service in that deity's temple for a certain period of time. The women were older, unmarried, and permanently attached to one of these temples. They were called *quaquacuilitin* or *tlamacauhque* (Hellbom 1967:129-130). Duran refers to these women as "*abadesas*" (abbess) under whom young girls in the temples served, being taught to worship, sweep, fast, light the incense, weave and spin (1967:II:544). The weaving and spinning was the only purely female activity and may have had both ritual and economic functions.

Female children could also be entrusted to the *telpochcalli* (school for commoners and warriors). Here they were trained by female teachers or leaders called *ichpuchtiahcauh* ("leader of girls").

The other level was the women priestesses. First we can consider the *ciuatlama-*

cazque, who were the women who participated in and who carried out duties in the monthly calendrical ritual. *Cihuaquacuilli* were also women priestesses; these may have had specific responsibilities to certain deities such as Toçi (Hellbom 1967:129-130). A woman entitled *Cihuaquacuilli iztacihuatl* kept watch over those who swept and kept the fire at Toçi's temple, *Atenchicalcan*. She also attended others who served at this temple (*Ibid.*). According to Sahagun, "... any who made supplications [to the goddess] spoke to the *Iztac Ciuatl Cihuaquacuilli*" (Dibble and Anderson 1951:2:197).

Women also played important roles in life-cycle ritual. For example, they were very active in all ceremonies after the birth of a child. The midwife proclaimed a child was born and led the ceremony where the child's umbilical cord was buried, and then ritually greeted the child. In these rites, symbols of the child's sex were displayed. For a male, symbols of his father's profession, such as a soldier's weapon or an artisan's tool, were displayed. A spindle, workbasket and broom were displayed for a female child. The child's name was then given by the midwife (Clark 1938:I:89). As Hellbom has pointed out, it is important to notice the essentially equivalent and parallel nature of male and female birth ceremonies (p. 153).

This parallelism is further seen in the way children were raised. Boys and girls were taught equivalent tasks at the same age, and while women's tasks do seem to have been domestically oriented, they would also have been useful to the selling in the marketplace which many Aztec women would do as adults (Nash 1979:356). Women were told that if they were diligent in their tasks they would be honored like warriors in battle (Hellbom 1967:90).

As in childbirth, women played key roles at marriage. Several older women would be the go-betweens, who negotiated marriages. Their role in marriage was symbolized in the wedding ceremony when they tied the shirt of the groom to the skirt of the bride (p. 106). Several women also guarded the couple for the four days they were secluded after the wedding (*Ibid.*).

What we see, in short, is that there was a certain degree of parallelism in male and female religious activities. In speaking of the Zapotecs, Clavijero has said that they, "... sacrificed the men to the gods, the women to the goddesses and the children to I don't know what small spirits (1976:171/my translation).

This type of parallelism in the male and female priestly hierarchies existed in Tenochtitlan as is demonstrated by the titles for male priests which are always the same as the terms for male priests, except justified by the word for women, and the responsibility that women carried for training young girls in temple schools. One can further show that in calendrical ceremonies where a person was selected to imitate a deity, males were chosen to represent male deities and females to represent female deities. The parallelism does not appear to have been perfect. For example, it is unclear whether the schools where female children were trained as priestesses or did holy service were part of *calmecacs* attached to temples devoted to male deities or whether the schools where females were trained were separate institutions.

It would be a mistake to employ terms such as "equal" or "subordinate" to

describe the role of women in the Aztec religious system—in other words, to impose our categories on their religious realm. To do this would obscure the complex organization of their religious structure in which, in important respects, men and women had parallel roles. As Leacock and Nash have pointed out, the Aztec state rationalized its power by invoking powerful male deities which threatened and dominated more egalitarian forces in the society. The Spanish tended to interpret Aztec religion through the lenses of male dominance and hierarchy (1977:634-635). Both of these tendencies make it much more difficult for us to understand the nature of Aztec religion in its own terms. If we try, however, we confront data which show us more active, more independent and more influential women in many realms of life than we would have thought. And kinship organization, even in this hierarchical, class-based society can be an important clue to the role of women in religious organization.

FOOTNOTES

¹The data sources used in this paper have not been clearly spelled out. Most of the discussion of religion draws on the standard ethnohistorical sources on Aztec Indians. Many of these are listed in Nash (1978). The discussion of kinship, however, also draws on archival sources, documentation generated in the *Real Audiencia*. The documentation, from the 16th century, which is relevant to Indians (from the point of view of the ethnohistorian or social historian interested in social life) is located in the *ramo Tierras*. Fifty-five sixteenth century, concerning Mexico City, were found. In all of these at least one side in the suit was Indian. Eleven of the suits concerned rural lands outside the city (but owned by natives of the city), two were over urban garden cultivation plots (*chinampas*), and forty-six concerned urban house sites. While the litigation itself is of considerable interest, the documentation from any one particular case might also contain other interesting and pertinent types of documents such as wills or letters of sale.

²This other evidence is on residential patterns and inheritance rights.

³This was also recognized by Alice Schlegel, in her book *Male Dominance and Female Autonomy* in regard to matrilineal societies.

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The Myth of Sexual Egalitarian Communities: New Harmony and Brook Farm Revisited *

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Dreaming of utopia has been a favorite pastime for men for centuries. From Plato onward, social critics have imagined communities where people's deepest yearnings and fondest dreams could be fulfilled, where life obeyed natural or spiritual laws, and where everyone could work harmoniously in a chosen social order. But almost without exception, the dreamers of utopia have been and are flesh and blood men (not the generic kind), and they have woven their fantasies into a social fabric that has perpetuated the power of people like themselves. It is not surprising that the "great utopian thinkers" of the western world envision their good place/no place to be a world where white, propertied men continue to retain control of their new worlds.¹ As Karl Mannheim has illustrated aptly in *Ideology and Utopia*, patterns of thought are culture bound, even for the most "utopian" of thinkers.² With few exceptions, utopia has always been a male construct where women are still defined by their relation to those with the power (the men), and where women, in some way, end up serving those selfsame men.³

Although almost no utopian thinkers have ever questioned the patriarchal basis of their visions, a few utopian reformers have tried to create communities where sexual equality would flourish. The two most famous of the secular communitarian reforms in nineteenth-century America—New Harmony and Brook Farm—have long been associated with their struggle for women's rights. Reformers in both communities wrote scathing essays criticizing women's economic dependence upon men and their treatment as mere playthings in the mainstream culture. Yet, both New Harmony and Brook Farm failed to implement the equality promised in their respective community constitutions. What encouraged New Harmony and Brook Farm reformers to refute their promises for equality at every level, while retaining a firm, male-based power structure, was their unquestioning, and perhaps unconscious, acceptance of the most pervasive pattern of thought that existed in nineteenth-century America—slavish devotion to the ideal of the True Woman.

*This paper was revised for this publication.

As numerous scholars such as Barbara Welter and Nancy Cott have clearly demonstrated, America's mythic landscape in the mid-nineteenth century was dominated by the pervasive ideal of the True Woman.⁴ The Cult of True Womanhood that swept the country in the second quarter of the nineteenth century prescribed specific qualities—submissiveness, domesticity, piety, and purity—for the ideal woman of the age. This idealized picture of American womanhood portrayed the True Woman as an inactive, self-sacrificing creature whose life's objectives were to nurture and serve the men and children in her life. The True Woman's sphere was unquestioningly the home, her duties domestic. She was everywhere considered separate and distinct from man.

Though woman's place was certainly in or around the home in eighteenth-century, pre-industrial America, her roles were vital and flexible.⁵ No one presumed to tell her her "place." By the early nineteenth century however, women had lost much of their status as "productive workers" because the industrial revolution rendered home production less necessary. Just at the time that young women began leaving their homes for employment, and upper-class women were left in homes with little to do, the home became, ironically, the "ideal sphere" for women. By the mid-nineteenth century in America, says Gerda Lerner, the generalization "woman's place is in the home," had evolved from an accurate description into a myth.⁶

This immensely popular cult was an important response to the vast changes necessitated by the industrial revolution. Nineteenth-century historians propose that the True Woman's ascribed pure and domestic "nature" represented a desperate effort to find in the sanctity of women the principle which would hold society together.⁷ The image of the True Woman, sitting passively, symbolizing all that was virtuous and good, provided a psychic repository for traditional American values that were being ignored in an age beset with the patriarchal priorities of aggression and acquisition. The success of nineteenth-century American industrialization, in effect, was dependant upon a culture-wide acceptance of the Cult of True Womanhood. "If women had not existed, the age would have had to invent them," suggests Welter.⁸ The reformers at New Harmony and Brook Farm, who proposed sexual equality were just as influenced by the Cult of True Womanhood as anyone else. Their theoretical arguments for equality were quickly and neatly forgotten as soon as they conflicted with Cult rhetoric.

* * * *

America's first "Community of Equality," was established in New Harmony, Indiana in 1825 by Robert Owen. Like Robert Owen, many of the reformers who came to New Harmony spoke enthusiastically for all kinds of equality, but sexual equality particularly captured their interest, because they were interested, as was Owen, in correcting woman's unequal place in traditional families. The constitution of the New Harmony Community of Equality specifies clearly the intent of the reformers: the first principle of association was that "equality of rights [is] unin-

fluenced by sex or condition in all adults." The constitution continues by stipulating that all adults should have an "equality of duties," while each member should "render his or her best services for the good of the whole."⁹

This constitution has erroneously convinced many twentieth-century scholars that sexual equality was a reality in New Harmony. Ross Lockridge, an Indian historian, claims that in New Harmony "there were no qualifications whatever as to the equal rights of women . . . They had full rights as voters and members of the assembly, and unlimited educational and industrial privileges."¹⁰ Raymond Muncy also says in his book *Sex and Marriage in Utopian Communities* that in New Harmony, "no distinction was made on the basis of sex in the enjoyments of rights and privileges."¹¹ Yet women had little direction over their own lives at New Harmony because they were, after all, only women; the egalitarian promises in the constitution remained empty rhetoric.

Most women had no political rights at New Harmony. Married women were not allowed to vote on any community issue until well into New Harmony's second (and final) year.¹² Even then, only select women were "invited" to vote.¹³ Most married women remained at home during the Wednesday night policy and voting sessions.

Although New Harmony's constitution guaranteed "equality of duties" to all members, all members did not work equally. Many of the male members of the community left numerous letters and journals full of their carefree days at New Harmony. Their writings illustrate the leisure they had to sit under trees and think, or travel to other nearby communities.¹⁴ The hurried, cryptic letters left by the women at New Harmony reflect a different expectation for their time in the community. Although women were encouraged to be employed full time in community industries because the Owenites wanted to eliminate women's economic dependence upon men, they were also responsible for the community's domestic services as well. Thus a dedicated professional like Marie Fretageot, who had transferred her Philadelphia school to New Harmony because of her unfailing belief in Robert Owen's "system," writes of a work day far more laborious than her male colleagues had. She relates that after getting up regularly at 4 am and holding classes for her twelve boarders before a 6:30 am breakfast, she then taught several different age groups from 9-11 in the morning, and from 2-4 and 6-8 in the afternoon. The other hours, she says, "I am occupied cooking for the whole family (herself and all boarders)." At the end of her description of her work day at New Harmony, Fretageot adds: "I may say that I have but very little the occasion of wearing out the chairs of the house."¹⁵ For most of the women in New Harmony—married women who had not committed themselves to Owen's cause as Fretageot had—the hard work simply embittered them. One such woman, Sarah Pears of Pittsburgh, writes shortly after arriving at New Harmony that her eldest daughter was "very poorly" because "all the hard work falls upon her and it is more than she is able to bear." Mrs. Pears adds that she and her husband had hoped that this daughter "would have been rather relieved from her heavy labor than otherwise by

coming here; but at present it is far from being the case."¹⁶ Only nine months later, after being informed that she must take in boarders and cook and clean for them, Sarah Pears states flatly that "I can stand it no longer."¹⁷

Perplexed by the ever-increasing "woman problem" at New Harmony, Robert Owen attempted to assuage it in the only way he knew—by lecturing to the community from *The Social System*, a tract he had written in the early 1820s. Women's problems could not come from too much work, reasoned Owen, because in association, "one female will with great ease and comfort perform as much as twenty servants can do."¹⁸ The problem in New Harmony must stem from women "talking too much," concluded Owen, because women could not have too much work living communally. That everyone should share the productive communal work, and that women would also be responsible for all domestic work, was a foregone conclusion because of women's "innately" domestic nature that demanded that women, and women alone, could (and should) cook, clean, make clothes, wash, and take care of small children. Constitutional promises of "equal duties" only went as far as the rhetoric surrounding the Cult of True Womanhood began. The end result—women working far more than men and consequently complaining—Owen blamed upon the women themselves.

The pages of New Harmony's weekly newspaper, the *New Harmony Gazette*, reflect the same tensions between egalitarian rhetoric and True Womanhood dogma. Without exception, the front page articles on women or egalitarian matters in the *Gazette* extolled woman's equal place in communal association while lambasting her limited, passive, submissive, and domestic functions in, as Owen called it, "the old immoral world." Always the importance of a good education, that all-encompassing equalizer in Robert Owen's schema, is constantly reiterated. Customs women have been taught to follow are often ridiculed, particularly the custom of unquestioningly preparing only to marry and become dependent upon a man. Women are urged to become independent and educated, while the society that chains women to a family and only servile duties is constantly attacked.

At the same time, however, other articles, editorials, advice columns, and aphorisms found in the back pages of the paper, indicate that women and men could not possibly be equals because Woman (and the term "woman" was always used, often with a capital "W") was a being whose sphere, whose duties, whose very nature separated her inexorably from man (and mankind). Because women were "others," a class of not-men, they are advised, lectured, and admonished throughout the back pages of the *Gazette*. They are told how to set a "silent example," and how to "enchain the heart of a husband." Once they trapped their spouse, they were advised of their "sacred and important" duties to fulfill, always asking themselves "how shall I preserve the heart I have won?"¹⁹ It comes as little surprise then, to find that woman's purpose for living is simply "to love. (Love) is the purpose—to be loved the consumation—to be faithful the religion of a woman; it is her all in all." (*New Harmony Gazette*, January 3, 1827).

Woman's unique duties which were derived from her innately pure, loving nature are also spelled out clearly in the latter part of the *Gazette*. Always woman's importance is depicted as coming from her salutary (and passive) influence upon a man, or upon society, never from her own initiative, courage, or intelligence. Women "smoothed" men's manners, and gave men's morals "their purity." The ideal woman portrayed in the *Gazette* sounds remarkably like a True Woman: "Woman," according to the November 5, 1826 *Gazette*, "is the purest abstract of nature that can be found in all its works. She is the image of love, purity, and truth; and she lives and moves in all who possess virtuous innocence. Woman ever has been, still is, and always will be the mainspring of every masculine achievement..." Here is a description that could be found in any number of popular "lady's" magazines in nineteenth-century America, but it is found in the *New Harmony Gazette*, a journal dedicated to eradicating "outdated" customs and beliefs about women. Everyone at New Harmony, including Robert Owen and the editors of the *Gazette*, carried with them unquestioned cultural "givens." Clashing strongly were the community's proclamations for equality and perhaps the most immutable "fact" of the age—the myth of the True Woman.

Some fourteen years after New Harmony's demise in 1827, Brook Farm was founded by George and Sophia Ripley. Both the economic depression of 1837 and the emerging "flowering of New England" combined to lay the foundation for a Transcendental community established for intellectuals to learn to work with both their heads and hands. Like New Harmony, Brook Farm captured the popular attention of the time. It was alternately praised and censored by Bostonians with raised Brahmin eyebrows waiting to see if the attempt at egalitarian communal living would indeed destroy the family as it was known to the modern world, or if transcendental individualism would blossom in its maturist expression.

Like New Harmony, Brook Farm promised through its constitution that "all rights, privileges, guaranties, and obligations of members expressed or implied . . . shall be understood to belong equally to both sexes."²⁰ Unlike the women at New Harmony, the Brook Farm women did vote on community matters and some held positions of authority, though these managerial positions were primarily in domestic areas. At Brook Farm, as at New Harmony, employment was strictly sex-segregated. Women were responsible for the domestic concerns of the community, though the boys sometimes "helped out," by carrying the heavy wash. Although men probably worked harder at Brook Farm than they did at New Harmony, "special" men were exempt from all communal work, despite the community's promise to combine both the head and the hand. Nathaniel Hawthorne grumbled only briefly about having to milk cows; shortly after his complaints he was "relieved" of all his work assignments so that he could spend

more time on "important" activities.²¹ No woman was excused from her work assignments at Brook Farm; rather, if a woman did not work appropriately long, arduous hours, she could be quickly dismissed from the community. One Sophia Eastman wrote only one letter back home complaining of the inordinant amount of work women in the community were expected to perform before George Ripley replied to her father that his daughter was being sent home because "she is not the kind of person contemplated in our plan," e.g. "skilled in all sorts of domestic labor and capable of taking the lead in the most fatiguing duties."²²

All of the women writing letters from Brook Farm comment on their 14-16 hour workdays, on the hundreds of meals cooked, tables set and cleared, dishes washed, clothes washed, pressed and sewed; but the Brook Farm women, with few exceptions, viewed their involved, long work day from a different perspective than the New Harmony women did. Brook Farm women were pleased with their community and wrote of joyous times as well as of their duties.²³ Perhaps this positive attitude can be at least partially explained by noting that these women who wrote of their happy life at Brook Farm were young, unmarried women whose venture into utopia reads like a collegiate experience replete with a popular vegetarian diet, a RLSC (Rejected Lovers Sympathizing Club), weekend trips to nearby Boston, and regular lectures by such dignitaries as Margaret Fuller and Ralph Waldo Emerson. Unlike New Harmony, where most of the women had come as wives, Brook Farm was primarily populated by unmarried young people. Charles Lane comments in the *Dial* of 1844 that there were only four married couples living at Brook Farm at that time.²⁴ The one woman who did complain of her treatment at the community was the wife of a member who was totally devoted to the community's principles while she was not.²⁵ Perhaps the individual commitment unmarried women made to communal living, or at least to communal living for a few "collegiate"-type years combined with the freedom our culture offers unmarried women allowed the young Brook Farm women to consider their domestic drudgery as more of a lark than the married women at New Harmony ever could.

The egalitarian bias built into Transcendentalism and translated into community goals with some small successes at Brook Farm was somewhat altered by the ideological changes that transformed Brook Farm from a Transcendental experiment into a Fourieristic phalanx in 1843. Though none of Charles Fourier's ideas were ever totally implemented at Brook Farm, his attitudes and his disciples' attitudes toward Woman's nature reflected the same ambivalences and contradictions expressed by the editors of the *New Harmony Gazette*. The rhetoric of Fourier's most important followers at Brook Farm—George Ripley, Charles Dana, and William Ellery Channing—that filled the pages of the *Harbinger*, Brook Farm's Fourieristic paper, called glowingly upon the "liberation of women" from the "slavery of the family," but at the same time, proposed that women "be assigned to their natural sphere of action."²⁶

Just as the editors of the *New Harmony Gazette* criticized society for relegating

women to positions of unimportance in the modern world and proclaimed better treatment in Robert Owen's own version of a "new moral world," so Fourier's followers urged men and women to accept the tenets behind "women's rights" which would allow women freedom to vote, freedom to speak in public, and freedom "from the bonds which do absolutely degrade them of their true position, their power to use the faculties which God has given them for their own service."²⁷ The writers in the *Harbinger* loved to point out Fourier's famous dictum that "social progress is in proportion to the progress of women towards liberty," and they loved, just as Robert Owen had loved, to criticize modern marriage where women "the moment they were married . . . descend from free-women into slaves, and are subjected to all the disabilities."²⁸

Yet, the *Harbinger's* editors, like their counterparts at New Harmony, also advocated a special nature, a special place, a special purpose for Woman that contradicted their egalitarian proclamations. George Ripley's essay in the September 26, 1846 *Harbinger* aptly illustrates this contradiction:

[In] the Associative system, woman will enjoy equal opportunity in all respects with man . . . She will no longer be a drudge to minister to the necessities of an acknowledged superior, nor a toy to serve for the amusement of his idle hours. With no sacrifice of the gentleness and serenity, with which she now throws a charm over existence, she will expand in the ripeness of the highest cultures, to fill her destined sphere in the mutual relations of life. Her intelligence will quicken and stimulate the intellect of man; her intuitive wisdom, refined by all the influence of a true education, will be a perpetual refreshment to his spirit; and the purity of her nature, fortified with the power of a well-developed understanding, will guaranty the purity of society.

How woman was to "enjoy equal opportunity in all respects with man" and still "refresh" his spirit and "guaranty the purity of society"—a rather full time job in itself, I would think—is not clear. What is clear is that the Cult of True Womanhood, with its labeling of women as domestic creatures whose purpose in life was to use their "natural" inclination to serve men and Society, pervaded every cultural and intellectual corner of nineteenth-century America. Even in the *Harbinger*, a forceful statement that advised women to "use their faculties for their own service," was quickly modified to imply: use your education, your very liberation that our system will give you to better serve men. Such advice doomed women to unequal and secondary positions even in a "utopian" community.

* * * *

As long as dreams of utopia are grounded in patriarchal frameworks, verbal pleas for sexual equality will remain just that: verbal invocations to be condescended to or partially implemented in such a way as to benefit men, but then rejected because of the subsequent "woman problem." As long as women are considered

"others," beings whose natures are reputed to be so different from those holding the power, reformers' attempts to "give" women sexual equality are doomed to an inevitable failure because equality between the sexes cannot exist in a patriarchy. Over one hundred and fifty years ago the most utopian of the Owenite thinkers, William Thompson, wrote that "to build up a new fabric of social happiness comprehending equally the interests of all existing human beings, has never been contemplated."²⁰ It still has not.

FOOTNOTES

¹For a discussion of how the "great utopian thinkers" eliminate women from their visions see Daphne Patai, "Utopia for Whom," *Aphra* 3 (Summer, 1974), pp. 2-16.

²*Ideology and Utopia* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1936).

³The rare exceptions up until the 1970s influx of the Piercy/LaGuinn genre of feminist science fiction have been woman-headed utopias where men (and sexual passion) were excluded such as "The Women's Commonwealth," an all-women utopian community in Texas in the late nineteenth century, or Charlotte Perkins Gilman's fictional *Herland* (1915).

⁴See Barbara Welter's pioneering essay, "The Cult of True Womanhood," *American Quarterly* 18 (Summer, 1866), pp. 151-74, as well as Nancy Cott, *The Bonds of Womanhood* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977); Ann Douglas, *The Feminization of American Culture* (New York: Knopf Press, 1977); and Mary P. Ryan, "American Society and the Cult of Domesticity," Dissertation, University of California, Santa Barbara, 1971, among many others.

⁵See Gerda Lerner, "The Lady and the Mill Girl: Changes in the Status of Women in the Age of Jackson," *American Studies* 10 (Spring, 1969), pp. 5-15; and Page Smith, *Daughters of the Promised Land* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1970).

⁶Lerner, p. 13.

⁷See William Taylor and Christopher Lasch, "Two Kindred Spirits," *New England Quarterly*, 36 (March, 1963), p. 35.

⁸Welter, "The Feminization of American Religion," in *Clio's Consciousness Raised*, ed. Mary Hartman and Lois Banner (New York: Harper and Row, 1974), p. 139.

⁹The Constitution for the New Harmony Community of Equality is published in the February 15, 1826 *New Harmony Gazette*.

¹⁰*The Old Fauntleroy Home* (New Harmony: New Harmony Memorial Commission, 1939), p. 62.

¹¹Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973, p. 218.

¹²See Thomas Pears' letter from New Harmony dated September 29, 1825 reprinted in *New Harmony: An Adventure in Happiness*, ed. by Thomas Pears Jr. (Clifton: Augustus Kelley, 1973).

¹³See Paul Brown, *Twelve Months in New Harmony, 1827*; rpt. (Philadelphia: Porcupine Press, 1972), p. 19.

¹⁴See Thomas Pears' letters; Paul Brown's book; William Maclure's letters published as *Education and Reform: Correspondence of William Maclure and Marie Duclos Fretageot*, (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Society, 1948); and Robert Dale Owen's "Travel Journal," ed. by Josephine M. Elliott, Indiana Historical Society Publications, 23 (1969), pp. 178-288.

¹⁵*Education and Reform*, p. 391.

¹⁶In the Pears' letters see June 3, 1825.

¹⁷Pears' letters, March 10, 1826.

¹⁸A record of the meeting was printed in the August 30, 1826 *New Harmony Gazette*.

¹⁹See the December 7, 1825, and the May 3, and November 8, 1826, *New Harmony Gazette*.

²⁰Article 7, Section 6, "Constitution of the Brook Farm Community," dated May 20, 1845 and located at the Massachusetts Historical Society.

²¹"Passages from the American Note-books," Vol Ii, Boston, 1868; See April 16, 1841 and September 22, 1841.

²²See Sophia Eastman to Mehitabel Eastman, July 25, 1843 and George Ripley to Phineas Eastman, November 24, 1843; letters are located in the Middlebury College Library.

²³See especially Elizabeth Hoxie's letters in the Houghton Rare Books Library at Harvard University and Marianne Dwight's letters, published as *Letters from Brook Farm*, Poughkeepsie, 1928.

²⁴"Brook Farm," *Dial* 4 (January, 1844), p. 354.

²⁵See John Codman, *Brook Farm* (Boston, 1844), pp. 136-37.

²⁶See the *Harbinger*, March 7, 1846.

²⁷the *Harbinger*, October 4, 1845.

²⁸*Harbinger*, October 4, 1845.

²⁹*Appeal of One Half the Human Race, Women, Against the Pretensions of the Other Half, Men...* London, 1825, p. xiv.

Elsie Dinmore **"Haunting the Minds of Millions of Women"**

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The editors of Arno Press recently announced the reprint of the 1868 juvenile novel, *Elsie Dinmore*. "While their brothers read Horatio Alger, Nick Carter and the latest Buffalo Bill adventure, girls had their own special set of heroines, such as Martha Finley's enormously popular Elsie Dinmore."¹ That statement raised several questions about the Elsie books. What sort of models for girls appeared in them? What is an Elsie Dinmore heroine? What attitudes towards women's roles and expectations were represented, either explicitly or implicitly? Did they include any criticism of the status quo? Did the Elsie books, like the Alger stories, provide a formula for success and happiness to those who accepted the current system and worked within it?

Elsie was the creation of Martha Finley, who began her writing career as the author of Presbyterian Sunday School books. Finley's work reached millions of readers over a period of several generations. The twenty-eight Elsie books, which constituted a third of Finley's total literary production, netted the author a quarter of a million dollars. The works sold two million copies and were read by an estimated twenty-four million people in the United States and an additional large audience in England. As late as World War II, twelve of the Elsie volumes were still in print in American editions and the entire series was still in print in England. Elsie, in the words of Ruth Suchow, "will never cease to haunt the minds of millions of women."²

Although *Elsie Dinmore* was the most widely read of the series³ it really only introduced the major characters and set the stage for further adventures. As the story begins, the heroine is a motherless child of eight, living with her absent father's family on their plantation "in the South." The year must be approximately 1845. Although a good and beautiful Christian child, Elsie is harassed or ignored by everyone in the house except her faithful mammy, Chloe. Her father's return does not improve things, for he too neglects his loving daughter, except to command or rebuke her. The climax of the story occurs when Horace, Elsie's father, orders her to play a secular song on the piano on the Sabbath. When Elsie's conscience compels

her to refuse, he orders the child to remain on the piano stool until she obeys. It is only after Elsie faints and bumps her head that Horace realizes his unreasonableness, although he still does not accept Elsie's strict notions of morality. Father and daughter are happy and loving as the book ends, but much unfinished business remains.⁴

Given Elsie's (and Martha Finley's) religious beliefs, it was likely that the confrontation would occur again. The second volume, *Elsie's Holidays at Roselands*, provides the indispensable chapter of the story. The title is ironic, for at least half the book is taken up with Elsie's punishment as she refuses to obey her father's command to read a novel on the Sabbath. He undertakes a series of increasingly harsh measures to force her compliance—beginning with isolation from his company and culminating with the threat to send Elsie to a convent school. That possibility forces Elsie into a complete physical and mental breakdown and drives her to the verge of death. Seeing the results of his immovable attitude, Horace repents and becomes a fervent Christian. Elsie miraculously recovers, and father and daughter go on to enjoy a communion of spirit and an idyllic relationship. It is in *Elsie's Holidays* that the heroine reaches the high point of her redemptive role—through her undeserved suffering her father is saved.⁵

With Horace Dinsmore's soul safely accounted for, Martha Finley devotes the next five volumes to Elsie's coming of age, courtship (including a narrow escape from a fortune hunting scoundrel), marriage to her father's contemporary and best friend, Edward Travilla, the birth of eight children, and Travilla's death. During those years, the Civil War occurs but the Dinsmores fortuitously find themselves in Europe.

After Elsie becomes a widow, the plots deteriorate. Her daughter Violet marries one Captain Levis Raymond who assumes Mr. Dinsmore's role as the strong father. The later volumes are almost totally didactic, consisting of lengthy lectures, attributed to Captain Raymond or Grandma Elsie, dealing with American history or Biblical texts.

Barbara Welter, Barbara Berg and others have dealt with the nineteenth century feminine ideal that emphasized the virtues of piety, purity, domesticity, and submissiveness.⁶ The strong father-daughter relationship, religion, virtue, and home and family are emphasized in the Elsie series, but their manifestations are sometimes ambiguous. Martha Finley clearly meant for her readers to draw lessons for living from her work. The author hoped, for example, that *Elsie's Girlhood* would serve "to those . . . now treading the same portion of life's pathway, a useful example particularly in her filial love and obedience."⁷ Such obedience is one of Elsie's most outstanding qualities—second only to her piety. The father-daughter relationship stands at the center of the Elsie stories, and it is a relationship based almost, but not entirely, on Elsie's submission to her father's will.

Horace Dinsmore was uncompromising in his determination that his daughter obey him, and Elsie cheerfully acquiesced until he gave her an order that violated her conscience. Martha Finley may be forgiven if the confrontation over the

observance of the Sabbath seems repetitious. It is, perhaps, the only believable sin an "upright moral man" would try to impose on his small daughter. Several characters point out to Elsie that her father only asked her to commit a "little sin," but Elsie's steadfastness is greater because she refused to yield even in a small matter.

Elsie, of course, must triumph in the situation, for she believes in a true religion as defined by Martha Finley. However, once the crisis is past, Elsie willingly and eagerly submits to any and every direction from her "dear papa." "I really enjoy being controlled by papa. It saves me a great deal of trouble and responsibility in the way of deciding for myself, and then I love him so dearly that I almost always feel it my greatest pleasure to do whatever pleases him."⁹ Even after Elsie becomes a widow and a grandmother, it is her father whose decisions govern the family's behavior.

One reason for Horace's domineering attitude lay in his view of Elsie as his possession. "She is as lovely as an angel, and she is *mine*, mine only, mine own precious one."⁹ The father forbade Elsie from playing "jack stones" for it might enlarge her knuckles "and I don't choose to have these little hands of mine robbed of their beauty."¹⁰ Nor would he permit Elsie to give one of her curls to a girl friend. "Elsie doesn't own any (curls), they all belong to me," he said. "I let her wear them to be sure, but that is all she has no right to give them away."¹¹

Even in a pre-Freudian age, Horace's possessive attitude might be considered extreme. He consented to Elsie's marriage only reluctantly, even though Travilla was a man of unimpeachable character. " 'My darling!' murmured the father in low, half tremulous accents, putting his arm about the slender waist, 'my beautiful darling! How can I give you to another?' and again and again his lips were pressed to hers in long, passionate kisses."¹²

But if Horace appeared to win the war for dominance, Elsie was victorious in the most significant battle. The assumptions that underlie the Elsie books cannot be simply categorized under the heading of male dominance and female submission, as some critics have suggested.¹³ Rather they approximate more closely one pattern described by Ann Douglas and Nancy Cott. Nineteenth century women, relegated to the sphere of family and religion, came to dominate in those fields through the exercise of the "moral influence" so widely believed to be indigenous to the female sex.¹⁴ Elsie conquered when she achieved her father's conversion in *Holidays at Roselands*. She conquered "through the combined force of a bleeding forehead and a high temperature."¹⁵ Although Martha Finley may not have intended it, the implication is clear that Elsie could obey her father only in lesser things. She transformed him when it really counted.

Elsie's husband did not demand submission from his wife, and in fact the marriages in the Elsie books do not rest on the subjection of wives. It is true that the marital relationships do not contain the drama of the father-daughter episodes. Janet Brown attributes this to Finley's neuroses about men. "Apparently her imaginary relations to a man were necessarily masochistic, whether she thought of

him intentionally as her father or subconsciously as her lover," Brown wrote. "She never pictures herself in relationship to a husband. The moment they, Finley's heroines, grow old enough to marry, she veers away from them, and gives them consideration only when circumstances can be contrived to draw them again into the daughter relationship."¹⁶ But it is also possible that Finley was attempting to portray marriages as partnerships, to the extent that her own limited experience with such an arrangement permitted. It is also likely that since she was writing children's books, Finley deemed the parent-child episodes more pertinent to their interest and edification than the husband-wife situations.

Inseparable from obedience, religion plays a major part in the Elsie books. If Martha Finley wrote *Elsie's Girlhood* as an example of "filial obedience," she wrote *Elsie's Widowhood* to show that the "love of Christ overcomes even bereavement," to show her readers where to turn for consolation.¹⁷

Elsie turned to her personal God.¹⁸ But her religion was more than personal consolation, it also provided a means for her to influence others. The portrayal of Elsie as a Christ figure is unmistakable. Although innocent herself, she suffers, and even appears to die, to save her father. There are other examples in the *Roselands* volume. She experiences continual torment, alludes to the agony in the garden, asking God that her trial might be removed. She forgives her father repeatedly, pointing out that he does not mean to be cruel. Horace, during the estrangement, is cast in the role of tempter. He reveals the riches and happiness that can be Elsie's if she will only acknowledge his authority.

Elsie's salvific mission does not end with her father. Many of the stories end with a conversion experience, inevitably accomplished through Elsie's example. Martha Finley would be horrified at the comparison, but in the later volumes, the heroine assumes a role like the Virgin Mary. She is the channel of grace, bringing sinful men to the true faith.

If Elsie's own religion was deep and true, it did not admit of tolerance or understanding of different faiths—especially Roman Catholicism. Her Aunt Adelaide dreaded telling Elsie of her father's threat to send her to a convent, "for she knew that much of Elsie's reading had been on the subject of Popery and Papal institutions; that she had pored over histories of the terrible tortures of the Inquisition, and stories of martyrs and captive nuns, until she had imbibed an intense horror and dread of anything connected with that form of error and superstition."¹⁹

Age did not mellow Elsie's prejudices. She explained to her grandchildren why the Huguenots had come to America after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. "They found it less hazardous to dwell beside the savage Indians than among the persecuting Papists."²⁰ Jews and Mormons were also singled out for special mention.

The heroic characters of the Elsie books represented, then, not only an affirmation of piety, but a particular set of religious beliefs and an intolerance toward those who failed to live up to a rigid set of Calvinish principles. The

"worldly" were condemned almost as roundly as the Papists, Jews, and Mormons.²¹

As Martha Finley compared true religion with "superstition" and error, she compared Elsie's purity and innocence with the unacceptable behavior of some other young women. Her Aunt Enna, younger than Elsie but more experienced, referred to her sixteen year old niece as "absurdly childish."²² Elsie's simplicity and naturalness won out however, for she was rewarded with a happy marriage while Enna undertook two disastrous matches.

As even more glaring negative example was Elsie's cousin Virginia, hurried into marriage with an apparently wealthy man by her mother. Wealth seemed more important than character, and Virginia suffers the consequences. She is found in "slosterly dress" with her hair in crimping pins, deserted by her gambler husband, and living in a tenement.²³

The Dinsmores et al demanded a single standard of morality. As Elsie explained, "The sin which makes a woman an outcast from decent society should receive the same condemnation when committed by a man . . . a woman should require as absolute moral purity in the man she marries as men do in the women they choose for wives, and so long as we are content with anything less, so long as we smile on men whom we know to be immoral, we are in a measure responsible for their vices."²⁴ There are positive male examples, Mr. Dinsmore, Travilla, and Captain Raymond, and there are negative male models. Elsie's Uncle Arthur, for example, came to no good end. Early in youth he began making bets and by the time he attended Princeton, Arthur was a frequenter of gambling dens. On one occasion he visited a "handsomely furnished room where tables were set out with the choicest viands, rich wine, and trays of fine cigars. There he was victimized by a professional gambler whose smile was sardonic" and who showed "a sinister expression in his keen black eye."²⁵ No vice was isolated. Where there was smoke, there would be drink, gambling—or worse.

One way to avoid vice and worldly temptation was to stay at home, among one's family and faithful retainers. As a child, Elsie dreaded the idea of boarding school. "It must be dismal to go off alone among strangers," she said.²⁶ Indeed when a vacation took the Dinsmores away, they usually travelled as an extended family.

Elsie's greatest domestic duty appeared to involve her role as mistress of the plantation. In that capacity she performed numerous kindly gestures for the spiritual and material well being of the "servants." On Christmas, for example, she distributed gifts—calico dresses, brightly colored handkerchiefs, and confectionary. The servants responded with bows, curtsies, and "broad grins," repeating, "Thank you Miss Elsie, dese berry handsome—berry nice, jes de ting for dis chile."²⁷ The reader is given to understand that the family behaved generously toward the blacks, who after emancipation were "paid liberal wages and yet as kind and generously cared for as in the old days of slavery; even more so, for now Elsie might lawfully carry out her desire to educate them to a higher standard of intelligence and morality."²⁸

Martha Finley obviously accepted racial stereotypes without qualm. On one

occasion, Mr. Dinsmore referred to the "dawdling, indolent ways" of the slaves.²⁹ These stock characterizations have a jarring effect on the modern reader. One other example should suffice. In her effort to provide for the spiritual advancement of her slaves, Elsie frequently went down to the "quarter" to preach. There the following dialogue took place. " 'Does He lub niggahs, missus?' queried one grinning little wooly head. 'Yes, if they love Him: and they won't be negroes in heaven. "White folks, missus? Oh dat nice! Guess I go dar; if dey let me in.' " "³⁰

Even after slavery, help was always available and the major characters were seldom seen doing any real work although they speak highly of its value. All of the male characters were either planters, doctors, or military men. Like soap opera characters, they were always free to tend to personal matters.

Even if they did not expect to be gainfully employed, the male and female children were tutored at home, as befit their class and region. As she is to be a model for her young readers, Elsie is, of course, a diligent student—mastering both intellectual subjects and the "accomplishments." She was even alleged to be "quite capable of earning her own living."³¹

But although college for women was a real possibility in the 1880s and after, Martha Finley never seriously considered it as an option for her heroines. While education for women is highly praised in the Elsie books, it is education of the conventional and limited variety that could be carried on within the home.

There is, however, an occasional recognition of other women's issues in the later books. One example involves a conversation between Captain Raymond and his daughter about Queen Victoria. " 'Women do sometimes do better than men.' 'At some things—things not requiring much physical strength, for example,' the Captain said with an amused glance. 'Yes, father it is certainly true that men excel us in physical strength; but is that any reason why women should be paid less for their work and taxed quite as heavily on their property—if they happen to have any?' she concluded with a laugh. 'No, I think not,' was his smiling rejoinder."³²

That exchange in some respects typifies the social consciousness of the Elsie books. Issues such as women's rights remain theoretical and remote to the girls and women who were to find life's meaning in personal relationships with their families and their God. The girls who read Martha Finley's series received a very different prescription for success than did their brothers who read the *Algers*. Social Darwinism, so much a factor in the intellectual climate of the late nineteenth century and in the *Alger* books, does not penetrate the atmosphere of the Elsie books. They do not emphasize the struggle for material advancement, but only the moral struggle for spiritual improvement. For Elsie herself, there is little moral growth. She begins as an almost completely virtuous character and serves as a redeemer for others. Although children of both sexes were told the evils of smoking, drinking, gambling, and frivolity—to Horatio's boys those vices were impediments to financial success, to Finley's girls they were qualities to be avoided in a husband. Boys were to seek self-mastery as a means to financial reward, girls were to seek it as a means to gain salvation and love. While nineteenth century boys read tales of

worldly success, their sisters got the message that happiness was to be found in their own—private—sphere. They might never change society, but following in Elsie's footsteps, they could redeem individuals.

FOOTNOTES

¹*Books By and About Women* (Arno Press, 1977), p. 35.

²Ruth Suchow, "Elsie Dinsmore: A Study in Perfection or How Fundamentalism Came to Dixie," *Bookman*, LXVI:2 (October, 1927), p. 126.

³New editions of Elsie Dinsmore were published annually, sometimes twice a year between 1868 and 1893.

⁴Their relationship is described in glowing terms. "She was much admired for her beauty and sweetness of disposition, much caressed and flattered, but through it all, lost none of her native modesty, but was ever the same meek, gentle little girl." Her happiest days were spent sitting for hours on her father's knee, talking, reading, working embroidery, or knitting. "He helped her with all her studies, taught her something of botany and geology in their walks, helped her to see and correct the faults of her drawings, sang with her when she played, bought her quantities of new music, and engaged the best masters to instruct her—in short, took a lively interest in all her pursuits and pleasures, gave her every indulgence, and lavished upon her the tenderest caresses. He was very proud of her beauty, her sweetness, her intelligence, and talent; and nothing pleased him better than to hear them spoken of by others in terms of praise." Martha Finley, *Elsie Dinsmore* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1893), pp. 213-14. I have maintained Finley's own style of punctuation, capitalization, and italics in all direct quotations.

⁵Barbara Welter has pointed out that the daughter is often cast in a redemptive role in nineteenth century literature. Barbara Welter, *Dimity Convictions: The American Woman in the Nineteenth Century* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1976), pp. 4-5.

⁶See, for example, Barbara Welter, "The Cult of True Womanhood," *American Quarterly*, XVIII (Summer, 1966), pp. 151-74, and Barbara Berg, *The Remembered Gate* (New York: 1977).

⁷Martha Finley, *Elsie's Girlhood* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1872), p. vii.

⁸*Ibid.*, 63. See also Martha Finley, *Elsie's Holidays at Roselands* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1898), p. 86.

⁹Finley, *Elsie Dinsmore*, pp. 227-28.

¹⁰Finley, *Elsie's Holidays*, p. 34.

¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 16.

¹²Martha Finley, *Elsie's Womanhood* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1875), p. 148.

¹³See, for example, Janet E. Brown, *The Saga of Elsie Dinsmore*, University of Buffalo Studies, vol. 17, #3 (July, 1945), p. 89.

¹⁴See Nancy F. Cott, *The Bonds of Womanhood* (New Haven: Yale, 1977) and Ann Douglas, *The Feminization of American Culture* (New York: Avon, 1977).

¹⁵Amy F. Dowe, "Elsie Finds a Modern Champion," *The Publishers' Weekly*, vol. 122 (December 31, 1932), p. 2387.

¹⁶Brown, *The Saga of Elsie Dinsmore*, p. 123.

¹⁷Martha Finley, *Elsie's Widowhood* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1880), preface.

¹⁸Elsie's experience is consistent with Wilber Cash's statement that Southerners demanded an anthropomorphic God, "a persona God, a God for the individualist." Cash noted that nine-tenths of the new planters were Methodists, Baptists, or Presbyterians. Wilber J. Cash, *The Mind of the South* (New York: Knopf, 1962), p. 56.

¹⁹Finley, *Elsie's Holidays*, p. 196.

²⁰Martha Finley, *Elsie on the Hudson* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1898), p. 49.

²¹See, for example, Martha Finley, *Elsie's Children* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1877), p. 60.

²⁸Finley, *Elsie's Girlhood*, p. 133.

²⁹Martha Finley, *Grandmother Elsie* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1882), p. 35.

³⁰Finley, *Elsie's Children*, p. 223.

³¹Finley, *Elsie's Girlhood*, p. 155.

³²Finley, *Elsie's Holidays*, p. 61.

³³*Ibid.*, pp. 286-87.

³⁴Finley, *Elsie's Motherhood*, 28. Elsie's mammy Chloë wept at the news of the Emancipation Proclamation. "Dis chile don't want no freedom, she lubs to b'long to her darlin young missus." *Elsie's Womanhood*, p. 315.

³⁵*Ibid.*, p. 66.

³⁶*Ibid.*, p. 84.

³⁷Finley, *Elsie's Children*, p. 263.

³⁸Martha Finley, *Elsie and Her Loved Ones* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1903), p. 127.

PART III

RESEARCH ABOUT WOMEN'S STUDIES METHODOLOGY

SECTION A

**SEX ROLE ISSUES
IN THE CLASSROOM**

Male Instructors in Women's Colleges

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Step back and reflect. Doesn't it seem peculiar that two-thirds or more of the full time faculty of a women's college are men? Can you imagine old Boola Boola Yale in the days prior to 1970 turning out a thousand male leaders a year with two-thirds of its faculty women? Of course there are some very persuasive historical, social, and economic explanations for this disproportional representation even in women's colleges. Some may even want to argue that, considering the historical availability of women academics and the low percentage of women faculty in coeducational institutions, the women's colleges have a high and laudatory ratio of women faculty—as some women's colleges undoubtedly do. But since philosophers are allowed to play naive, ahistorical, and appallingly impractical, I will pursue the question. Why are there so many men on the faculties of women's colleges and don't they adversely affect the education being offered?

I'll start by assuming that a women's college is not just a college without male students, and that "tradition" is not the sole justification for its single sex status. Unless there is something more to offer, some educational benefit beyond what is available in coeducational institutions, some concrete meaning to the phrase "education of women" which is not captured in the phrase "education of students", then I see no justification for these schools surviving. They would either be superfluous anachronisms left over from the days before the Ivy and its poorer cousins went coed, or reformatories for wayward disciplinary cases, or finishing schools whose speciality is sewing a fine hem to catch the eye of a man.

So the claim is that the education exclusively of women differs from the education of men and women together, and that, only if the former offers a unique *educational* benefit (which requires it to remain a segregationist institution in an increasingly integrationist society) is it educationally justified.

What then is this unique benefit? There are at least two. Unlike coeducational colleges, women's colleges can (1) effectively offer a non-sexist educational environment and (2) gear the entire curriculum to women students. I will argue that both of these unique benefits (and subsequently the educational justification of women's

colleges) may be jeopardized by the presence of male faculty members.

The first unique educational benefit of women's colleges (a non-sexist educational environment) is a contingent feature. There is no guarantee that the prohibition of male participants will eliminate sexism within an institution. Otherwise, women's prisons and sewing circles would be hot beds of liberation, which they are not. But the opportunity for creating such an environment in a women's college is greater than in a coeducational institution. In a women's college there are no male students present who would have an interest in preserving and maintaining sexist patterns from which they benefit, and no motivational incentive for female students to cooperate to receive traditional "goodies". Though isolation from the mixed sex community will not solve the larger social problem, at least the construction of a non-oppressive environment where women's interests, needs, talents, leadership potential, and development are taken seriously (and are not automatically defined in terms of or in relation to men) is an important educational benefit of women's colleges. This is a benefit which ought to be preserved (or created, if necessary). I realize the dangers of head-in-sand isolation, of becoming a safe haven, a secluded retreat from the nasty competitive real world, etc. I am not advocating the quietude of a pastoral nunnery—far from it. To maintain an environment as free as possible from sexism and male dominance requires an informed awareness of the world outside the campus. It also requires an aggressive willingness to continually re-examine internal policies and practices as well as to constantly challenge personal motives, intentions, habitual responses, ways of seeing the world, and ways of acting. The likelihood of creating this type of environment is higher in women's colleges than in coeducational ones, and thus the unique educational benefit they can offer to women.

But since students are not the only population in such an environment, it is relevant to examine instructors, administrators, and board members. If those in power, armed with institutional authority and punitive discretion are themselves committed (even if indirectly and subtly) to the perpetuation of the traditional subordination of women, then it matters little if there are no male students on campus.

There are two obvious ways to discover the sexism level of an institution; one is structural, one atomistic. A structural approach focusses upon percentages, rank breakdowns, and ratios in the hierarchial levels of power, leadership and decision making. A non-sexist institution should not send a "message" of male dominance in the organization of its power structure. Rather than advocate increasing token positions for women as role models, the norm of male leadership should be challenged such that over 50% of males in power positions is *prima facie* considered to be detrimental to achieving a structurally non-sexist institution and is in need of justification.

Of course, giving such a structural analysis is far easier than trying to remedy any undesirable results. The types of policies and practices required to attain a paradigm institution would not go unnoticed by the AAUP. It would probably

require freezes on hiring and promoting males, leap frogging promotions, and occasional dismissals. I will humbly defer to administrative experts to solve these problems.

The second approach to ferreting out sexism is atomistic—it examines the individuals who teach, administer, etc. Rather than concentrate on ratios and hierarchies, it examines the actions, behavior, attitudes and relationships of the individuals in relation to sexist criteria. Technically it is sex-blind; it considers the sex of the individual examined as irrelevant since being female is no guarantee that one is dedicated to preserving a non-sexist environment. But, as a group, women are less suspect than men since men stand to personally benefit from sexist patterns. Men have been socialized so thoroughly into masculine dominance that there is a severe problem of even becoming aware of the issue. So men are, as a group, more likely to perpetuate sexism in their thinking, acting, relating, and feeling. As such they become a "suspect classification"—that is, they should be examined with special scrutiny to insure that they are compatible with the goal of preserving a non-sexist environment. Prudence alone would dictate a policy of screening men more carefully than women.

Although this approach can be applied to all levels—all the way up to the board members—I will focus upon instructors. The grosser forms of sexism, outright misogyny and exploitative lechery will undoubtedly be screened out by search committees or at least by tenure committees. It is the more subtle forms which are worrisome since they are harder to detect and seldom stem from malicious intentions. I will cite a few well-worn examples, though I am sure you can expand the list: the paternalistic authoritarian, the patronizing protector, the naive coddler, the flirt, the peacock, the cock of the roost, etc., etc. If we dig deep enough all of us who are male instructors will discover the label which covers our own peculiar manifestation of sexism. I am convinced that for males it is a life long struggle to overcome the sexism of our attitudes, emotions, actions, and relationships. If complete "non-sexism" were made a requirement for employment I doubt if there would be any males teaching in women's colleges. But at least an acknowledgement of, and a commitment to remedying, the problem is a reasonable requirement for the goal of minimizing the impact of male instructors on the environment. Perhaps an all-college effort to identify and define manifestations of sexism and a cooperative commitment to transcend the problem (by attending consciousness raising seminars and designing feedback mechanisms) would help. Ultimately I think women's colleges should require male faculty to commit themselves to eliminating their own sexist behavior and to promote the goal of a non-sexist environment. This could even take the form of a loyalty oath or confession statement. Though I imagine there may be some interesting "academic freedom" objections, I'll remind you that "religious" colleges require such commitment from their faculty on the grounds that they are justified in attempting to preserve a unique feature of their college, a non-secular environment for their students. Are not women's colleges equally justified in *openly* screening their faculties in order to

provide a unique non-sexist environment for their students?

But however this is accomplished, if a unique feature of women's colleges which educationally justified their existence is a non-sexist environment, and if male instructors jeopardize that environment, then women's colleges are justified in requiring them to conform to the preservation of that environment or to leave.

The second unique feature of a women's college is that it can gear its entire curriculum to women students. If it can be shown that the sex of an instructor is a relevant factor in judging qualifications for teaching women students, then, barring unusual circumstances or clearly overriding factors, males should not be teaching at women's colleges.

Unlike coeducational institutions which at best ardently pursue, though seldom attain, the goal of "sex blindness" in their educational content, policies, and practices, women's colleges can transcend this model so dear to liberal feminists. In a women's college you don't have to pretend that the sex of your students is irrelevant. Your students are women who have grown up in a male dominated culture, who have experienced themselves and their society as females and not as some androgynous ideal, and who have different emotional and psychological obstacles than do their male counterparts. They are not "universal" students, but women students. In a coeducational school teaching "universal" students, anything vaguely related to the special concerns of women students is isolated and compartmentalized in the traditional manner. Such subject matter is classified by content (the *object* of study) and placed in a special department called "women's studies" or (in what makes equally good catalogue copy without additional administrative overhead) in a "program" which is a loose conglomeration of courses selected from traditional departmental offerings. Either way, the message is clear—there are traditional, normal, *real* courses (about science, history, art, business) and there are courses about women. There are seldom "men's studies" courses. I do not deny the importance of this academic object of study nor that such knowledge is necessary for the education of both women and men. But it is hardly sufficient for the education of women in a women's college, where one is not only teaching *objects* of study, but one is also teaching *to* women. This entails that whatever concerns, needs, interests, experiences, perspectives, and talents are unique to women in this society must be addressed in every course if it is to be effectively taught. Though the "content" of traditional women's studies courses need not be totally integrated in the curriculum, the "extra-content" factors and techniques and "messages" integrally related to women's studies courses should be. Such "extra-content" factors are described by Professor Alison Jaggar in her provocative essay, "Male Instructors, Feminists, and Women's Studies" (*Teaching Philosophy* 2, No. 3-4, 1977-1978: pp 247-256). In this essay she argues that males should not teach women's studies courses since they inevitably do more harm to the women students than good. She cites males' inability to draw on personal examples pertinent to women students' experience; their inability to recognize and appreciate the relevance of women students' insights, comments and perceptions; their inability to

surmount the implicit sexism of their authority role as instructor; their inability to question the theory-laden and potentially sexist bias inherent in the very norms for what counts as knowledge and truth; and ultimately their existential inability to affirm alteration of norms under which they benefit. All of these "extra-content" factors seem to apply to the teaching of women students regardless of the object of study—though they are perhaps more relevant to the teaching of women's studies courses. It is not expertise in content that matters here, it is the sex of the instructor. Female instructors are more likely to provide these "extra-content" elements than are male instructors and thus are better qualified, other things being equal, to teach women students.

Unless you are willing to defend the claim that the teaching of women students should be "sex-blind" (and thus intentionally ignorant of the special experiences and interests of your students *as women*) then I do not see how you can avoid the extension of Professor Jagger's arguments to include the teaching of any subject to women. This leads to the conclusion that men are less qualified to teach women. But if you do affirm the sex blind model you undercut one of the unique features of a women's college since only women's colleges can gear their entire curriculum to women students which means integrating the special concerns of women into the entire program. So to adopt the sex blind model eliminates the unique educational benefit of women's colleges and undercuts their educational justification. But to deny the sex blind model entails that men are, because of their sex alone, less qualified as instructors.

So men should not teach in women's colleges if there are qualified women available, unless those men (a) are so clearly superior in other respects that their inherent ineffectiveness as males is clearly compensated, *and* (b) are demonstrably not harmful to students which means that they are predominantly non-sexist and thus do not disrupt the preservation of a non-sexist environment. Unless these two conditions are met by male instructors in women's colleges, then these colleges stand to lose their unique educational benefit and thus their educational justification is threatened.

Unfortunately, few of us males currently employed by women's colleges can pass these strict requirements. If these arguments are sound, we perhaps ought to be looking for other jobs.

Perceptions of Authors and their Arguments as a Function of Sex

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The prevalence in our society of well-formed sex-role stereotypes has been amply documented (cf. Broverman, *et al.*, 1972; Kagan, 1964). Moreover, in identifying the differing characteristics of women and men, strong consensus is found across groups differing in sex, religion, age, and educational level. Perhaps the most extensive and definitive research in this area has been that of Inge Broverman and her associates (Broverman, *et al.*, 1972) who identified a number of characteristics which are attributed to adults largely on the basis of sex. Those researchers found that characteristics ascribed to men are more often highly valued than those associated with women, and that these male characteristics form a cluster of related behaviors which entail competence, rationality, and assertion. Men were, for example, in contrast to women, characterized as very independent, logical, objective, and worldly. They were also seen as aggressive, active, direct, and self-confident leaders, in opposition to their female counterparts who were perceived as dependent, illogical, subjective, passive—and even sneaky.

Such sex-role stereotypes are not only distinctive and universal; but, in general, they are also uncritically and even approvingly accepted, or at least have been until very recently. Therefore it is not surprising that researchers have found evidence that women's accomplishments are devalued as such. Goldberg (1968), for example, asked women college students to rate the quality of written articles representing a broad number of fields. He found that identical essays were differentially evaluated as a function of the sex of the person to whom authorship was attributed, and that male-authored articles were rated more highly. In a similar study, Pheterson, Kiesler, and Goldberg (1971) presented evidence that under some circumstances identical paintings were ascribed greater merit if attributed to a male.

Moreover, when the accomplishment of a woman cannot be denied or minimized, it is likely to be attributed to luck. Deaux and Emswiller (1974) found that when women were seen to succeed at "masculine" tasks, their success was much

more often attributed to luck than was that of men accomplishing "feminine" tasks. Such men were most often perceived as skillful, as were both men and women who succeeded at tasks that were sex-role appropriate.

Another study focused on the reactions to women whose style, rather than accomplishments, transgressed sex-role expectations. Costrich, *et al.* (1975), reported that women are personally derogated, relative to men, for engaging in aggressive verbal behavior. This study differed from those cited above in that it dealt primarily with something women aren't "supposed" to do, act aggressively, as opposed to things they aren't supposed to *be able* to do, such as first-rate professional or artistic work.

Actually, then, there are two behavioral dimensions within which women's sex-role violations may be seen to occur, consisting respectively of those behaviors which a woman supposedly cannot do, e.g., acts entailing a high degree of competency or rationality, and those which she may well be able to do, but *should not*, such as making displays of assertiveness or aggressiveness. The supposed women authors of Goldberg's (1968) study, to the extent they are perceived as less competent and rational than males, would be expected to be correspondingly less capable of producing a quality article. Thus, to the extent a communication attempt is judged by the quality of its source, a woman's article suffers. But there is also some degree to which these women authors are out of role in the "should not" direction also; for "passive, dependent, and noncompetitive" creatures such as they have no business publishing professional articles in the first place (and of course the more male-appropriate the particular professional field involved, the greater is the "should not" violation). Whether or not such behavior is inhibited in women by the fear of success, as Horner (1970) proposes, it is clearly not generally expected of them and not approved, as Horner's research and that of others (Feinman, 1974, e.g.) demonstrates. It would not be surprising, then, if this factor contributed also to the observed devaluing of women's writing.

From these same two factors, the lower ability attributed to women and the out-of-role character of their professional writing efforts, one might reasonably hypothesize that their writing would also be less carefully read and considered. In the first study below, the hypothesis is tested that not only will women readers judge the quality of published professional writing less favorably when it is attributed to female authorship, but that they will also perform more poorly on an objective test covering the material they have read.

Experiment I

Method

Subjects were 78 undergraduates from a small women's liberal arts college. Subjects were asked to read a biographical sketch of an author and a short (1000-1500 word) excerpt from an economics of history text. Actual excerpts were used from male-authored economics and history textbooks, accompanied by fake

biographical sketches differing only in the author's name and sex (James or Margaret Carpenter). Each author was credited with a Ph.D., several articles, and a university professorship. Two book excerpts were used to control for any idiosyncratic effect one might have, but since no differences were observed in the spread of male-female ratings between the two, the data were combined. Forty subjects read male-authored pieces, 38 female-authored.

Objective tests were prepared over the text excerpts, which were handed out to subjects after each had read and returned her excerpt. After these tests were collected, a questionnaire was administered requiring several judgments about the quality of the article and the author's ability, education, personality, and character.

Results

Analysis of questionnaire results revealed only one significant difference between male and female authors. Males were rated significantly more likable ($p < .05$). The intellectual quality of male-authored excerpts was rated nonsignificantly higher ($p < .10$). Several other ratings were also nonsignificantly higher for males in expected directions, such as their objectivity, intelligence, and clarity of writing.

Turning to the analysis of subjects' scores on the tests over the content of the excerpts, we find that test scores were significantly higher for male-authored pieces ($p < .02$). That is, readers did significantly better in tests over the material they read when it was attributed to a male author. This finding supports the authors' major hypothesis.

Discussion

Overall, the results of the first experiment are difficult to interpret, since although there was evidence that the writing of women authors was less well attended to, it was not significantly devalued vis-à-vis that of men, and very little evidence was found of expected sex-role stereotyping. It could be argued that the biographical sketches provided to subjects served to diminish sex-role stereotyping, although it would then be difficult to explain the differing content retention observed. It was decided to run a second, related study, with a somewhat different approach.

In a study reported by Pheterson, Kiesler, and Goldberg (1971), evidence was found that when subjects were asked to judge the quality of paintings, where again the method used was to credit males or females with identical items, males were rated above females only when the paintings were identified as contest entrants. When the same paintings were depicted as contest winners, there was no difference in ratings as a function of the artist's sex.

So, in the second study, an attempt was made to avoid the high status attributions which were attached to the author in the first study.

Also, a new variable was introduced, by employing two different writing styles, one designed to appear more masculine in nature, the other feminine. Zeldow (1976) reports that women psychiatric patients, but not men, were rated as more

disturbed when opposite sex characteristics were attributed to them, while Costrich, *et al.* (1975), found that both men and women were downrated in both popularity and mental health for sex-role reversals. It was hypothesized that when women authors were credited with writing done in a distinctively "masculine" style, they would be more downrated, vis-à-vis male authors, than when both wrote in a more "feminine" style. It was hypothesized also that we would again find women's writing less well attended to, and predicted further that this expected effect would be greater for the more masculine writing style. This prediction was based on the expectation that it would be distracting to read masculine writing attributed to a female author, for subjects' attention would be divided between their reading and the formation of judgments about the inappropriate sex-role behavior of the author. Similar but weaker results were expected for male authors employing a more feminine style.

Experiment II

Method

Subjects were 68 women undergraduates, again from a women's college. Subjects were asked to read what was supposedly a letter to the editor of some unnamed newspaper. The writer's name was listed at the top of the letter and again at the end. Two letters were used (about 800 words), each presenting identical arguments concerning the then highly salient Karen Quinlan case. The style of the two letters differed markedly—the first strongly worded, confident, and assertive, in comparison to the second letter which was more circumspect and less assertive in tone. We will label these letters Masculine and Feminine, respectively. Two examples of their different styles are:

1. Masculine—"In this argument, you rely on emotion to make your point when reason cannot."

Femine—"I share your concerns, but at the same time I feel that perhaps your argument relies more on emotion than reason to make its point."

2. Masculine—"This is neither a vague, cruel, nor dangerous precedent."

Feminine—"I just can't see how this could be considered a vague, cruel, or dangerous precedent."

In pretesting, the Feminine letter was rated significantly more feminine in style than the Masculine letter, although it was still rated slightly more masculine than feminine.

Subjects were divided into 4 equal groups, in a 2x2 factorial design, varying sex of author and style of letter. After reading and returning the letter, subjects were asked to take an objective test over its content and to fill out a questionnaire similar to that used in Experiment I.

Results

An analysis of variance performed on the questionnaire results again revealed

only one significant difference between male and female authors. Women authors of Masculine letters were rated as significantly more offensive than male authors of the same letter ($p < .01$).

Analysis of retention scores on the objective tests revealed no significant differences in scores obtained as a function of the sex of author, although for both the Masculine and Feminine letters, scores were slightly higher for male authors. There was however, a highly significant difference in the objective test scores as a function of the letter read. Those subjects who read the Masculine letter, whether attributed to male or female authorship, performed better on the test ($p < .01$).

Discussion—Both Studies

Recapitulating the results, support was found in Experiment I for the hypothesis that women's professional writing would be less carefully attended to, and thus their message less fully received, than when the same piece of writing was attributed to a male. However, Experiment II failed to replicate this finding when letters to a newspaper editorial office were substituted for the textbook passages used in Experiment I.

Most surprising was a general inability to replicate the findings of studies which report devaluation of written work attributed to female authorship. Also unexpected was the weakness of the sex-role stereotyping revealed in the questionnaire responses, although this may be at least partially explained by our exclusive employment of female subjects, who have been found to exhibit less sex-role stereotyping than males. One important indication that some stereotyping was occurring, however, was the finding that women, and not men, were rated as highly objectionable when they were seen as responsible for the assertive and highly effective (in getting points across) Masculine letter. In many respects, this finding is important, since it provides a clear example of a realistic instance in which women are faced with the dilemma of choosing between social approval and communication effectiveness. Such a finding also lends support to such critics of Martina Horner as Condry and Dyer (1976) who argue that one does not need to reify the women a motive to avoid success to explain the phenomena Horner (1970) reports, because a superior and less victim-blaming explanation is available—simply that women realistically fear punishment here and now for transgressions of sex-related behavior norms.

In considering the failure to replicate Goldberg's famous finding of anti-female bias, it may be that I used a less sensitive method of measuring this. I did consistently find nonsignificant biases in the same direction as Goldberg's findings. It might be pointed out additionally, however, that Mischel (1974), in contrast to Goldberg, not only failed to find anti-female bias for articles from sex-role appropriate fields, but that articles in female sex-role appropriate fields were downrated when attributed to *male* authorship. Mischel furthermore points out that in only one of the six fields covered by Goldberg's article was a statistically

significant difference found indicating anti-female bias, and that was in a male appropriate field. It is only in aggregate that his data indicate the presence of anti-female bias.

Turning finally to the inconclusive finding that women's writing was less carefully read than men's, a very compelling line of analysis offers itself to explain why one might expect such a finding where male-appropriate professional writing is used, but not for letters to an editor, even when those letters are sex-role inappropriate in tone, as were those we labeled Masculine in Experiment II. Recalling the two dimensional model of sex-role transgressions (the "cannot" and the "should not") outlined earlier in this paper, clearly good professional writing lies closer to the "cannot" axis and aggressive and assertive letters to a newspaper nearer the "should not" axis of out-of-role feminine behavior. Obviously, when women do well what they supposedly cannot, a different response is likely to follow than when they do only what they ought not to do.

In Experiment I and in all those studies previously discussed in which a woman's accomplishments transcended what she supposedly was able to do, the most likely response was some form of *denial*, as it may be seen was reported in each such case. If the judgment to be made is highly subjective, as when paintings or professional writings are evaluated, denial most readily takes the form of failure to fully recognize the quality of the accomplishment. Failure to read carefully a piece of written work, if it is of generally acknowledged high quality, certainly makes it easier to misperceive its quality, as it appears was the case in our Experiment I. If the response of total denial is blocked off, however, as when Deaux and Emswiller (1974) presented their subjects with the objective fact of out-of-role achievements by women, attributing the accomplishment to luck or chance serves still to successfully deny that the women involved were really *capable* of the acts they performed.

In the previously discussed experiment reported by Costrich, *et al.* (1975), and the Masculine letter/female author condition of Experiment II, the sex-role violation was primarily of the "should not" variety, and hence necessitated not denial but the imposition of a proper sanction, which was in each case duly administered in the form of negative personal evaluations of the violators. Because there was no need to deny that women *could* write aggressive, assertive letters, there was no need and hence no tendency to miss the points they made.

What the present analysis implies, in short, is that the dilemma faced by success-oriented women in a male-dominated social system may be nastier even than Matina Horner (1970) indicates; for not only will women pay the price for success achieved out of role as when they make a masculinely aggressive and assertive, but also measurably more effective, argument than they are "supposed" to, but when their accomplishments are too big, they are likely to be minimized if not missed entirely, or credited to luck!

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Predicting the Null in Women's Research with Black Populations

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Research on women is often used as a base for making broad generalizations about all women, but many of these studies do not sample sufficiently from black populations. In face of incomplete, and perhaps irrelevant textbook information (Baron & Byrne, 1977), the investigators teaching strategy at a black women's institution (Spelman College) is one of caution in the interpretation of this body of data, lest black students add "white" problems to the multitude of others they face. In the interest of science and the development of a psychology for black people, another responsibility become clear. Replications of classical studies using black populations are needed to either firmly establish or negate the relevance of women's research to black women.

The present study examines self-bias in the perception of competence in women. It replicates the classical study conducted by Goldberg (1968), which showed that women frequently devalue the achievements of other women, in comparison to similar achievements of men. College women were asked to rate a series of manuscripts attributed either to male or female authors. These manuscripts also dealt with either traditionally masculine (law) or traditionally feminine (dietetics) fields. Results showed that regardless of the topics, the manuscripts received lower ratings when attributed to female authors in comparison to male author ratings. In the Goldberg (1968) study, male college students also showed bias in favor of the accomplishments of men. Similar findings were reported by Mischel (1974), and by Ettaugh and Rose (1975) who used a high school population.

The present investigator reviewed the achievement literature on women for her dissertation project (Harris, 1974). A small body of literature existed on black women which caused her to question the relevance of traditional research findings to black women. Weston and Mednick (1970) showed that black women do not respond to achievement situations with a fear of success exhibited by white women in the Horner (1970) investigations. In a study by Steinman and Fox (1970) black women's perceptions of a woman's family role were more outgoing, work-oriented, and less family-centered than white women. A study by Axelson (1970) showed that

black men are more supportive of work and career opportunities for women. They believe that wives should work as they please, and that they have a right to a career. Wilson (1972) showed that black women's self-perceptions are more positive than their perception of males; although they were not significantly more positive than black males' self-perceptions. Finally, the investigator's own research (Harris, 1974) demonstrated that black females will respond to achievement cues as predicted by achievement motivation theory. A return to conceptual thinking along this line as a research premise may be considered partly as "unfinished business, and partly as a scholarly responsibility of faculty dedicated to teaching from a premise of relevance.

The present study is based on the hypothesis that negative self-perceptions would not be pervasive among Spelman women. Also, men enrolled at Morehouse, another Atlanta University Center institution, were not expected to show bias in regard to the competence of black women in favor of men. These hypotheses are equivalent to "predicting the null." Research of this nature is unorthodox and says more about *what is not*, rather than *what is* relevant. The science of discovery, however, does permit the problem solver to look where the solution is least likely to be found, in order to rule out those possibilities (Kaplan, 1964). Predicting the null is being used as a strategy for discounting the relevance of traditional psychology to the black experience.

Method

Fifty-six Freshman English students enrolled at Spelman and 27 enrolled at Morehouse participated in the study. Data were collected in their classroom setting, using the manuscript format described in the Goldberg (1968) study. Subjects were asked to rate excerpts of six articles from six different professional fields. The specific instructions were:

In this booklet you will find excerpts of six (6) articles written by six different authors in six different professional fields. At the end of each article you will find several questions. You are not presumed to be sophisticated or knowledgeable in all the fields. We are interested in the ability of freshman English students to make critical evaluations. There are no right or wrong responses.

Two of the fields were female-associated, two were male-associated and two were neutral as established by the Goldberg (1968) study. These fields as designated are:

Education and Dietetics (female)

Law and City Planning (male)

Art History and Linguistics (neutral)

Two forms of the instrument were alternately distributed among subjects. In Form A three articles were assigned female authorship and three, male authorship. In Form B the sex of the authors for these articles was reversed. Subjects were asked to rate each article for value, persuasiveness, and profoundness. They also rated each author for writing style, professional competence and professional status. A

five point scale from highly unfavorable to highly favorable was used.

Results and Discussion

Data for each article were summarized into a mean article rating and mean author rating. A *t*-test of the difference between mean scores by sex of author was performed. Spelman and Morehouse data were analyzed separately. Mean scores and *t* values are displayed in Tables 1 and 2. For Spelman women not one of twelve comparisons approached significance, thus justifying acceptance of the null hypothesis. For Morehouse men one of the twelve comparisons was significant. Male students showed bias in favor of male authors in their evaluation of the City Planning article. The "author rating" when the article was attributed to a female author was 10.66 compared to 12.80 when attributed to a male. ($t = 2.54, p < .05$). The difference between the "article ratings" for the same writing (City Planning) approached significance favoring male authorship ($t = 1.93, p < .10$). Morehouse data was collapsed across articles to obtain one rating score for articles attributed to female authors and one score for male authors. The *t* test was not significant which justifies accepting the null hypothesis about the perceptions of Morehouse men.

Accepting the null functions within this context clarifies for black women the confused portrayal of feminine psychology which has been generalized to explain all women. It appears that at least for the college population studied, black men and women's perceptions of competence is free of the sex-bias which was demonstrated in predominantly white college populations in the 60's and 70's. It follows then, that perspective for elucidating the psychological dynamics of black women should take a different course from traditional research.

Spelman College recently received foundation money to establish a Black Women's Research Center. The program purpose is to chart a course for sensitive and relevant research which will be responsive to the needs of black women within the context of family, community, education, and the world of work. Already a philosophical premise is being developed in academic circles which may appear opposed to, but is simply different from feminism. One position taken in a discourse on "The African-American Woman" (Harper-Bolton, 1979) declared that:

... a conceptualization, discussion and definition of "woman" cannot be made without a conceptualization, discussion and definition of what is considered by some to be the antithesis of woman, but what I am considering to be the complement of woman—man. This is necessary because neither woman nor man exists apart from the other; thus neither can be conceived of except in relation to the other. (p. 10)

Another colleague presented his views of black involvement in the woman's liberation movement (Tucker, 1980)

Despite the fact that Black men need to give up a lot of things in order to free up Black women, . . . we make a mistake when we assume that these normative movements (feminism) speak to our concerns. There is no question but that a sisterhood of Black women could be extremely

TABLE 1

T-Tests of Difference Between Ratings
of Female and Male-Authored Articles

FOR SUBJECT SUBJECTS

Field of Article	Female Author		Male Author		<i>t</i> for Article	<i>t</i> for Author	Degrees of Freedom
	Art. Rating	Ant. Rating	Art Rating	Ant. Rating			
Education	10.14	10.14	10.00	10.21	.22	.09	54 (<i>t</i> .10 = 1.67*)
Philosophy	9.66	10.51	10.14	11.14	-.65	-.84	(<i>t</i> .05 = 2.00**)
Law	10.44	10.21	10.10	10.46	.41	-.31	(<i>t</i> .01 = 2.66***)
City Planning	11.18	11.51	10.20	10.51	1.12	1.29	
Art History	9.51	10.74	9.77	10.74	-.30	0.00	
Linguistics	7.76	7.92	8.14	9.21	-.57	-1.64	

TABLE 2

T-Tests of Difference Between Ratings
of Female and Male-Authored Articles

FOR MOREHOUSE SUBJECTS

Field of Article	<i>Female Author</i>		<i>Male Author</i>		<i>t</i> for Article	<i>t</i> for Author	Degrees of Freedom
	Art. Rating	Aut. Rating	Art Rating	Aut. Rating			
Education	9.80	10.26	10.41	9.83	-.48	.70	25
Dietetics	8.60	10.06	7.91	10.41	-.53	.38	(<i>t</i> .10 = 1.71*)
Law	10.66	10.25	10.06	10.73	-.48	-.57	(<i>t</i> .05 = 2.06**)
City Planning	10.66	10.66	12.06	12.80	1.93*	2.54**	(<i>t</i> .01 = 2.79***)
Art History	9.53	10.50	10.25	10.83	.70	.37	
Linguistics	8.66	9.41	8.05	9.20	-.78	-.21	

useful to our struggle, but only if it is *pro-Black women* rather than anti-Black men. . . . Black women should be wary, lest their frustrations lead them into a trick bag. Our survival requires that we remember that we are Black people first and then male or female second. (p. 5)

With the advent of different research perspectives for black women and white women, the writer proposes open dialogue between the two forums. There is much to be gained from open communication. For example, one clear recommendation that follows from this study is that the Goldberg (1968) study should be replicated with white women. Almost twelve years have passed; and during that interim, efforts to sensitize, educate and socialize women differently have probably generated measurable changes in feminine personality and motivational dynamics. Replications of classical studies might be implored as a strategy to monitor success.

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A Developmental Study of Sex Differences in Mathematics and Reading Avoidance

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Sex differences in aptitude for mathematics have been found in children from the youngest groups tested through age 12. However, in 7th grade boys begin to score higher on mathematics achievement tests (Maccoby & Jacklin, 1974). The sex differences are significant for college bound high school students as early as 7th grade while not significant for non-college bound students until grade 11. One study of superior 12-year-old boys and girls demonstrated that 20% of the boys scored above the top scoring girl on the SAT mathematics section.

A review of the relevant research (Cross and Douglas, 1980), indicated that sex differences in attitudes towards mathematics do not appear until Junior High School. Research has demonstrated that girls' negative feelings about math increase at the same time as the decline in their math achievement relative to males. As early as the 7th grade boys perceive math to be more useful in earning a living while girls do not see math as useful in their future. From the 6th grade on there is a clear relationship between a positive attitude toward math and math achievement scores. Math has been found to be sex-typed as early as the fifth grade, with both boys and girls viewing it as a male concern. There is some evidence that the more masculine sex-typed child will demonstrate more problem-solving ability and will be better at math. There is also evidence that parents assume that girls will have a more difficult time with math, expecting less of daughters. In recent research by Cross and Douglas, (1980), girls in fifth, seventh, ninth and eleventh grades demonstrated greater math anxiety than boys. Girls showed a sharp increase in math anxiety in the eleventh grade.

In contrast, both elementary and high school students perceive reading, artistic and social skills as feminine, while mathematical, spatial, mechanical, and athletic skills are viewed as masculine (Garai and Scheinfeld, 1968). There is evidence that the more a boy perceives reading to be passive, docile and therefore feminine, the less likely he will be motivated to read (Stein, 1971). Eme (1979) points out that boys

are less mature and more vulnerable in many ways than are girls on school entrance. At the beginning of school, four times as many boys as girls are referred to reading clinics. Girls are more interested in reading at every age tested and spend more time reading (Anderson, Hughes and Dison, 1962).

In the present study, it was hypothesized that sex differences in both mathematics avoidance and reading avoidance can be demonstrated, girls avoiding mathematics and boys avoiding reading. It was also predicted that these differences in attitudes could be demonstrated to appear in the early elementary grades, much earlier than achievement differences are demonstrated, and that these differences would increase with age.

METHOD

Subjects

Subjects were 120 students from middle-income families, equally divided by sex, randomly selected from each of the 2nd, 4th 6th and 8th grades in a public school system in upstate New York.

Instruments

Math anxiety was assessed by selected items from the Fennema-Sherman Math Anxiety Scale (Fennema and Sherman, 1976). The teachers read the items aloud to 2nd and 4th grade children. Reading anxiety items were written in the same format as the math anxiety items in order to make the two forms comparable. Parental involvement items were added to study their relationship to math and reading anxiety.

Procedure

The Math and Reading Anxiety Scale was distributed to the teachers and the students completed it in their classrooms. Each student indicated on a 5-point scale to what extent they agreed or disagreed with each statement. There were eleven math anxiety items, eleven reading anxiety items, and twelve parent involvement items. A math anxiety score, a reading anxiety score, and a parent involvement score for math and reading were obtained for each student. The higher the score, the higher was the level of anxiety. The less the parent involvement, the higher the score.


Results

The means for males and females for the math anxiety scores and the reading anxiety scores are presented for each grade level in Figure 1. Females were more anxious than males about math, males were more anxious than females about reading. Both sexes were more anxious about math as compared to reading.

Results of a 2 (sex) X 4 (grade) X 2 (subject) analysis of a variance indicated a significant main effect for subject ($p .01$), sex ($p .05$), and a significant interaction for subject by sex ($p .01$). Pearson R correlations were calculated between degree of mother and father involvement and anxiety scores for math and reading. Results

FIGURE 1

Mean scores for mathematics and reading anxiety by sex and grade.



indicated only one significant relationship. Boys' math anxiety scores were related to the degree of mother involvement, high anxiety with low involvement and vice versa.

Discussion

Results of this study indicate that sex differences in attitudes toward math and reading begin as early as second grade, much earlier than the appearance of sex differences in math achievement. Anxiety in math increases for both males and females from grades 2 through 6, while reading scores appear relatively stable. Females are more afraid of math, males are more afraid of reading. Consistent differences were found at every grade level.

Results of the correlations on parental involvements suggest that mothers who are seen as being uninvolved in math have sons who have greater math anxiety and mothers involved in math have sons who have low math anxiety. This finding may suggest that a greater percentage of males seek assistance from their mothers in the elementary grades. We would expect this proportion to decrease in the high school years as the father comes to be viewed as a more appropriate information source.

Also mothers perceiving math as an important subject may give greater encouragement to their sons than their daughters and are more ready to help their sons than their daughters because it is more necessary for males' achievement.

In conclusion, the present study suggests that both boys and girls experience higher levels of math anxiety than reading anxiety. As predicted females had greater anxiety over math than the males, and males had greater anxiety with reading than females. Most importantly, these sex differences are demonstrated as early as second grade. Attitude differences in math appear much earlier than achievement differences.

In attempting to explain these sex differences, a review of the research on this topic indicates that little is known about the contributing variables which limit a woman's potential for achievement in math-related fields (e.g., medicine, economics, engineering, computer-science, business management). Likewise, it is impossible to estimate the numbers of boys who have been limited to heavily sex-typed occupations because of early avoidance of reading-related activity. Future research should involve direct intervention in the classroom where these negative attitudes have been fostered. For example, specific math achievement goals could be set for girls in a third grade classroom. Concrete reinforcement could be used to maintain optimal skills and older female students' positive math attitudes could be used as peer role models who have control of the reinforcements. Attitudes and achievement could be measured at various times during that year.

The following remediation and intervention strategies in math and reading are suggested:

1. *Math phobia clinic:* Tobias (1979) has implemented a math phobia clinic at Wesleyan which demonstrates that attitudes towards math can be changed in college age females.
2. *Role Models:* Involve parents and teachers in sex-role stereotyping workshops in order to counteract prevalent sex-role expectations concerning math and reading abilities. Fathers could be encouraged to spend time in reading activities with sons, mothers and fathers, in math related activities with daughters.
3. *Behavior modification:* Because girls characteristically are not reinforced for math achievement, a positive reinforcement for approaching math has powerful implications for remediation. Reinforcing boys for reading activities would be similarly impactful.
4. *Textbooks:* Change text content to reflect females as competent problem solvers and portray females as active, assertive thinkers. Include in basic readers images of males engaged in activities in which reading is useful and rewarding (e.g., car maintenance, airplane design, football strategy; Good & Brophy, 1977).

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A Typology of Motives and Attitudes Toward Women's Role Among Black and White Older Undergraduate Women at an Urban University

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The phenomenon of "older women" returning to college in large numbers has been widely reported and written about, but not so well researched. The study on which I will report today was undertaken because it seemed to me that answers to the questions "Who are these women, and why are they doing this?" were inadequate. Assumptions seemed to be based on casual observations or on small subgroups of the population at a particular place, and these led to biased, partial, and overgeneralized answers. Methods used to assess motives for returning to college were simplistic. The result was that the continuing education (CE) woman was often characterized—even stereotyped—as a white, middle-or upper-middle-class housewife, an empty nest mother who either a) is bored, depressed, isolated, going through middle-age identity crisis, or b) is yearning to find self-fulfillment through a new career, or both a) and b). Another assumption often presented was that the phenomenon is part of the feminist movement and a feminist attitude is characteristic of returned women students.

Having a large undergraduate CE population available to me, I undertook to study motives for returning to college. The sample consisted of 250 women randomly selected from the 1800 regularly enrolled CE undergraduates over age 25 at Temple University. The personal background characteristics of this sample definitely did not fit the stereotype and the range was wide on all personal variables. Forty-two percent of them were black, only a fourth were age 40 or older, only 12% had grown children, only half were currently married, just under half lived in the urban center (the rest commuted from outlying areas), and more than half reported household incomes of less than \$15,000. However, the sample contained enough representatives of subgroups to provide a cross-section of types according to background.

The aspects of the study on which I will report today are attempts to answer the following questions:

- 1) What distinct motive for returning to college can be identified within such a population of CE women?
- 2) Do these motives occur in particular combinations or patterns in enough individual women so that we can classify women by types based on their motive patterns?
- 3) What relationship is there between motive patterns and attitudes towards women's role (that is, feminist vs. traditional attitude)?
- 4) Are women who share a particular set of motives alike in any other ways, such as their personal background characteristics?

Without going into detail at this point, I can quickly summarize answers to these questions based on findings:

- 1) Eight distinct motives prevailed in this sample of CE students.
- 2) Yes, these motives did occur in patterns—again, and by coincidence, in eight distinct patterns. About 2/3 of the women could be classified as falling into one of the eight motive-types. The rest had uniquely individual patterns. Thus, the diversity of motives and motive-patterns did not confirm previous assumptions and stereotypes.
- 3) While the relationship of feminist attitudes to motive patterns was not clearly significant across the board, some particular relationships between categories could be seen.
- 4) Yes, some personal characteristics appeared to be associated with particular motive-types. However, I consider these findings of associated characteristics to be very tentative because of the small sample size.

A questionnaire consisting of 70 possible reasons a woman might have for continuing education was developed to measure motives. Factor analysis of responses to the items showed that eight distinct motives were discernable. Based on the content (items that loaded on each factor), the eight motive/factors were named as follows (these are presented in order of their relative importance to the group as a whole):

1. Vocational (a desire for career preparation and advancement).
2. Competency Recognition (a desire to achieve in a way that is recognized by others, to develop and use abilities, to prove oneself, meet the challenge).
3. Self-Actualizing (a desire for noncompetitive personal growth, exploration and understanding of self, learning to think and act independently).
4. Humanitarian (an altruistic desire to serve humanity, to teach and to share, to make the path easier for those who follow).
5. Family Advancement (somewhat altruistic, but the desire is to help one's own family by providing income, advantages, enriching opportunities).
6. Counteractive (reflects an effort to counteract or escape from unpleasant emotions, marital disappointment, dull life, household demands, isolation,

stagnation, feeling left out. Here, college is therapy.).

7. Interpersonal Contact (college is a place to make friends or useful contacts).
8. Social Recognition (a desire to gain in status, social acceptability, respect in the family—college is an entrance ticket).

It was obvious that a woman may not have one and only one motive in deciding to continue her education. Instead, her responses to the questionnaire items would indicate the importance of each of these eight motives to her, and a profile could be drawn for each individual. A further analysis of the motive profiles of all the women revealed that eight patterns recurred—these patterns constituted motive-types. A type was defined by the motives which were important as well as those which were unimportant.

Because of the time constraints, it is not possible today to describe all eight types, the motives which define each, and the personal characteristics that seemed to be associated with each type. However, some of the findings are of interest because they do not support widely held assumptions.

1. There was not evidence that black women, or divorced women, or low-income women are the ones who return to college mainly in order to get good jobs. Women in the one motive-type in which the Vocational motive was the sole predominant motive were more likely to be white than black and they were *not* more likely to be unmarried or low-income. Vocationally oriented women tended to be over age 40 and highly feminist.
2. Regarding the stereotyped notion of the CE woman as an affluent housewife suffering from middle-age identity crisis and boredom and wanting to expand, perhaps seeking self-fulfillment by finding a new career:

Four separate motive patterns appeared which seemed to pertain to this issue, but only one of the four was a pattern held by high-income, middle-aged white women with little responsibility for motherhood. In this pattern women had three co-existing motives—the Vocational, the Competency Recognition, and the Counteractive. So they were unhappy, wanted to prove their worth, and wanted careers, but they showed no desire for self-actualization, for personal growth as a means of resolving an assumed identity crisis. The changes these affluent unhappy women wanted to effect were practical, tangible ones.

In a second motive-pattern, self actualization was the dominant motive, but it was not accompanied by the Counteractive motive or the motive to be recognized for competency. Apparently, personal growth and understanding are goals of women who are already fairly happy and who don't feel impelled to meet achievement needs. Whatever self-fulfillment is, it does not arise from unhappiness and is not seen as being reached by proving competency. Women in this category tended to be older black

women, young single white women, and high feminist women.

Two other motive patterns, in which the motive to counteract negative emotions and aversive life circumstances was predominant, included neither a desire for self-actualization nor for career preparation. These women who came to college primarily to overcome unhappiness also had either a social motive or a desire to help the family advance. These patterns were no more typical of white, middle aged women than of other women. Thus, college as therapy is not limited to women from a particular background, and the way to counteract the blues and the blahs is not to get a job or to work on personal growth.

A general conclusion can be that we muddy the waters when we view self-fulfillment, personal growth, a new career, developing one's abilities, all as aspects of the same phenomenon—that of the unhappy middle-aged, middle-class housewife trying to resolve her identity crisis.

3. The expectation—from human development theory that in the second half of life people become more altruistic and less concerned with personal advancement was not supported in this study. Instead, it was women in their 20's and 30's who were humanitarian in their motives.
4. Findings regarding attitudes toward women's sex-role indicate that, for the sample as a whole, feminist attitudes did not seem to be strong enough to constitute a major impetus for returning to college. The sample scored about midway between neutral and complete agreement with feminist positions. A highly significant race difference in feminist attitude was found. White women were more feminist than the college norm; black women were less feminist than the college norm. Two-thirds of those in the low-feminist category were black women, while four out of five high feminists were white women. The highest feminist attitudes were found in white women under age 30 and over age 50, but their black age-counterparts were low in feminism. One possible mediating variable here is that 75% of the young black women were mothers, whereas few of the young white CEs were mothers. So, it is possible that motherhood and not age itself makes the difference. The more obvious explanation, which has been described by others, is that black women are more concerned with survival and advancement in a racist society than in a sexist society. However, the degree of feminist attitude was related to an individual's motive-type for black women, but not for white women.

Findings of factors and motive-types are preliminary and not definitive and need to be validated in replications of this study at other institutions. It was concluded from the study that many assumptions about the circumstances and motives of returned women students are unwarranted as generalizations about the group. Those of us who can affect the lives of older women students should be aware that needs, desires, and expectations vary considerably among individuals and that an individual's motives should be assessed rather than assumed.

SECTION B

MAINSTREAMING TECHNIQUES

Mainstreaming Women's Studies Into Teacher Education

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A recent study found that "over 95% of 24 of the most widely used teacher education textbooks devote less than 1% of book space to the issue of sexism" (Sadker, 1980). Additionally, this study found that textbooks in use are laden with harmful and limiting sex role stereotypes.

If the textbooks which are most widely used are any indication of what is going on in teacher education programs today, then 150,000 future teachers each year are being prepared with little or no training to reduce the sex bias endemic in this nation's schools.

Although Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments has eliminated blatant forms of sex discrimination, as in admissions and access to course offerings, a pervasive hidden curriculum still exists which reinforces sex bias. Curricular materials which are not covered by Title IX either exclude women or perpetuate stereotypes. Teachers continue to expect different academic and social behavior from girls and boys. Additionally, recent research has documented that teachers spend more time positively interacting with boys (NIE, 1979). Despite the various guidelines circulated by the publishing companies, classroom materials still use generic terms, such as, man, mankind, and he.

To counteract this obvious lack of sensitivity to women's changing roles and demands for equal educational opportunity, teacher education programs must (1) sensitize future teachers to the "hidden curriculum" which reinforces sex bias, and (2) introduce future teachers to materials and methods which they can use in their classrooms to overcome this sex bias.

At some point a stand must be taken to intervene in the vicious cycle of socialization that perpetuates sex role stereotypes from one generation to the next. It is the writer's opinion that teacher education programs can become change agents: content about the women's movement, women's contributions, research on sex differences, and ways in which teachers can promote sex equity within their classrooms, can easily and naturally be integrated into the various teacher preparation courses.

While the writer has designed and taught women's studies courses which have exclusively addressed the problem of sex bias in education, it is greatly preferable to have this content integrated into a number of teacher education courses. For one reason, most women's studies courses are elective. Secondly, when only one course addresses the subject of sex bias, the course and the instructor may be perceived as outside the mainstream with regard to public school practices and policies. It seems more logical to have a series of courses and various instructors address the issue, thus lending legitimacy and urgency to the topic.

This paper offers suggestions from the author's teaching experience as to how women's studies material may be included in five teacher education courses: Contemporary Foundations of Education, Educational Psychology, Children's Literature, Mathematics Methods, and Social Studies Methods. Contemporary Foundations and Educational Psychology are core courses for most teacher education programs; therefore, it is imperative that content dealing with sex equity be included in these courses. There are, also, many other courses that would lend themselves quite as naturally to including relevant content; for example, methods courses in reading and science, plus graduate courses in counseling and administration.

Contemporary Foundations of Education

Foundation courses usually include content relating to equal educational opportunity. Most often this goal is discussed from the standpoint of Blacks and low socio-economic groups. One excellent method of integrating content about women, (and in the process providing an overview of where women stand today, vis-a-vis education) is to take the four meanings (Levin, 1976) suggested for the phrase "equality of opportunity" and apply them to women. For example, do women have (1) equal access to the educational system regardless of social circumstances; (2) equal participation rates within the system; (3) equal educational results (achievement); and (4) equal educational results on life's chances? An examination such as this will expose women's unequal participation in mathematics, science, and vocational education courses, as well as athletics. Further, it will highlight the greater male achievement which increases with age in mathematics, science, social studies and citizenship (*U.S. News and World Report*, 1975). Finally, the unequal payoff of education for males and females (women with 4 years of college have lower incomes than men who completed only 8th grade) will be highlighted (Women's Bureau, 1979).

Additionally, Title IX, the Women's Educational Equity Act, and the 1976 Vocational Amendments should be discussed as part of a contemporary foundations course.

If the foundations course includes a brief introduction to the history of education, as many of them do, then it would be most appropriate to study the reasons behind women's entry into teaching during the 1830's and 40's. School reformers such as Horace Mann and Henry Barnard advocated women teachers for their gentle manners, superior moral character, and refining influence. In reality,

the rapid expansion of public schools made female teachers an economic necessity—women were paid approximately one third to one half of what men were paid (Russell, 1979).

Educational Psychology

Educational Psychology courses are the ideal place to discuss research relating to sex differences in intellectual abilities and personality (Maccoby, 1974). Why, when research supports differences in mathematics and visual spatial abilities only after age 10, do we continue to believe that males have a "mathematics gene" or that males have a different cognitive style (analytic) than females? Why do we continue to reinforce sex role stereotypes when research supports only one personality difference—males are more aggressive.

Educational Psychology courses should create an awareness on the student's part of various ways in which teachers unconsciously reinforce sex bias. Many core courses such as Foundations and Educational Psychology also include a field component, i.e., observation in a school setting. Teacher education students, once sensitized to the "hidden curriculum", could be required to observe for sex bias and share their findings with their class. For example, teacher education students could be asked to look for (1) exclusion or stereotypes of women in textbooks; (2) linguistic bias, such as generic terms (man, mankind, etc.); (3) direct teacher behaviors which reinforce stereotypes such as encouraging girls to the play kitchen and boys to the block area; and (4) indirect teacher behaviors such as calling on and praising boys more often than girls.

Children's Literature

Children's Literature reflects the attitudes and values of the times in which it was written. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that children's literature prior to the 1970's is replete with sexist and racist stereotypes. Boys are depicted in instrumental roles, i.e., goal directed, purposeful, problem solving, striving, and achievement oriented. Girls on the other hand are depicted in expressive roles, i.e., nurturant, more concerned with feelings and emotions, and other directed.

Future teachers must be introduced to the growing body of literature that criticizes children's books for the perpetuation of racism and sexism (Rudman, 1976).

Students in Children's Literature courses may be asked to evaluate several children's books according to the guidelines developed by the Council on Interracial Books for Children. Results of these evaluations should then be shared with their class.

Folk and fairy tales are especially vulnerable to charges of stereotyping. The typical male hero is strong, courageous, and active. The female heroine is beautiful and passive—whatever her dilemma, ultimately, she will be rescued by the male. Unfortunate metaphors dominate which equate goodness with fairness and beauty while evil is ugly and dark. Ultimately, marriage brings "happiness everafter".

Here, several suggestions may be offered to future teachers: (1) discuss the

obvious stereotypes with children (an interesting consciousness raiser is to read aloud to students a fairy tale such as "Jack the Giant Killer" or "Jack and the Beanstalk" and substitute a female name for Jack); (2) introduce children to books which portray females in leading roles demonstrating courage and determination, such as *Juile of the Wolves* by Jean George, or *Island of the Blue Dolphins* by Scott O'Dell. Also, many of the new books of realistic fiction are beginning to show both males and females in non-stereotyped roles (see books by Norma Klein).

Mathematics Methods

Women who have achieved in mathematics and science report that they received strong support and encouragement either from a teacher or parent (Fox, 1981). To counteract the prevailing notion that mathematics is a masculine domain, future teachers not only need to be conscious of the stereotype, but they also must be encouraged to provide female students with strong support and role models.

Future teachers must also be aware of the relationship between mathematics and various program areas in college. More and more, four years of mathematics in high school appear to be essential to enter programs in the physical, biological, and social sciences.

Additionally, future teachers should be knowledgeable regarding the research on visual-spatial abilities and various means whereby they can incorporate training in visual-spatial skills within their classes.

Social Studies

Since so much of our current history excludes women, it is imperative to teach content related to women's history, along with an examination of how our current definition of history excludes women.

An examination of 8 major high school history textbooks found 1103 index listings for men and 33 for women. Seventy to 88% of the illustrations were of males only or where males were dominant (MacLeod, 1973). A recent study of 27 college history textbooks noted that no book devoted more than 2% of its space to women. One way to encourage future teachers to interact with historical content about women would be to require them to develop a unit of instruction on some aspect of women's history. It would be more likely for new teachers to use curricular materials and plans that are already developed.

The writer has noted elsewhere (Zuercher, 1976) that women have been excluded from history largely due to the way we define history. History has been defined narrowly as political and military. If we included the social and intellectual aspects of history, we would have no difficulty including content about women.

Too, our history is elitist—filled with "superstars". How many little boys can realistically expect to grow up to be a president, general, or senator? Feminists are encouraging "oral histories" and the examination of community resources for information regarding the lives of local men and women who have contributed to a community's growth and development.

Recording oral histories is exciting and helps correct many fallacious ideas about

women's "passive" role. Students I have asked to do this were amazed at the number of hardships many women have endured and their obvious strength to overcome. An added positive feature was the newfound respect that the young develop for the mature as a result of these interviews.

In summary, the surface has merely been scratched with regard to the myriad ways in which content about women and their changing roles may be incorporated easily and naturally into a teacher education program. There is no excuse to continue to perpetuate damaging and limiting sex role stereotypes in this nation's schools.

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Methodologies of Integration of Scholarship About Women Into Sociology Courses

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This paper will discuss several means of integrating scholarship about women into six sociology courses I teach at Agnes Scott College and will include some comments about two others that are women's studies courses.

This presentation will of necessity introduce some of the non-traditional methods of teaching that I use in my classes, having come from a background of professional training and research experience in individualized instructional and programmed teaching/learning methodologies. Therefore, I would like to elaborate on two of these so that they will be understood within the context of "gender-balancing" my courses.

First, I rarely assign term papers, preferring instead to introduce and/or refine skills that are not so pervasive in other courses as are writing term papers, amassing entries for bibliographies, and mastering the techniques of footnoting. One of my requirements in almost every class is oral presentations—not just reading a paper, but more like conducting a seminar or leading a discussion. In this way, the students not only learn from each other and share intellectual experiences, but also amass and absorb much more information individually than is possible through time spent on papers shared only with me. In addition, they become more comfortable about speaking to groups and learn some public speaking skills.

Another prominent feature of some of my classes is "Reading Day"—a class period set aside in advance so that students can look for and bring to class current clippings and articles that are relevant to the subject matter of the course. Their materials, along with mine, are shared and discussed.

To get on with the subject of this paper, I will present each of the courses I teach and discuss methodologies for integrating material on women's issues.

1. *Social Problems*

We split this original course of five credits into two three-credit courses: one on social disorganization but called as the original, Social

Problems, and the other, *Deviant Behavior*.

Two major areas covered by almost all social problems textbooks are sex roles and family disorganization. Both of these subjects, then, automatically include women's issues. I employ several methods to enhance the textbook material and to keep the students up to date on these subjects, an absolute necessity in view of the two-year lag between writing and publication and the extreme current-day relevance of these two subjects. We have at least one Reading Day to share and discuss clippings, articles, etc., from current newspapers and magazines. Always included here are file folders of my own accumulated clippings on ERA, abortion, child-care problems, displaced homemakers, etc. Also, I bring to class any articles on pertinent women's issues that come to my attention as the course proceeds. Sometimes I xerox and distribute clippings or charts that are extremely relevant, such as those on the latest development on ERA in Georgia and current statistics on female vs. male earnings. Students are responsible for individual presentations—their own selection, with my approval, or their selections from my list. These presentations always include classics on women and current popular books on women. This current quarter's presentations included Caroline Bird's *The Two-Paycheck Marriage*, Betty Friedan's *The Feminine Mystique*, Marilyn French's *The Women's Room*, and Morton Hunt's *The World of the Formerly Married* (the last, with an emphasis on divorced and widowed women).

Occasionally, a student develops a presentation that includes something from a personal experience that has a direct bearing on the course subjects. This quarter one student (a reentry woman) spoke on a current sexist employment issue in a government organization in Atlanta where she had actually been employed for years and had been involved in some of the accountability work required in the legal suit.

Other projects in former Social Problems classes include an annotated bibliography of publications on the traditional housewife vs. the working wife/ mother and one or two-career families.

When we are dealing with problems of population, inequality, aging, minorities, unemployment, poverty, etc., in this course I try always to insert information about the special problems of women within these global problems. For instance, in dealing with racial inequities, we spend time discussing the special problems of Black women, particularly the shortage of Black men and the subsequent cruel double standard in marriages.

2. *Deviant Behavior*

In dealing with alcoholism in this course, I present, discuss, and read from my own ethnographic study on Al-Anon, the spin-off from Alcoholics Anonymous that offers help to the partners and relatives of

alcoholics. Since Al-Anon is mostly made up of the wives of alcoholics, it is particularly pertinent to focus on this organization that involves women primarily. This segment of the course also includes descriptive information on the wife/mother in the alcoholic setting. In addition, attention is given to women alcoholics who have only in recent years been "coming out of the closet."

In teaching about problems in the areas of sexual behaviors that are considered deviant, special facets related to women are emphasized including lesbianism and prostitution. I focus a great deal on the double standard and its inherent meaning that women are seen as, believed to be, and acted upon as inferior and on how this view underlies many sexual social problems involving pornography, prostitution, and rape. I understand particularly the sexist laws concerning these problems and the sexist enforcement of these laws.

Once again, there are Reading Days and presentations that always include material on women's issues.

3. *The Family*

This course automatically includes much about women. Sex roles and married working women are common features in all textbooks on the family. Presentations for this class fall into two groups: books and articles on the family in various cultures and on marriage. Female roles—those of mother/ wife and daughter—must be included in the presentations. Cultures usually include the Amish, the Hutterites, an Indian tribe, Black families, the Oneida community, an African tribe, an Appalachian community, and colonial families in the United States. Books that emphasize female roles and sexist problems include Caroline Bird's *The Two-Paycheck Marriage*, Jessie Bernard's *The Future of Marriage*, and Betty Friedan's *The Feminine Mystique*. To enhance the sexuality component of the course—and this is a part of every family textbook—I bring to class, pass around, and briefly discuss books referenced in the textbooks: *The Hite Report* (Shere Hite); *Our Bodies, Ourselves* (Boston Women's Health Book Collective); *The World of the Formerly Married* (Morton Hunt); etc.

Required reading includes Mirra Komarovsky's *Blue-Collar Marriage* and Carol Stack's *All Our Kin*—on lower-class families and on Black families, respectively. Assignments on these books have many questions related to sex roles of mothers/wives and daughters and to the socialization processes for them.

4. *The South in Transition: Explorations in Rural and Urban Sociology*

This course (as well as another, Sociology of Education) is conducted in a somewhat unique way. There are no formal tests, mid-term or final examinations in the traditional sense, or term papers. I want to cram as much reading as possible into the quarter's work. I want the students to

know comprehensively the literature on the subjects involved. While a student is typing a paper, or studying for an exam, she could read a book; while she is footnoting and compiling a bibliography or researching in the library, she could read several articles or chapters. Since this course covers three major subjects—the culture of the South, rural sociology, and urban sociology—the reading list is extensive. Weekly written assignments, participation in class, and a term project that culminates in the final exam room are used for evaluation. Throughout the reading list, there are books on women.¹ Included in suggested topics for the projects are those about women. During the entire quarter, I bring to the students' attention the paucity or complete lack of material on women, the few entries or total absence of entries in the indexes of major works they read. Of course, Anne Firor Scott's historical work, *The Southern Lady*, is a required book. Project topics this year include "The Southern Lady in Transition," "Southern Black Women in Transition," and "The Southern Family in Transition with an Emphasis on Women."

5. *Sociology of Education*

As stated before, this class is conducted like The South in Transition class.

Since the family and education go hand in hand in the socialization of children, family as a socialization process almost has to be included in parts of this course. Therefore, several readings on the subject are required. Threaded throughout such material are sex roles for mothers and female children and much about their socialization.

In Bernard Wishy's *The Child and the Republic*, the author begins by including a discussion of conflicting tendencies of American life using Hester and Pearl of *The Scarlet Letter* to show such conflict and its effect on women and child nurturing. By contemplating this introductory material and reading this book on "the dawn of modern child nurture," the students are exposed to many facets of sex roles and mothering of those early times that seep through even into today's culture, socialization processes, and formal education that form early sex-role stereotyping and the inferior position of women.

A required reading in this course is Ray Rist's classic² on the self-fulfilling prophecy. This article reports on research on ghetto Black children and treatment of the boys and girls individually. Another reading is George Spindler's study³ on the problems of a middle-class white female student in an elementary school. Also, the students read in Sarane Beacock's book⁴ the chapter on the relationship of sex and school performance and how the inferior female role is taught and learned.

In readings from Hope Jensen Leichter's books *The Family as*

Educator and Families and Communities as Educators, the students learn a great deal about the impact of family on the development of sex roles and stereotyping.

Specific research work on women and education like Martina Horner's⁵ are also introduced.

6. *Methodology and Analysis in Social Research*

Even in this class I have managed to insert specifics about women. First, because most students enter the class with the preconceived notion that jobs and careers in research are essentially comprised of work that involves amassing statistical data—boring—and producing intricate tables—boring—I share with them the various tasks that I (and female colleagues) have had during my affiliation since 1967 with an organization for research in the behavioral sciences. In this manner they are made aware of a variety of diverse occupational opportunities and choices in the area of research. I have amassed a great deal of material about this work, and to get my point across I bring to class RFP's (requests for proposals), proposals, final reports, and products for them to review and discuss.

In addition, I share with them all the components of a large nationwide project—from RFP to final report, including instruments, workshop material for data collection in the field, etc.—in which I was involved just prior to my coming to Agnes Scott. The project just happens to be one on sex equity in vocational education settings!

7. *Two Women's Studies Seminars*

Although I am in the process of getting the word *female* inserted in the title of one of these one-hour seminars and thus it is not technically a women's studies course yet, for all practical purposes it is such a course already. This is a seminar entitled Human Sexuality and the Female College Student. One of the supplementary books is *The Hite Report*. In addition to the obvious emphasis on female sexuality in this seminar in general, I include a specific component on the sexuality of older women so that they will have some understanding of the sexuality of their mothers and other older female relatives as well as some idea of themselves as they age. There is of course a textbook on human sexuality for this class—it is written by three women.⁶ In addition, the students read an excellent new book on college students and sexuality whose four authors are women.⁷ Three-quarters of the material in this book is taken from the journals of male and female students in a college class on sexuality.

The other seminar is *The Reentry Woman*. We use two books for this course: Pam Mendelsohn's *Happier by Degrees* and—once again—Bird's *The Two-Paycheck Marriage*.

In both these seminars other books and clippings on women are

brought to class and shared.

With each year I am a teacher and with each class I teach, I become more aware of the imperative necessity for gender-balancing my course, and I try to put forth more effort in this direction wherever and whenever possible, practical, and relevant.

FOOTNOTES

¹*Hillbilly Women* (Kathy Kahn); *Mothers of the South* (Margaret Hagood); *Becoming a Woman in Rural Black Culture, Generations, Women in the South* (Molly C. Dougherty); *Coming of Age in Mississippi* (Anne Moody), etc.

²Ray C. Kist, "The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy of the Ghetto School," *Harvard Educational Review*, Reprint Series no. 5.

³George D. Spindler, "Beth Anne—A Case Study of Culturally Defined Adjustment and Teacher Perceptions," in George D. Spindler, editor, *Education and Cultural Process* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1974).

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Woman's Point of View in a Freshman Literature Course

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A distinct imbalance exists between the opportunities that have traditionally been offered in literary study for examining woman's, as opposed to man's, point of view in important matters of the conduct of life. This can be remedied to some extent by adding to curricula works by women, but there is also room for reinterpretation of great works by men—Homer, Chaucer, Shakespear—whose even-handed treatment of the sexes has not been fully recognized, because most critics have been men and because women themselves are often oriented to, or uncritical of, a strongly masculine point of view.

The point can be illustrated by a brief examination of three works by men that are included in my freshman course at Hollins, *The Tempest* and *Other Magic*. These are *The Taming of the Shrew*, *The Odyssey*, and John Fowles' *The Magus*.

It is possible to interpret—or misinterpret—each of these works from a strictly male point of view or to remain unaware that they hold that point of view up for criticism. Thus Petruchio, the tamer of Kate, can be seen simply as a hero rough and determined enough to bully an intractable wife into submission. At an extreme, this reading would suggest that women, like Soviet Russia, only understand physical force and that Kate submits at the end only because she is afraid to do otherwise. But of course Shakespeare intends no such thing, and what is on the surface a crude farce is actually a sensitive revelation of the growth of mutual respect and loving cooperation in marriage.

Kate has been made into a shrew by the outrageous favoritism of her father, Baptista, for her sister Bianca; and Bianca, in her turn, has further maddened Kate by hypocritically playing the docile and obedient daughter in order to win from Baptista whatever her heart desires.

Petruchio begins in the role of a rather vulgar fortune-seeker whose main qualifications for wooing are military experience and a gift for play-acting. Faced by the strident hostility of Kate, he resolves to outdo her excess of willfulness. At the

same time, he pretends to be the solicitous wooer and husband, fully appreciative of Kate's imagined perfections. But what starts as a travesty merges slowly into truth as Petruchio begins in fact to perceive that an estimable Kate actually does exist under her defensive antagonism.

While doing battle, Kate and Petruchio develop an admiration for each other's spirit, humor and intelligence that issues finally in a public revelation of their love for and confidence in one another. At the wedding feast of Bianca and Lucentio, Bianca, being safely married, shows herself for the spoiled darling that she is, while Kate, to make her point clear to her detractors, borrows from the conventional rhetoric of wifely duty to show up Bianca, restore her own self-esteem, and demonstrate her real love for her husband. Any notion that Kate believes woman's proper role to be unquestioning subservience should be dispelled by the relish with which she shows up her father, former suitors and Bianca, and by Petruchio's admiring pleasure in her wit, resolution and integrity.

The Odyssey can be read as uncritical adulation of a great hero's exploits in overcoming a long series of bizarre obstacles that stand between him and his desired return to his wife and son and island kingdom. Penelope, in this reading, enacts the passive role of wife and mother, praiseworthy as notably patient and faithful, but significant principally as the goal and the reward of the hero's adventures.

Such a reading of course does violence to Homer's poem. *The Odyssey* is in fact a masterly exposition of the mutual dependence of male and female in creating not a heroic individual of either sex but a heroic man and woman, a divinely inspired and sanctioned king and queen.

Penelope uses her ample resources of dignity, courage and ingenuity to keep at bay the brutal suitors who threaten, during Odysseus' long absence, to demolish the very values upon which civilized life must rest, to waste the family's substance, even to murder her son. In carrying out her lonely and difficult task, she is assisted by Pallas Athena, who has given her a noble mind, the ability to make beautiful things, and, most significantly, abundant wiles. These qualities enable her to preserve herself as the essential other half of the new world that will be established when Odysseus, also assisted by Athena, is ready at last to do his part in clearing out the anarchic crowd whose presence in his home makes visible the destructive imbalance of Penelope's life without him and of his without her.

Though the return of Odysseus is essential to setting things straight in Ithaca, it must be remembered that the cause of those difficulties was his absence from home in order to gain fame in the Trojan War. The dehumanizing effect of war upon Odysseus, in inflating his pride and dulling his sensibilities, is precisely what gives meaning to the long series of mishaps that marks his journey home. Under the guidance of Athena, he is progressively stripped of his followers, his possessions, his very identity. He must finally approach his home disguised as an aged beggar and must then be subjected to violent abuse and humiliation while maintaining iron patience and restraint. Athena is, in my experience, the most complete and distinguished embodiment in literature of power and resourcefulness combined

with the gift of persuasion, a moderation that alone can transmute heroic aggressiveness into humane leadership. With regard to both Penelope and Odysseus, Athena's preeminence in *The Odyssey* suggests that the spirit of woman is instrumental in engendering and preserving the values, institutions and usages of civil human beings in a civilized society.

Our third example, John Fowles' novel *The Magus*, is ironic in the modern mode. Here the anti-hero or incorrigible male Everyman is pitted against a female-oriented script in which he inadvertently plays a grubby part. His temptation by the Artemis-like phantom, Lily, is frequently taken to be a kind of teasing version of a genuine paradise of promised sexual conquest and surrender, a wish-fulfillment that seems particularly perverse in readers who are young women.

The anti-hero in question, Nicholas Urfe, is put forward by Fowles as grimly representative of the modern male: that is, faithless, sexually aggressive and exploitative, selfish, self-deluded, emotionally dishonest and incapable of love. That this person should be viewed sympathetically by young women suggests that, for all their increasing awareness of woman's dignity and value, these women are subject to dangerous delusions.

The tenuous charm of Nicholas Urfe vanishes rapidly when the reader can be persuaded to look at the facts of his character, behavior and attitudes. The temptress, Lily, seen through the eyes of Nicholas, assumes first an unearthly charm and perfection, then a powerful sexual appeal, and finally a mixture of the two in which her unattainability plays off against her provocation and proximity. But though Nicholas can simultaneously see Lily as Artemis and Aphrodite, he is blind to her as Fury until her vengeance is upon him. Then his pride does suffer excruciating pain.

Lily's opposite number, Nicholas' former lover Alison, is as real as Lily is illusory. She is depicted in the novel as honest, good-hearted, faithful and wise save only in loving Nicholas. When the readers whom I have mentioned give up hope for the alliance between Nicholas and Lily, they readily transfer their expectations back to Nicholas and Alison. But Fowles is not about to gratify such expectations. Alison at last becomes so enraged and disgusted with Nicholas that she is unable to believe even his most earnest protestations of love. The final pages leave Nicholas suspecting that he is in some way permanently incomplete and deformed. Disburdened of Nicholas, Alison remains confirmed as the type of a real, loyal and loving woman, and her extraordinary value as such receives strong emphasis, together with the fact that such women are too often betrayed by loveless predatory males.

Men, says Fowles' Magus, see objects; women, relationships. I do not necessarily commit myself to that view. However, like much that is suggested about the relationships between the sexes in *The Taming of the Shrew*, *The Odyssey*, and elsewhere, the observation can be usefully provocative to women who are themselves the subject of study as students of literature.

Integrating Women's Studies Perspectives Into the Philosophy Curriculum

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Now that we have had a chance to start exploring issues of special interest to women and to teach them in special women's studies courses, it is time to start systematically integrating our new insights and perspectives into the regular curriculum. This procedure is necessary in order to confer upon them the academic legitimacy they deserve, and to introduce *all* students (not just the "converted") to new concerns and new ways of looking at the world. Unless these aims are achieved, there is not much hope of widespread support for the improvement of women's position in society.

How can this goal be met in the context of philosophy courses? A three-pronged attack is required.

First, we must look with a fresh eye at writings which have been influential in our culture. For instance, consider the usual approach to Aristotle's *Ethics* and *Politics*, sections of which are frequently encountered in courses such as Introduction to Philosophy, Ethics, Political and Social Philosophy, and History of Philosophy. Considerable attention is often paid to his claims about the place of "natural slaves" in society: "natural slaves" have a subordinate position because they are not very bright.¹ Aristotle gives a similar argument for the subordination of women to their husbands. The passage about women is often ignored, or worse, accepted as obviously true. Yet there are no grounds for holding that the slaves are philosophically interesting, whereas women are not: both passages raise important questions about justice and equality. Why is a certain level of intelligence required for full citizenship? What are the criteria for judging the intelligence of individuals? What evidence is there that all males are more intelligent than all females? What role do social factors play in the development of intelligence? Are there any biological differences between males and females, such as reproductive functions, which justify female subordination? And so forth. Bringing lesser-known works of Aristotle (such as *The Generation of Animals*,²) and pieces by other writers to bear

on these often-read passages, and probing the whole for dubious premises and fallacious reasoning is essential if students are to develop an accurate understanding of our culture and sharpen their analytical skills.

Plausible candidates for such re-examination are major figures such as Plato, Kant, Rousseau, Hegel, and Mill. Anthologies like Rosemary Agonito's *History of Ideas on Women* have facilitated such work.

The second task is to add issues having a special impact on women to problem-oriented courses. The main issue of this sort commonly dealt with is abortion. Although abortion needs to be discussed, I fear that the topic is too difficult for elementary courses. More useful, I think, would be substituting a unit on contraception. It raises similar issues (the moral value of "the nature!", control over one's body and life, etc.) without the complicating feature of fetus' rights which beginning philosophy students are not really equipped to deal with.

Much more could be done. Many issues of special interest to women also raise general questions that concern everybody. These issues could replace certain "standard" topics. Thus, instead of reading up on the usual Jehovah's Witness transfusion case, the question of medical paternalism could be raised via reading on contraceptive decisions (including the current controversy over whether to permit companies to market overseas drugs like DepoProvera banned by the FDA in the United States). There is furthermore no need to stick to old questions: entirely new issues can be raised, such as the morality of artificial reproductive technologies, and, in more advanced courses, discussion of the morality of home birth. Adding topics such as these to ethics courses is relatively easy, but much work remains to be done on other standard courses in the curriculum.

I have begun work on this job by adding issues such as affirmative action to Philosophy of Education. One such topic is whether the two sexes should be educated differently. Students in philosophy of education courses often read passages from Rousseau's *Emile*³ on a young boy's education. However, unless they also read Chapter 5, they may well assume that all these recommendations are meant for young girls, too. It is therefore very instructive to introduce classes to Rousseau's opinions on girls. He concedes that the sexes complement each other, and contribute to a common end, but then concludes that "woman is specially made for man's delight."⁴ He goes on: "A woman's education must therefore be planned in relation to man. To be pleasing in his sight, to win his respect and love, to train him in childhood, to tend him in manhood, to counsel and console, to make his life pleasant and happy, these are the duties of women for all time, and this is what she should be taught while she is young...."⁵ She should not be taught to read, but should be kept busy and accustomed to restraint: only thus will she be able to live in the subjection to man which is her lot.

One might argue that spending time on such a passage is a mere orgy of self-pity for the women and pointless for the men, but it is necessary to give students an accurate view of Rousseau. Furthermore, analyzing his arguments is an excellent exercise in reasoning and prepares students to deal with contemporary versions of

them. Finally, seeing the whole philosophy helps students realize that it might not be desirable to simply try to apply what he says about boys to all children. Emile's education pre-supposes Sophie's, and so the former's is seriously warped: he grows up expecting a Sophie to be his slave. Is this an expectation we want to instill in every child? Kant's writings raise similar questions.

Another class where insights from women's studies can be used is Logic, where careful use of examples can often spark interesting discussion. "Abortion is wrong because it is murder" is an example of the fallacy of begging the question. "Women bear children, therefore they ought to have chief responsibility for raising them" commits the fallacy of irrelevant reason. When we study syllogisms, I show that a common argument against abortion is invalid because it contains four terms instead of the required three. ("Fetuses are human," "All humans have a right to life," therefore "Fetuses have a right to life." But "human" means "homo sapiens" in the first sentence, and "moral agent" in the second.)

There is considerable scope for consciousness-raising in other courses. The late Jane English has suggested that philosophy of language courses take up the debate about "chairman," that philosophy of science courses use sexism as an example of bias in psychology, and that metaphysics inquire into the concept of a person.⁶

One device for sharpening students' perceptions about differences in men's and women's place in society is assigning passages from anti-feminist literature to analyze in a paper. This has worked quite well in Introduction to Philosophy, even in the absence of specific units on women. It is certainly preferable to any attempt to raise such questions by thrusting them into a context which doesn't seem natural, as I learned to my dismay two years ago. Sometime after the end of the course, a student confided to me that she and some of her friends had decided that I must have been badly wounded by men sometime earlier in my life!

The third task is the hardest, yet perhaps the most crucial in affecting students' views about justice for women. It is to find ways to present basic topics like "justice" and "equality" in a complete and unbiased way in ethics and political philosophy courses. Such standard topics are difficult because one needs to tear oneself away from approaches and materials pounded into one from graduate school days. I plan to attack this problem in a couple of different ways. One is to expand the material used in Ethics and Feminism, a women's studies course I teach. Another is to adapt some materials used in Philosophy of Law. Last fall I taught this course with a general theoretical introduction, followed by an eight week examination of Supreme Court decisions on discrimination.⁷ This gave students a clear notion of the history of legal discrimination in this country, as well as a detailed understanding of the moral questions and dilemmas raised by the concept of discrimination. With it, they naturally acquired some ideas about the closely related notions of justice and equality.

It should be clear that much remains to be done in order to integrate the curriculum fully. I have applied for a grant from the Women's Educational Equity Act Program to pursue these problems next year, and I would certainly appreciate

Appendix

"SCHOLARS AND WOMEN" CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS

- | | |
|---|--|
| William Aiken (Chatham College) | Hilda Kahne (Wheaton College) |
| John Allen (Hollins College) | Susan Kellogg (Sweet Briar College) |
| President Alberta Arthurs (Chatham College) | Elizabeth Kennedy (SUNY/ Buffalo) |
| Mary W. Atwell (Hollins College) | Carol Kolmerten (Hood College) |
| Susan Bales (Women's College Coalition) | Heleen E. Longino (Mills College) |
| Barbara Bergman (University of Maryland) | Audrey Maslin (Hood College) |
| Anne Briscoe (Columbia University) | Judith McIlwee (Salem College) |
| Inzer Byers (Salem College) | Arthur R. Poskovic (Hollins College) |
| William Chafe (Duke University) | Laura Purdy (Wells College) |
| Caroline Dillman (Agnes Scott College) | Elaine Reuben (National Women's Studies Association) |
| Joan Douglas (Skidmore College) | Sue V. Rosser (Mary Baldwin College) |
| Todd Fay (Salem College) | Anne Russ (Wells College) |
| President Alice Emerson (Wheaton College) | Dorothy Russell (Salem College) |
| Rosalind Ekman* (Wheaton College) | Provost Ruth Schmidt (Wheaton College) |
| Roberta Fernandez (Mills College) | Sheila Shaw (Wheaton College) |
| Charlotte Goodman (Skidmore College) | Arthur Smith (Chatham College) |
| Margaret Guyder (Skidmore College) | Alan Soble (Wheaton College) |
| Mary Mitchell Harris (Spelman College) | Catharine Stimpson (Rutgers University) |
| Dean Thomas Hershberger (Chatham College) | Dean Clark Thompson (Salem College) |
| Dean Frances Hoffman (Skidmore College) | Marianne Triplette (Salem College) |
| Charlotte Hogsett (Mary Baldwin College) | Trudy Villars (Wheaton College) |
| Florence Howe (Feminist Press) | Joanna Zangrando (Skidmore College) |

*Listed in the program as Rosalind E. Ladd.

**CONFERENCE ON
"SCHOLARS AND WOMEN" PROGRAM**

March 13-15, 1981

Center of Continuing Education,
The University of Maryland,
College Park, Maryland

Friday, March 13

2:00-2:30 *Opening Session*
Chair, Inzer Byers, Salem College

2:30-3:30 *Opening Address*
Catharine Stimpson, "Scholarship About Women: The State of the
Art"
Professor of English, Douglass College, Rutgers University;
editor of *Signs*, 1975-1980
Chair: Dean Thomas Hershberger, Chatham College

3:30-4:00 **COFFEE**

4:00-5:15 **STUDIES ABOUT WOMEN: WHAT ARE OUR OWN
FACULTY DOING?**

Session A: THE HUMANITIES

Carol Kolmerten, "Egalitarian Promises and Inegalitarian Practices: Women's Roles in the American Owenite Communities, 1824-1828."

English, Hood College

Mary W. Atwell, "Elsie Dinmore . . . Haunting the Minds of Millions of Women."

History, Hollins College

Sheila Shaw, "The Female Alcoholic in English and American Literature."

English, Wheaton College

Chair: Joanna Zangrando, Skidmore College

Session B: THE SCIENCES

Sue V. Rosser and Charlotte Hogsett, "Darwinism and Sexism: Victorian Courses, Contemporary Effects."

Biology, French, Mary Baldwin College

Helen E. Longino, "Scientific Objectivity and Feminist Theorizing."
Philosophy, Mills College

Trudy Villars, "Sexual Dimorphism in the Brain and Behavior: An Analysis of the Evidence and the Concept."

Psychology, Wheaton College

Chair: Margaret Guyder, Skidmore College

Session C: SOCIAL SCIENCES

Marianne Triplette, "The Changing Theory of Institutional Discrimination."

Sociology, Salem College

Anne Russ, "Collegiate Women and Institutional Change, 1875-1921."

Director of Career Services, Wells College.

Work done with Garlyn Casaday (Wheaton), Kathryn Moore (Penn State University) and Charlotte Shza (Mt. Holyoke).

Hilda Kahne, "Women and Social Security: Social Policy Adjusts to Social Change."

Economics, Wheaton College

Susan Kellogg, "Aztec Women in the 16th Century: Kinship, Religion and Law."

Anthropology/Sociology, Sweet Briar College

Chair: Dean Frances Hoffman, Skidmore College

5:30-6:30 CASH BAR

6:30-7:30 DINNER

8:00 FILM SHOWING

Saturday, March 14

8:15 CONTINENTAL BREAKFAST

9:00-10:30 WOMEN'S STUDIES: HOW FAR HAVE WE COME IN
SELECTED DISCIPLINES?

Session A: HISTORY

William Chafe, "The Changing Shape of Historical Scholarship:
The Feminist Impact."

Professor of History, Duke University
Chair: Inzer Byers, Salem College

Session B: ANTHROPOLOGY

Elizabeth Kennedy, "How Far Have We Come?: Anthropology and
Women's Studies."

Associate Professor of American Studies/Women's Studies,
SUNY/Buffalo
Chair: Susan Kellogg, Sweet Briar College

Session C: ECONOMICS

Barbara Bergman, "Introducing the Feminist Perspective into
Social Science Research and Social Science Teaching."

Professor of Economics, University of Maryland
Chair: Dean Frances Hoffman, Skidmore College

Session D: WOMEN AND SCIENCE

Anne Briscoe, "Do You Really Need a Y Chromosome to Succeed in
Science?"

Director of the Bio-Chemical Laboratory, Harlem Hospital
Center; Assistant Professor of Medicine, Columbia University
Chair: Dean Thomas Hershberger, Chatham College

10:30-11:00 COFFEE

11:00-12:00 THE IMPACT OF SCHOLARSHIP ABOUT WOMEN

Florence Howe, "Teaching Strategic Knowledge: Transforming the
Curriculum in the 70s."

Professor of Humanities, SUNY/Old Westbury, the editor of
Feminist Press
Chair: Dean Frances Hoffman, Skidmore College

12:30-1:30 LUNCH

**2:00-3:30 STUDIES ABOUT WOMEN: WHAT ARE OUR OWN
FACULTY DOING?**

Session A: SEX ROLE ISSUES IN THE CLASSROOM

William Aiken, "Male Instructors and Women's Studies."

Philosophy, Chatham College

Arthur R. Poskovic, "Female Sex-Role Violations: Suggesting a
Two-Dimensional Model."

Sociology, Hollins College

Mary Mitchell Harris, "Predicting the Null in Women's Research
with Black Populations."

Psychology, Spelman College

Joan Douglas, "Sex Differences in Math and Reading Avoidance."

Psychology, Skidmore College

Audrey Maslin, "A Typology of Motives and Attitudes Toward
Women's Role Among Black and White Older Under-
graduate Women at One Urban University."

Psychology, Hood College

Chair: Todd Fay, Salem College

Session B: WOMEN AND WORK

Rosalind E. Ladd, "Women and Medicine."

Philosophy, Wheaton College

Judith Mellwee, "Work Satisfaction Among Women in Non-
Traditional Blue Collar Occupation."

Sociology, Salem College

Alan Sobel, "Why Should More Women Be Scientists?"

Philosophy, Wheaton College

Chair: Arthur Smith, Chatham

3:30-4:00 COFFEE

**4:00-5:30 HOW DO WE INTEGRATE THE NEW SCHOLARSHIP
ABOUT WOMEN?**

Session A: METHODOLOGIES FOR THE HUMANITIES

Roberta Fernandez, "Approaching the Ethnic Woman Writer."

Ethnic Studies, Mills College

John A. Allen, "Themes Concerning Women in a Freshman English

Course: *'The Tempest and Other Magic.'* "

English, Hollins College

Laura M. Purdy, "On Integrating Women's Studies into the
Philosophy, Wells College

Chair: Dean Clark Thompson, Salem College

Session B: SOCIAL SCIENCE STRATEGIES

Caroline M. Dillman, "Methodologies of Integration of Scholarship About Women into Sociology Courses."

Sociology, Agnes Scott College

Dorothy Russell, "Mainstreaming Women's Studies into Teacher Education."

Education, Salem College

Charlotte Goodman, Joan Douglas, Joanne Zangrando, "General Education and Women: Interdisciplinary Approaches."

English, Psychology, American Studies, Shidmore College

Chair: Hilda Kahne, Wheaton College

5:30-6:30 CASH BAR

6:30-7:30 DINNER

8:00-9:30 THE CLIMATE FOR WOMEN'S STUDIES: WOMEN'S
COLLEGES AND THE OTHER 99%

Susan Bales, "The Learning Environment at Women's Colleges."

Research Associate, Women's College Coalition

Elaine Reuben, "Women's Studies Programs: Current Issues."

Director, National Women's Studies Association

Chair: Provost Ruth Schmidt, Wheaton College

Sunday, March 15:

9:00-10:30 WOMEN'S COLLEGES: PIONEERING THE FUTURE

President Alberta Arthurs, Chatham College, and President Alice Emerson, Wheaton.

11:00

BRUNCH AND CLOSING DISCUSSION:

WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

An open discussion among conference participants

Chair: Inzer Byers, Salem College